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1989 Supreme(SC) 632

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KAYASTHA PATHSHALA, allahabad
Versus
RAJENDRAPRASAD
Decided on, December 8, 1989

Advocates:
A.K.SRIVASTAVA, Mukul Mudgal, S.DIXIT, SATISH CHANDRA AGRAWAL, YOGESHAR PRASAD

Headnote:

Constitution of India 1950 - Article 311 - U. P. High School and Intermediate College (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971 - Section 10 - Period of probation since his work was found to be unsatisfactory – Suspension - On management wrote to him stating that his services would not be required - It was indeed termination letter respondent moved the Civil Court with suit for permanent injunction restraining management from interfering with his teaching work - Management resisted suit inter alia contending that respondent was appointed only for one year - He was removed after period of probation since his work was found to be unsatisfactory - It was also contended that no injunction could be granted for enforcement of the contract of personal service and the suit was not maintainable - Trial court dismissed the suit as not maintainable - It was also that the suit had become in fructuous since the management had withdrawn impugned communication – Held, Respondent knew very well that his service contract was with private management - In itself while dismissing first - Suit has that his contract of employment could not specifically be enforced - He was then obliged to place his services on market to mitigate damages - But he did nothing of the kind - In he joined legal profession and he is still not out of it - He has not disclosed his professional income - In fairness he ought to have disclosed his income to Court since it is in his personal knowledge - Instead he seems to have urged before High Court that professional income is not relevant for consideration - High Court while accepting submission went a step further and observed that joining the legal fraternity can never be to be employment and could not disentitle respondent to claim his arrears of salary - Legal profession may not be considered as an employment but income from profession or avocation if not negligible, cannot be ignored while determining damages or back wages for payment - It must also be taken into consideration - In Baroda Municipal Corporation Baroda Court gave deduction of even small income per month earned by the worker turned advocate while awarding back wages upon reinstatement - Appeals allowed

( 1 ) K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, L:- This is the third time the matter is coming before this Court and we hope that this is the last of a series of litigations between the parties.

( 2 ) WE have helpfully provided with a chronology of the events leading up to this appeal. It Is important that the chronology is made clear. It is as follows:

AT Allahabad, there is a private college called "kulbhaskar Ashram Agriculture Intermediate College". It is run by the "kayastha Pathshala" which is a society registered under the Societies Registation Act. Rajendra Prasad, the common respondent in the appeals, was a Chemistry lecturer in that College. He was appointed on 15/07/1952 in the scale of Rs. 175-10-215. On 20/06/1953, the management wrote to him stating that his services would not be required after 15/07/1963. It was indeed a termination letter. The respondent moved the Civil Court with suit No. 422/ 1953 for permanent injunction restraining management from interfering with his teaching work. The management resisted the suit inter alia, contending that the respondent was appointed only for one year. He was removed after the period of probation since his work was found to be unsatisfactory. It was also contended that no injunction could be granted for enforcement of the contract of personal service and the suit was not maintainable. On 20/05/1964, the Trial court dismissed the suit as not maintainable. It was also held that the suit had become infructuous since the management had with drawn the impugned communication.

( 3 ) IT seems that the management had withdrawn its earlier communication only to make another order. On 28/08/1964, the respondent was placed under suspension and he again approached the Civil Court for relief. He instituted suit No. 190 of 1964 in the Munsif Court seeking a declaration that the order of suspension was illegal. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appeal therefrom, F. A. No. 583/1965, was allowed by the First Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad decreeing the suit as prayed for. That decision was affirmed by the High Court in Second Appeals No. 1111 of 1966. The High Court rendered the judgment on 9/04/1968.

( 4 ) BEFORE the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, the management made a fresh order suspending the respondent pending enquiry on certain allegations. That order was issued on 30/12/1969/7 January 1866 This order was also the subject matter of a suit. The respondent filed Civil Suit No. 48 of 1966 in the Munsif Court at Allahabad challenging the competency of the managing committee to take action against him. He also contended that the prior approval of District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) was not taken for placing him under suspension. The Munsif Court accepted the suit and declared that the suspension order was illegal and void. But the management successfully took up the matter in Civil Appeal No. 117 of 1969 before the Additional Civil Judge. The appeal was allowed reversing the trial court decree and upholding the respondents suspension. The respondent preferred second appeal to the High Court and it was numbered as S. A. No. 2036 of 1970. We may stop here for a moment and refer to some other events.

( 5 ) DURING the pendency of the said second appeal in the High Court, the U. P. Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, was brought into force with effect from 18/08/1976. The provisions thereunder required the management of the college to take prior approval of DIOS for taking any action against teaching staff. The respondent took advantage of those provisions and made an application for amendment of his plaint to incorporate additional paragraphs 13-A and 14 (g ). In the additional paragraphs, he challenged the validity of the suspension order since management did not take prior permission of the DIOS. It was alleged that the suspension order became invalid and inoperative on the expiry of 60 days from the date of service.

( 6 ) THE State of Uttar Pradesh was not a party to the








































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