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2006 Supreme(SC) 861

2006(7) Supreme 404
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
The Managing Director, North East K.R.T.C.—Appellant
versus
Devidas Manikrao Sadananda—Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 4147 of 2006
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 17130 of 2005)
Decided on 15-9-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Basava Prabhu S. Patil, V.N. Raghupathy, B. Subrahmanya Prasad and Narayan P. Kengasur, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Principles of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry and standard of proof could be preponderance of probability.

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 10(4A)—Order dismissing respondent workman from services of appellant corporation—Respondent working as driver in the process of overtaking the bus collided with hind portion of other bus whereby other bus went and dashed against a tree resulting in injury to 56 passengers and death of 4 passengers—On the basis of enquiry report, Disciplinary Authority passed an order of dismissal from service—Labour Court held that domestic enquiry was fair and proper but there was no evidence to show that respondent-driver had not taken reasonable care in driving—Court set aside the order and directed reinstatement—High Court upheld the order and granted 50% of back wages—Appeal—Question whether Labour Court erred in facts and circumstances in not invoking doctrine of res-ipsa loquitur ?—Offending bus had collided with hind portion of other bus and impact was so great that other bus went and dashed into a tree—Once maxim “res ipsa loquitur” was found to be applicable, burden of proof would shift on delinquent—Labour Court failed to apply correct standard of proof in relation to domestic enquiry which was “preponderance of probability”—Matter needed to be remitted to Labour Court.

       Held : As stated above, the short question which arises for determination in the present case is : whether the Labour Court had erred in the facts and circumstances of this case in not invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The facts, as narrated above, show that the offending bus collided with the hind portion of the other bus. That other bus was running in front of the offending bus. The impact of the offending bus running into the other bus was so great that the other bus went and dashed into a tree resulting in injuries to 56 passengers and death of 4 lives. In such circumstances, was the Labour Court not required to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is the question which we have to answer.(Paras 8 and 9)

       Once the maxim “res ipsa loquitur” is found to be applicable, the burden of proof would shift on the delinquent. In such cases, the nature of impact has to be seen because it indicates that the vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently. In such cases, the burden of proof was on the driver to show that the offending vehicle was not driven by him rashly and negligently. In the said case, it was further held that the learned Single Judge of the High Court in that case had erred in observing that unless witnesses (passengers) were examined by the management it was not possible to draw any inference of misconduct against the workman. In this connection, it was held that the principles of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry. It was observed that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic enquiry, however, they cannot be stretched too far nor can they be applied in a vacuum. In the case of Cholan Roadways (supra) this Court came to the conclusion that in cases of accident of the above nature it was not necessary as a relevant factor a examine before the enquiry officer passengers of the bus and that the Labour Court had failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to the domestic enquiry, which is “preponderance of probability” and thus a case for judicial review stood, clearly made out by the Corporation. Accordingly the matter is remitted to the Labour Court to decide whether on the facts and circumstances of this case the above maxim “res ipsa loquitur” applies or not.(Paras 12 and 13)

JUDGMENT

Kapadia, J.—Leave granted.

2. This civil appeal by grant of special leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dated 14.3.2005 in Writ Appeal No. 6521 of 2002 by which the writ appeal preferred by Northeast Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as, “the Corporation”) stood dismissed.

3. The short question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is : whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court misdirected itself in not invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, namely, the facts speak for themselves.

4. The Corporation is an ‘Undertaking’ which is catering to the requirements of the travelling public in various parts of the State of Karnataka. It has more than 60,000 employees appointed under Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (Cadre and Recruitment) Regulations, 1982. The service conditions of each employee are governed by Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as, “the 1971 Regulations”).

5. Respondent-workman was working as a driver in the Corporation. On 13.2.96 the bus which he was driving on the route from Basavakalyan to Hyderabad met with an accident while trying to overtake another bus of the Corporation. According to the management of the Corporation, in the process of overtaking the bus which was driven by respondent-workman collided with the hind portion of the other bus and consequent upon which the other bus went and dashed against a tree resulting in injuries to 56 passengers and death of 4 passengers. This was in addition to severe damage caused to the bus of the Corporation. On 10.6.96 the officials of the Corporation collected statements of the passengers in the preliminary enquiry and reported the matter to the Disciplinary Authority of the Corporation constituted under the 1971 Regulations. Based on the said report on which the respondent-workman also gave his reply, the departmental enquiry was instituted. On 11.8.97 the enquiry was conducted under the said 1971 Regulations. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order on the same day dismissing the respondent-workman from the services of the Corporation.

6. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 11.8.97, the respondent-workman raised a dispute under Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court, Gulbarga bearing number K.I.D. No. 147 of 1998. On receipt of the notice from the Labour Court the Corporation filed its written statement. On the preliminary issue as to whether the departmental enquiry held by the management was fair and proper, the Labour Court vide its order dated 24.8.98 held that the domestic enquiry held by the management was fair and proper; that the enquiry conducted was in accordance with rules of natural justice and in accordance with the regulations; and that there was no vagueness or uncertainty in the proceedings so as to render the enquiry unfair. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent-workman that the enquiry was not fair and proper, stood rejected. This was Part-I Award. However, vide Part-II Award dated 19.10.99, the Labour Court held that there was no evidence whatsoever to show that the respondent-driver had not taken reasonable care in the process of driving. The Labour Court took the view in this connection that the management ought to have examined the driver of the bus against which the offending vehicle (bus) collided. According to the Labour Court non-examination of the said driver was fatal to the case of the management. According to the Labour Court there was no eye-witness to the accident. According to the Labour Court the reporting officer of the Corporation was not an eye-witness and the statements collected by him from the respective passengers cannot be considered as substantive evidence to say that the respondent-driver acted in a negligen










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