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2006 Supreme(SC) 189

2006(2) Supreme 363
Supreme Court of India
(From Rajasthan High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
Dinesh @ Buddha —Appellant
versus
State of Rajasthan —Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 2006
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5753 of 2005)
Decided on 28-2-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Nalin Kumar Jain, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Aruneshwar Gupta, AAG, Naveen Kumar Singh, Advocate.

Important PointCorroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case.

Headnote:(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376(2)(f)—Rape—Testimony of victim of sexual assault in absence of corroboration—Evidence of such victim is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding—Corroboration is not sine-qua non for conviction in a rape case.

       Held : In the Indian Setting refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society and when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. A woman or a girl who is raped is not an accomplice. Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. (Para 11)

       (ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Rape—Punishment or sentence—Measure of punishment can not depend upon social status of victim or accused—It must depend on conduct of accused, state and age of sexually assaulted female and gravity of criminal act.

       Held : The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years, as in this case, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence by the Court. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. (Para 12)

       (iii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376(2)(f)—8 year old victim subject to sexual assault by appellant—Sentence—Trial Court awarded sentence of life imprisonment with fine Rs. 2000/- and State to pay compensation of Rs. 50,000/—High Court upheld conviction and sentence—Appeal—Sentence of life imprisonment was awarded keeping in view offence u/s 3(2)(v) under Atrocities Act also proved—Offence under Atrocities Act found not attracted—Sentence u/s 376(2)(f) IPC would not per se become life imprisonment—Sentence reduced to minimum prescribed i.e. 10 years imprisonment —Since State had not filed appeal, award of compensation of Rs. 50,000 by State to victim could not be interfered with.

       Held : In view of the finding that Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act is not applicable, the sentence provided in Section 376(2)(f) IPC does not per se become life sentence. Though learned counsel for the State submitted that even in a case covered under Section 376(2)(f) IPC, imprisonment for life can be awarded, it is to be noted that minimum sentence of 10 years has been statutorily provided and considering the attendant circumstances the imprisonment for life in a given case is permissible. Neither the Trial Court nor the High Court has indicated any such factor. Only by applying Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act the life sentence was awarded. Therefore, the sentence is reduced to 10 years with a fine of Rs. 2000/- in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for one year. The other question is legality of the compensation awarded. Since the State has not challenged the award of compensation, it is not open to it to question the legality of the award in the present appeal filed by the accused. Therefore, State’s challenge to the legality and/or quantum of compensation awarded is without merit. The amount shall be paid to the victim if not already paid within a period of eight weeks. (Para 16)

       (iv) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989—Section 3(2)(v)—Sine qua non for application was that offence must have been committed against a person on ground that such person is member of S.C. and S.T.

       Held : Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that an offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste. In the absence of evidence to that effect, Section 3(2)(v) has no application. Had Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act been applicable then by operation of law, the sentence would have been imprisonment for life and fine. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted.

2. An eight years old girl was sexually ravished by the appellant is what was alleged and for that the appellant faced trial. The victim suffered ignominy on 5.2.1998. The appellant has been found guilty of offence punishable under Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) read with Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short the ‘Atrocities Act’). The appellant was directed to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and the State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the victim.

3. Background facts are essentially as follows :

On 5.2.1998 the victim had gone to witness a marriage procession in the night. When she was coming back to her house in the night at about 12 O’ clock the accused sexually assaulted her. She was threatened that if she disclosed about the incident to anybody, she would be killed. Suffering from the acute pain the victim told her sister, mother and grandmother about the incident. The matter was reported to the police. The accused person was arrested; medical tests were conducted both in respect of the accused and the victim, and after completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. The Trial Court found the accused guilty of the offences charged under Section 376(2) IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act and sentenced him. The appeal before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, did not bring any relief to the accused.

4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence is not credible and cogent. There are many inconsistencies in the evidence, more particularly, of the victim (PW-8). This is not a case where life imprisonment could have been awarded. In any event there is no material to bring in application of Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act. It is further submitted that the appellant belongs to the lowest economic strata of society who could not even afford to engage a lawyer at any stage. Even during trial and before the High Court, lawyers were engaged at State’s cost. The young age of the accused should also be taken into consideration.

5. In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that though Section 3(2) (v) of the Atrocities Act may not be applicable, but imposition of life sentence is also permissible in a case covered under Section 376(2)(f) IPC. It is also submitted that the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- directed to be paid by the State, should be set aside.

6. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity - it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty (AIR 1996 SC 922), the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim’s most cherished of the Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to Life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’) The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos.

7. We do not pro


















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