Supreme Court Of India
APPASAHEB TULJARAM DESAI
Versus
Bhalchandra Vithalrao Thube
Decided On : October 28, 1960
Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 - Section 4 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 60 - Watan Property - Attachment - Agriculturist - Interpretation.
Fact of the Case:
The dispute arose from an execution petition filed by the decree holder to attach a Wada (house) belonging to the legal representatives of the judgment debtor. The executing court ordered the attachment of the Wada. The legal representatives appealed to the High Court, which set aside the order of attachment. The decree holder appealed to the Supreme Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that the Wada was not Watan property and was not exempted from attachment by virtue of the provisions of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court also held that the legal representative was an agriculturist and the Wada belonging to and occupied by him was protected from attachment and sale by clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues: 1. Whether the Wada was Watan property? 2. Whether the Wada was exempted from attachment by virtue of the provisions of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code? 3. Whether the legal representative was an agriculturist? 4. Whether the Wada belonging to and occupied by the legal representative was protected from attachment and sale by clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Wada was not Watan property because it was not the subject of the original grant and was constructed subsequently on the land which was admittedly Watan property. 2. The Wada was not exempted from attachment by virtue of the provisions of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code because the legal representative was an agriculturist and the Wada belonging to and occupied by him was protected from attachment and sale by clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The legal representative was an agriculturist because he occupied himself with agriculture, that is, cultivation of land for raising crops. 4. The Wada belonging to and occupied by the legal representative was protected from attachment and sale by clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it was occupied by the agriculturist for the purpose of agriculture.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Judgment
( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 50 of 1953, reversing the decision of Shah, J. and restoring the order passed by the executing court which had been set aside by him.
( 2 ) TWO questions arise for decision in this appeal (1) whether the Wada (house) ordered to be attached by the executing court is Watan Property, and if so, can it be attached in execution of a decree? (2) If the Wada is not Watan property, is it exempted from attachment by virtue, of the provisions of S. 60 of the Civil Procedure Code?
( 3 ) IT is necessary now to state a few facts. One Rao Ba. Vithalrao Laxmanrao Thube, hereinafter referred to as Laxmanrao, brought Civil Suit No. 313 of 1943 against Tuljaramarao Narainrao Desai, hereinafter referred to as Tuljaramarao, to recover Rs. 80,000 which had been borrowed by him from the plaintiff. Laxmanraos suit was decreed on 20/12/1943. Tuljaramarao having died his legal representatives, the present appellants, were brought on the record on 21/09/1944. In April, 1949. Laxmamanrao filed an application for the execution of the decree. He sought the attachment, with a view to their subsequent sale, of certain properties including the Wada which is the subject matter of this appeal. The appellants objected to the proposed attachment on various grounds. The executing court on 17/12/1951, issued a warrant of attachment only against the Wada in question. The appellants appealed to the Bombay High Court. Their appeal was heard by Shah, J. who by his order dated 23/09/1953, set aside the order of attachment relying on the decision of Chagla, J. in Second Appeal No. 760 of 1942. He, however, gave no decision on the question whether S. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure gave protection to the Wada from attachment. Against the decision of Shah, J. there was an appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court which was heard by a Division Bench. The Division Bench, as already stated, reversed the decision of Shah, J. and restored the order made by the executing court. Subsequently, the High Court gave a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
( 4 ) IT is undisputed that the whole of village Nandi had been granted as inam to the ancestor of Tuljaramarao and his descendants as per Sanad, Ext. 54, and the Inam Patrak, Ext. 57. In that Sanad there is not mention of any Wada existing on the Inam land. According to the executing court the Wada appears to have been built after the grant. It appears that the opinion of the Division Bench of the High Court was also to the same effect. There is no finding of Shah, J. to the contrary. We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the Wada in question was not the subject of the original grant. This Wada came to be constructed on the land in the inam village of Nandi sometime subsequent to the grant.
( 5 ) WHAT has to be decided is, do the attributes of "watan Property accrue to the Wada which was constructed after the grant on land which was admittedly "watan Property as defined by the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (Bombay Act No. 3 of 1874), hereinafter referred to as the Act. In appeal No. 760 of 1942, Chagla, J. took the view that the house in that case was an accession to the side on which it stood. Accordingly, it must partake of the character of the land on which it stood. The learned Judge stated that the question which he had to determine was whether the house was immovable property held for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office within the meaning of S. 4 of the Act. Having regard to the definition of "immoveable property in the Bombay General Clauses Act he was of the opinion that the house certainly formed part of the immoveable property which was held for the performance of the duty appertaining to the hereditary office of the Watan and that the only answer to the question "what is the immoveable property which is held for the
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