1975 Supreme(SC) 526

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
H.R. KHANNA, P.N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FUZL ALI, JJ.
Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others. Appellants
Versus
Lakshmi Narain and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1543 of 1974
Decided on 12-12-1975.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. V. Gupte, Sr. Advocate, (M/s J. P. Goyal, P. C. Gupta and G. S. Chatterjee, Advocates with him), for Appellants; Mr. M. K. Ramamurthi, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. O. P. Rana, Advocate with him for No. 1 and Mr. D. P. Mukherjee, Advocate, for Nos. 3-5) for Respondents and Respondent No. 2 Ex. Parte. 890

Headnote:

Termination of Services - Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College in the District of Muzaffarnagar was registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act as an institution for imparting education. The affairs of the College were managed by the Executive Committee of the Vaish College which is the appellant in this case. In the year 1967 the Vaish Degree College which is the appellant in this case. In the year 1967 the Vaish College was affiliated to the Agra University and as a consequence thereof the College agreed to be governed by the provisions of the Agra University Act and the statutes and Ordinances made thereunder. With the establishment of the Meerut University some time in the year 1965 the Vaish Degree College got affiliated to the Meerut University. The plaintiff/respondent was appointed as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from July 1, 1964 and his appointment as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from July 1, 1964 and his appointment as Principal was formally approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University. Two years later it appears that differences arose between the Executive Committee of the College and the plaintiff/respondent resulting in allegations and counter-allegations and culminating in a notice served by the Executive Committee on October 24, 1966 on the plaintiff/respondent directing him not to discharge the duties of the Principal and another letter was sent to defendant No. 4 a member of the staff of the College to officiate as Principal in place of the plaintiff/respondent. This was followed up by a counter-notice by the plaintiff/respondent to the Executive Committee that the notice sent to him was illegal and the respondent also asked defendant No. 4 not to assume charge of the Principal - On March 12, 1967, the Executive Committee by a resolution terminated the services of the plaintiff/respondent with effect from October 24, 1966 and this resolution was amended by another resolution on March 29, 1967. Even before the formal resolution terminating the services of the plaintiff/respondent was passed it appears that the plaintiff had filed the present suit on October 28, 1966 before the Court of the First Additional Civil and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar which was transferred for disposal to the Court of the Munisif, Kairana -whether or not the appellant Executive committee can be said to be a statutory body in the circumstances of the present case - whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, as the present appellant is, was a statutory body - whether the school after being recognised by the Government for the purpose of grant was bound to observe the rules - whether even if there has been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute, should we in the exercise of our discretion grant a declaration or an injunction to the plaintiff/respondent in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case? - whether the termination of the service of the first respondent by the appellant was in violation of statute 30 of the Statutes of the Agra University which applied to the appellant at the material time, and in any event, the termination was ineffective and inoperative as it was not approved b the Vice-Chancellor as required by Section 28, sub-section (3) of the Kanpur and Meerut Universities Act, 1965, and in either case, whether the first respondent was entitled to a declaration that the termination was null and void so as to warrant a declaration that he continued in the service of the appellant, or, his claim merely lay in damages - whether this was a fit case in which the discretion should have been exercised in favour of the respondent - Held, Court are trying to understand what is the statutory body which this Court had in mind when it laid down this statement of law, it must be remembered that a statement of law enunciated by this Court must be read in the light of the principle which it seeks to effectuate and if should not be construed as if it was a section. The third exception is intended to cover cases whereby reason of breach of mandatory obligation imposed by law, as distinct from contract, the termination of service is null and void so that there is in law no repudiation at all. That is the principle on which the third exception is based and it is in the light of this principle that the expression statutory body used by this Court has to be understood. Now, obviously, a body or authority created by statute would be a statutory body, but even a body or authority which is created under a statute, as for example, the State Road Transport Corporation which is created by the State under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, would also be a statutory body. What other kinds of statutory bodies would be included is a matter not free from difficulty. But in any event it does appear to me that the three exceptions formulated in the statement of law laid down by this Court in the above decisions are not intended to be and cannot be exhaustive. The categories of exceptions to the general rule should not be closed, because any attempt at rigid and exhaustive formulation of legal rules - any attempt to put law in a straitjacket formula - is bound to stifle the growth of law and seriously cripple its capacity to adapt itself to the changing needs of society. In fact, Ray, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of this Court pointed out that the third exception applied not only to employees in the service of "bodies created under statutes", but also to those in the employment of "other public or local authorities." It may be a possible view - and some day this Court may have to consider it that where law, as distinct from contract, imposes a mandatory obligation prescribing the kind of contract which may be entered into by an employer and the manner in which alone the service of an employee may be terminated, any termination of service effected in breach of such statutory obligation would be invalid and ineffective and in such a case the court may treat it as null and void. But I do not think it necessary to pursue this line of discussion any further and come to a positive conclusion whether the appellant is or is not a statutory body or a public authority nor do I consider it necessary to go into the question whether the Statutes of the Agra University had the force of law and conferred rights on the Principal 906 and teachers of affiliated colleges, as or they only set out the terms and conditions which had no validity and conferred no legal rights, unless and until they were embodied in the contract between the principal or teacher on the one hand and the affiliated college on the other as in Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing Committee -Court take the view that on the second part of the question the case of the first respondent is well founded - Appeal allowed