JUDGMENT

RANGANATH MISRA, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal by special leave is directed against the order made by a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The High Court relied upon the ratio of its Full Bench decision in M. M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR (1987) Kant 1286 : (AIR 1987 Kant 186) and dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable.

( 2 ) THE short question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether a revision application is maintainable under S. 115, Civil P. C. read with S. 50 (1) Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made an order in his revisional jurisdiction under S. 50 (2) of the Act. This very question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar, ILR (1978) 2 Kant 1585. Venkataramiah, J. , as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held :-"the second for consideration is whether the declaration made in S. 50 (2) that the order of the District Judge shall be final takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its powers of revision under S. 115, CPC. A doubt about the above question arose in view of some observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Diwakar Hegde v. Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. , (1975) 2 Kant LJ 390 to the effect that when a statute declares that the decision of an authority shall be final, it cannot be questioned either in appeal or revision under the statute. The doubt however stands resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, (1977) 2 SCR 871 : (AIR 1977 SC 1555 ). In that case S. 149, Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which provided that the decision of the district court in an appeal filed against an order of the Municipal Commissioner was final came up for consideration. Rejecting the contention that the said provision debarred the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115, CPC over the order of the district court passed in appeal, the Supreme Court observedthe second contention is based on S. 149, Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. It provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the district court when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment. Sub-section (1) of S. 149 provides that the decision of the district court shall be final. It was submitted that the decision of the district court was therefore final and that the High Court was in error in entertaining a revision petition. This plea cannot be accepted for under S. 115 of the CPC the High Court has got power to revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the district court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . "the Full Bench also relied upon a brief decision of this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija v. A. S. Venkatachala Shetty (dead) by LRs. (Special Leave Petn. No. 913 of 1978 dated 13th of February, 1978) where referring to the very provision, this Court observed :"the petitioner contends that the order of the High Court is without jurisdiction because under S. 50 Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a revision does not lie to the High Court. We do not agree. Section 115, CPC gives powers to the High Court to revise any order from the district court, subject of course to the limitations set out therein. The narrow point then is as to whether the District Judge can be equated with a district court. The High Court, following its own earlier decisions, has held so. We agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the District Judge and the district court are interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the section uses the expression disirict Judge. Section 115, CPC therefore applies and the revision