2007(2) Supreme 418
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Patna High Court)
S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju, JJ.
Chandrika Singh (Dead) by Lrs. & Anr.—Appellants
versus
Sarjug Singh & Anr.—Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4409 of 2000
Decided on 30-11-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : E.R. Kumar, P.H. Parekh, Rajendra Rohtagi and Ms. Diksha Rai, Advocates.
For the Respondents : S.B. Upadhyay, Sr. Advocate, Shiv Mangal Sharma and Ms. Kumud L. Das, Advocates.
Held : We may before adverting to the question raised before us must observe that the High Court dealt with the matter in a very slipshod manner. It interfered with the finding of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court without assigning any reason therefor. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is required to formulate a substantial question of law in relation to a finding of fact. The High Court exercises a limited jurisdiction in that behalf. Ordinarily unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reasons, the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below are binding on the High Court.(Para 11)
Once it was found that Koleshra Devi was possessed of the land in question in lieu of her right of maintenance, in our opinion, Sub-Section 1 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will clearly be attracted.(Para 12)
As Koleshra Devi, in terms of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1950 became absolute owner of the property and thus she was competent to execute the deed of sale in the year 1960. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the well considered judgment of the First Appellate Court and it is set aside accordingly.(Paras 16 and 17)
ORDER
One Ishwar Dutta was the owner of the property. He died leaving behind three sons- Mahadeo, Hira and Mahabir, Mahabir died issueless. His interest in the property, therefore, vested in Mahadeo and Mewa (son of Hira) who predeceased him. Mewa died in 1921-22 leaving behind a son Damoder, Koleshra Devi was the widow of Damodar whose exact date of death is not known but he is said to have expired sometime after 1932.
2. The plaintiffs herein are heirs of Ram Layak - one of the sons of Mahadeo whereas the respondents herein are heirs of Raja, another son of Mahadeo.
3. The properties in question bearing plot Nos. 901, 902 and 907 were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The properties were mutated in the name of Damoder.
4. The amount of compensation was paid to respondent - Mona Devi.
5. The appellants herein filed an application under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Collector whereupon a reference was made. One of the issues which fell for consideration before the Reference Judge under the Land Acquisition Act was as to whether the deed of gift executed by Koleshra Devi in respect of her half share of plot No. 901, full share of plot No. 902 and three fourth share of plot No. 907 in favour of the appellants herein by deed of gift dated 7.5.1960 was valid in law.
6. It was inter alia held that Koleshra Devi being possessed of the share which vested in her on the death of her husband-Damoder in lieu of maintenance, she became the absolute owner in terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
7. The judgment and decree passed by the Reference Court was reversed by the First Appellate Court.
8. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment allowed the appeal preferred by the respondents herein and affirmed judgment of the trial Court opining :
“.......It is not in dispute that mostt. Kauleshwara was maintenance holder and her husband had died before the year 1937. Nothing has come on record that she was put in possession over the lands, in lieu of maintenance, which she gifted to the respondents. In absence of such evidence, she was not authorised to make a gift and Ext. 1 was invalid.”
The extent of the share of the parties herein are said to be as under:
Plot No.Originally inShare of PetitionersShare of name ofrespondents
901MahadeoHalfHalf
902MewaFull (gifted by Koleshra——-Devi)
907Mahabir (MewaThree Fourth (Half of MewaOne Fourth (one& Mahadeo)gifted by Koleshra Devi &fourth of Mahadeo)one fourth of Mahadeo
TotalThree fourthOne fourth
9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would contend that having regard to the fact that a finding of fact had been arrived at that Koleshra Devi was possessed of the property in question, the High Court committed a manifest error in interfering therewith.
10. Our attention in this behalf has been drawn to a decision of this Court in Raghubar Singh and Ors. Vs. Gulab Singh & Ors. - (1998) 6 SCC 314. Mr. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand would support the judgment.
11. We may before adverting to the question raised before us must observe that the High Court dealt with the matter in a very slipshod manner. It interfered with the finding of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court without assigning any reason therefor. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is required to formulate a substantial question of law in relation to a finding of fact. The High Court exercises a limited jurisdiction in that behalf. Ordinarily unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reasons, the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below are binding on the High Court. The First Appellate Court clearly came to the following conclusion:
“........Mewa Mahto died leaving behind Demoder Mahto and Damodar Mahto died leaving behind Kaulashwari who according to the discussed evidence came into possession as limited owner and not as maintenanc
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