IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Exclusion of workmen retiring before the date fixed is no good ground to characterise settlement as unjust or unfair.
2. A settlement cannot weigh in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which comes into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication.

Headnote:SERVICE LAW—Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 12(3)—Respondent retired from service of Electricity Board on 30.4.1990 after attaining age of superannuation—Pay scales of employees were revised with effect from 1.7.1990 by which time respondents were drawing maximum pay in the concerned scale—Revised pay scales permitted grant of three annual increments beyond time scale in regard to those who reached or crossed maximum pay as on 1.7.1986—High Court held that respondents were discriminated while calculating pension on ground that they had retired prior to the introduction of scheme—Division Bench upheld the judgment—Appeal—Scheme was introduced in view of settlement entered into between the wage Negotiation Committee and the Board before Joint Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) of the Act—No challenge to settlement—Exclusion of workmen retiring before date fixed was no good ground to characterise settlement as unjust or unfair—On the basis of settlement Board’s decision was taken—Impugned Judgment could not be sustained.
       Held : There is no challenge to the legality of the Board’s decision on the ground that there is no rational for fixing the date, except saying that it should have been done from an earlier date i.e. 1985 and not from 1.7.1986 as done earlier. There was no challenge at the stage it was done. The line of enquiry whether settlement was unfair and unjust has been examined by this Court in several decisions.(Para 11)
       Exclusion of workmen retiring before the date fixed is no good ground to characterize settlement as unjust or unfair. In fact in the instant case there is no challenge to the legality of the settlement.(Para 16)
       As noted above there was no challenge to the settlement which was the foundation for the Board’s decision. A copy of the Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act before the Joint Commissioner and Labour and State Conciliation officer, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad was placed on record. On the basis of the settlement, the Board’s decision was taken. Paragraph 2 of the proceedings is very significance and read as follows :
       “A Wage Negotiation Committee was therefore constituted by the Board in the B.P. sixth read above. The committee held detailed discussions with the representatives of the unions and finally reached a negotiated settlement with the recognized union under the code of discipline on 29.1.1991 before the Joint Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer under Section 12(3) of I.D. Act.”
       Above being the position the judgment of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench affirming the same cannot be maintained and are, therefore, set aside.(Paras 19 and 20)

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Order of learned Single Judge allowed writ petition filed by the respondents was affirmed.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows :

Respondents retired from the services of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short the ‘Board’) on 30.4.1990 after attaining the age of superannuation. The Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. (in short the ‘Corporation’), is the successor company of the Board which came into existence with effect from 1.2.1990 by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Reforms Act, 1998 (in short the ‘Reforms Act’). The pay scales of the employees were revised with effect from 1.7.1990 by which time the respondents herein were drawing maximum pay in the concerned scale. The rational of fixing the date with effect from 1.7.1990 was that employees who retired prior to 1.7.1990 are entitled to D.A. at the rate of 38% on the pension whereas the D.A. payable to pensioners retired on or after 1.7.1990 is 12.4%, but not before the date of issue of the order. The revised pay scales permitted grant of three annual increments beyond the time scale in regard to those who had reached or crossed the maximum pay as on 1.7.1986. However, in respect of the respondents herein the additional amount was shown as personal pay and the stagnation increments were adjusted towards the said additional amount.

3. Questioning correctness of the action of the Corporation and its functionaries the respondents herein filed writ a petition. Prayer was to direct the appellants herein to fix their pension and other terminal benefits at par with other UDCs. retired on or after 1.7.1990 and to pay all the arrears of pensions and other terminal benefits. Learned Single judge having regard to the intended purpose of the scheme held that the respondents have been discriminated while calculating the pension on the ground that they had retired prior to the introduction of the scheme. Stand of the employer in essence was that the Board’s proceedings Ms No. 481 dated 4.2.1991 had application only to those who were on its rolls as on 1.7.1990. In view of the fact that the respondents retired on 30.4.1990 the said scheme has no application to them. In any event the scheme was introduced keeping in view the settlement dated 29.1.1991 entered into between the Wage Negotiation Committee and the Board before the Joint Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ‘Act’) and the same cannot be the subject matter of interpretation in the writ petition. In the Appeal its stand before learned Single Judge was reiterated before the Division Bench. Stand of the writ petitioners was that the learned Single Judge was justified in its conclusion.

4. The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983 (1) SCC 305) it was held that the cut off date fixed was discriminatory.

5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant highlighted that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had not considered the issues in their proper perspective. D.S. Nakara’s case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no challenge to the settlement and the only challenge relating to rational of fixing the cut off date with effect from 1.7.1990. The conclusion that the respondents were entitled to the stagnation increment deducting the same from the personal pay is clearly tenable.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the judgment of learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench.

7. A brief reference to the factual position would be necessary. Relevant portion of the Board’s proce

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2006 Supreme(SC) 356

Cases Referred (6)