2004 Supreme(SC) 1609

2005(1) Supreme 822
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Cholan Roadways Ltd. —Appellant
versus
G. Thirugnanasambandam —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 3392 of 2002
Decided on 17-12-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : K. Ramamurthy, Sr. Advocate, A. Krishnamoorthy and Sriram J. Thalapathy, Advocates.
For the Respondent : J. Buther, R.S. Chauhan, Ms. Geeta Kalra and Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Advocates.

Important pointThe jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a limited one and while exercising this jurisdiction, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the validly or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent.

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 33(2)(b)—Order of dismissal—Application for grant of approval of said order of dismissal—Scope of adjudication in a proceeding u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act—Standard of proof—Respondent was a driver of a bus plying between Tanjore and Nagapattinam—Bus accident resulting in death of 7 passengers—Disciplinary proceeding as according to appellant the said bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner—Inquiry Officer upon consideration of materials on record found the respondent guilty of misconduct—Respondent was dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority—Appellant filed an application u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act for grant of approval of order of dismissal—Industrial Tribunal refused to grant approval holding that the domestic enquiry conducted cannot be considered as fair and proper and is vitiated on account of failure of Enquiry Officer to observe principles of natural justice—Whether the Tribunal and consequently High Court were justified in passing the impugned judgments—(No)—Jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act is a limited one—Probative value of evidence showing extensive damages caused to bus—Nature of impact demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.

       Held : It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a limited one. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) cannot be equated with that of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this case admittedly an enquiry has been held wherein the parties examined their witnesses. The Respondent was represented and assisted by three observers. Shri M. Venkatatesan was the Branch Manager, CRC Tanjore Town Branch, who had submitted his report and proved the same before the Inquiry Officer. He furnished a detailed account of the position of the bus vis-a-vis the other bus after the collision took place. He found that there was no brake tyre mark of the bus on the road. All the two seaters seats on the entire left side of the bus were found totally damaged. The left side roof arch angle of the bus was found totally out. Not only 4 persons were found to be dead at the spot, the driver and conductor of the bus and 10 other passengers were also sustained injuries in this accident. Out of the said 10 passengers, 3 subsequently died in the hospital owing to the injuries sustained by them. He further found that on the left side of the road in the earthen margin, there was a tamarind tree’s protruding branch and which was found to have been already cut and the bottom stump of the branch was found protruding to a length of 3 inches. The bus was found to have been brought to a halt only at a distance of 81 ft. from the place of impact against the tree. He further noticed that even after the impact of the bus against the tree, the delinquent is said to have swerved the bus further to the right side from left side without applying brake and reducing speed and later only be brought the bus to a halt at some distance as a result of which the entire side roof angle of the bus got cut. (Para 12)

       The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, opined that the passengers of the bus should have been examined. It does not appear from the order dated 29.4.88 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal that the Respondent herein made any prayer for cross examining the passengers who travelled in the ill-fated bus and who were examined by the said Shri M. Venkatesan. It is evident from the order of the learned Tribunal that only in the show cause filed by the Respondent in response to the second show cause notice, such a contention was raised. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal in his impugned judgment further failed to take into consideration that even if the statements of the said passengers are ignored, the misconduct ­allegedly committed by the Respondent would stand proved on the basis of the evidence adduced by Shri M. Venkatesan together with the circumstantial evidences brought on records. The learned Single Judge of the High Court although referred to the sketch drawn by PW-1 on the site (Ex.P-2) and 4 photographs (Ex.P-8) but ignored the same observing that unless witnesses were examined in support of the two exhibits, it is not possible to draw any inference therefrom. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine the materials on records independently but referred to the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge to the effect that from their judgments it was apparent that the driver had not been driving the bus rashly and negligently. (Para 13)

       It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principle of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry. (Para 14)

       There cannot, however, be any doubt whatsoever that the principle of natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic enquiry. It is, however, well-known that the said principle cannot be stretched too far nor can be applied in a vacuum. (Para 16)

       It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different. Whereas in the former ‘preponderance of probability’ would suffice; in the latter, ‘proof beyond all reasonable doubt’ is imperative. The tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. (Paras 18 and 19)

       In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, further more, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not garmane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which in “preponderance of probability” and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out. (Para 32)