SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2006 Supreme(SC) 130

2006(2) Supreme 162
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & R.V. Raveendran, JJ.
S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills P. Ltd. —Appellant
versus
Union of India & Anr. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6777 of 2003
(With Civil Appeal Nos. 6778 to 6780 of 2003)
Decided on 15-2-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : S.S. Rana, B. Rana, Vikrant Rana, Ms. Amaya Singh, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Advocate, C.V. Subba Rao, Ajay Sharma, B.K. Prasad and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advocates.

Important point
Unless a different intention appears the repeal in a statute shall not affect any right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment repealed.

Headnote:Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952—Section 16 —Amendment Act 10 of 1998 to delete Section 16(1)(d) of the Act to take away benefit of “infancy protection” for period of three years from the date of establishment of Industry—Writ petition challenging the amendment—High Court dismissed writ holding that amendment was intended to take away certain benefits and question as to whether any vested right were sought to be affected would arise only when provisions were given retrospective operation—Appeal—Question was the effect of amendment on existing rights—Effect of repeal as dealt with in Section 6 of General Clauses Act—Unless a different intention appeared, repeal shall not affect any right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment repeal—Appellants were entitled to protection as had accrued to them prior to amendment in 1997—Impugned judgment was liable to be set aside.

       Held : Unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment repeal. The effect of the amendment in the instant case is the same. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. (See Keshav Madhavan Memon v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128). But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’. In the words of LORD BLANESBURG, “provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.” (See Delhi Cloth Mills & General Co. Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi AIR 1927 PC 242). “Every statute, it has been said”, observed LOPES, L.J., “which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect.” (See Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi Sitharamamma AIR 1965 SC 1970). As a logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. (See Reid v. Reid, (1886) 31 Ch D 402). In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for determining the scope of the retrospectivity intended by Parliament. (See Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (AIR 1989 SC 1933). The above position has been highlighted in “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by Justice G.P. Singh. (Tenth Edition, 2006) at PP. 474 and 475). In The State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa & Others (1974(1) SCC 19) and in Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors. (1997(6) SCC 623), this Court held that provision which operates to affect only the future rights without affecting the benefits or rights which have already accrued or enjoyed, till the deletion, is not retrospective in operation. Above being the legal position, the judgments of the High Court are indefensible and are set aside. The appellants shall be entitled to the protection as had accrued to them prior to the amendment in 1997 for the period of 3 years starting from the date the establishment was set up irrespective of repeal of the provision for such infancy protection. (Paras 17 to 20)

Judgment

Arijit Pasayat, J.—These four appeals involve common points of law and, therefore, are disposed of by this judgment which shall govern each one of them. Appellant in each appeal has questioned correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed before the High Court praying issuance of a writ of mandamus to declare that Act 10 of 1998 seeking to amend provisions of Section 16 of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short the ‘Act’) shall not apply to the writ petitioners and they would continue to have the “infancy protection” for the period of 3 years starting from the date of establishment of the industry. The High Court by the impugned judgments dismissed the writ petitions holding that the amendment was intended to take away certain benefits by way of necessary amendments to Section 16 and the question as to whether any vested right are sought to be affected would arise only when the provisions are given retrospective operation.

2. It was held that the real intention was to deal with the establishments universally on equal footing under the provisions of the Act and, therefore, no exemption whatsoever was intended to be provided in favour of any establishment. On and from date of enforcement of the amended provisions all establishments including the establishments who had enjoyed the benefit of exemption are brought within the purview of the operation of the Act and they in no way alter any of the rights accrued in favour of the writ petitioners’ establishments.

3. The factual scenario needs to be noted in brief as the controversy is whether the appellants are entitled to the protection as claimed.

At the time of enactment of the Act :

Name of the Sri Lakshmi Navya Jute Mills Srinivasa Jute Sitaram Lakshmi appellant Srinivasa Mills Jute Mills

Civil Appeal No. 6777/2003 6778/2003 6779/2003 6780/2003

Commencement of November April 1, 1996 August 19, February 19, infancy period/ 17, 1995 1997 1997 commercial production

Expiry of infancy November March 31, August 20, February 18, period as per 16, 1998 1999 2000 2000 Section 16(d) as claimed by appellant

Date of Ordinance September September September September No. 17/1997 22, 1997 22, 1997 22, 1997 22, 1997

Date of omission of June 22, June 22, June 22, June 22, Section 16(d) (vide 1998 w.e.f. 1998 w.e.f. 1998 w.e.f. 1998 w.e.f. Act 10/1998) 22.9.1997 22.9.1997 22.9.1997 22.9.1997

Balance infancy 1 year 1 year 2 years 2 years period to be available 1 month 6 months 10 month 5 month 24 days 8 days 28 days 26 days

4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court has clearly erred in holding that the accrued rights were in no way affected or altered. In fact, under the un-amended provisions the appellants were entitled to the protection for the infancy period as provided in the Act.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that in public interest the amendment can be done and this is a case where keeping the ultimate welfare of the workers in view the amendment was made and the exemption was not granted to any category of establishment. That according to learned counsel for the respondents meet the requirements of law and the judgment of the High Court is therefore not open to challenge.

6. The position of Section 16 at different points of time can be noticed. Section 16 as originally enacted read as follows :

“16. Act not to apply to factories belonging to Government or local authority and also to infant factories.

This Act shall not apply to-

(a) any factory belonging to the government or a local authority, and

(b) any other factory established whether before or after the commencement, of this Act unless three years have elapsed from its establishment.

7. Section 16 was amended by the Employees’ Provident Funds (Amendment) Act, 1958 and sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Principal Act was substituted as under :

“(1) This Act shall not

































Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top