2006 Supreme(SC) 864

2006(8) Supreme 138
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and Lokeshwar Singh Panta, JJ.
Laxman—Appellant
versus
State of M.P.—Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 974 of 2006
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1471 of 2006)
Decided on 18-9-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Ramesh Chandra Pandey, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Difference between clause (b) of Section 299 IPC & Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302—Appellant and other accused assaulted deceased by shooting arrows and pelting stones wherein complainants PW10 and PW12 were hit and injured and deceased on sustaining injury fell down and died immediately—Placing reliance on evidence of eye witnesses, trial court convicted appellant for murder and other accused u/s 324 IPC—High Court upheld conviction—Appeal—Distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC and Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC was one of the degree of probability of death resulting from intended bodily injury—Arrows were being shot from a distance, not with accuracy—One of such arrows hit deceased and appellant had shot that arrow—There was no sudden quarrel —Appellant was liable to be convicted u/s 304 Part I IPC and sentence of 10 years imprisonment awarded.

       Held : Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300 IPC. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the intention to cause death is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offenders knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This of Clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300 IPC.(Para 10)

       Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases of falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 IPC can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result: of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, instead of the words likely to cause death occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC and Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium of the lowest degree. The word likely in Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury.....sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.(Para 11)

       For cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.(Para 12)

       Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singhs case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 IPC clearly brings out this point.(Para 17)

       Clause (c) and Clause (4) of Section 300 IPC both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 IPC would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently dangerous act approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.(Para 18)

       The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.(Para 19)

       The fact situation shows that arrows were being shot from a distance, not with any accuracy. One of such arrows hit the deceased. As established by the evidence of eye-witnesses the appellant had shot that arrow. There was no sudden quarrel as stated by the appellant. The evidence shows otherwise. Considering the background facts as noted above, appellant has to be convicted in terms of Section 304 Part I IPC and not in Section 302 IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.(Paras 21 and 22)