( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the order dated 19-4-1999.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are as follows: the respondents were called upon to show cause as to why they should not be made liable to pay duty and penalty for not having disclosed that they were manufacturing densified wood. The Commissioner, after hearing the respondents, held that the respondents were not manufacturing densified wood and that therefore they were not liable to pay duty.

( 3 ) THE Department filed an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT ). By an order dated 24-7-1998 it was held that the respondents were manufacturing densified wood. It was further held that the respondents had not suppressed any material or misstated any fact and that therefore the extended period of limitation was not available to the Department. The matter was then remanded to the Commissioner for determination of the duty payable for the period of six months which was available to the Department. In passing the order dated 24-7-1998, CEGAT relied upon reports of the Alipore Test House, the Central Revenue Control laboratory and commercial literature of the respondents.

( 4 ) THE respondents filed an application for rectification of the order dated 24-7-1998. This application was filed under the provisions of Section 35-C (2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which reads as follows:"35-C. (2) The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1) and shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by the commissioner of Central Excise or the other party to the appeal: provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the other party, shall not be made under this sub-section, unless the Appellate tribunal has given notice to him of its intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. "

( 5 ) AT this stage it must be mentioned that under the Act there is no power of review available to the Tribunal. The only power available is the power of rectification of a mistake apparent from the record.

( 6 ) MR S. K. Bagaria, learned counsel for the respondents had drawn our attention to the case of CCE v. Pradyumna Steel Ltd. wherein by a cryptic order, it has been mentioned that even if reliance is placed on a wrong provision of law, so long as the power can be exercised under a different provision, then the power does not get invalidated. It is held that the exercise of the power under a wrong provision is error apparent on the face of the record. In our view, this judgment has no relevance and is of no assistance to the question before us.

( 7 ) THIS Court has in two judgments viz. T. S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart bros. and CIT v. Hew Cycles (P) Ltd. considered the extent to which power can be exercised under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 154 is pari materia to Section 35-C (2 ). In both these decisions, it has been held that a mistake apparent or the face of the record must be an obvious and patent mistake. It is held that "mistake apparent from the record" cannot be something which would have to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. It has been held that a decision on a debatable point of law cannot be a "mistake apparent from the record".

( 8 ) THE application under Section 35-C (2) was on the ground that the tribunal had in its order dated 24-7-1998 taken into consideration the reports of the Alipore Test House and the Central Revenue Control Laboratory. It was claimed that these reports did not pertain to any product of the respondent Company and that these reports could not have been used.

( 9 ) WHEN the application for rectification came up for consideration, the vice-President op