ORDER

1. The plaintiff - respondents, hereinafter referred to as the respondents, filed a suit for a declaration that the acquisition of Schedule B property in LA Case No. XI/16 of 1965 - 66 was illegal and void. Another prayer made by them in the suit was that the sale deed dated 11 - 9 - 1975 in respect of Schedule D property executed by Defendant 5 in favour of Arjun Singh, predecessor - in - interest of Defendants 13 to 17 was illegal and void having been executed without any title of ownership therein with the predetermined object of depriving the plaintiffs of the said property without any authority of law. It was also alleged that a fraud had been committed. An application was filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking injunction restraining Defendants 13 to 18 from changing the nature and character of Schedule D property by alienating or transferring the same in any manner whatsoever and also from undertaking any construction thereon. Defendant 18 in the suit, the appellant herein, instead of filing the written statement filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint which was termed as dismissal of the suit.

2. The trial court dismissed the application, aggrieved against which the appellant filed CO No. 1512 of 2002 which has been decided by the impugned order. The learned Single Judge, although did not agree with the reasoning given by the trial court, but upheld the conclusions arrived at by the trial court on different grounds. The learned Single Judge went on the merits of the dispute and dismissed the revision application.

3. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the High Court the present a appeal by way of special leave has been filed.

4. This case was argued at length on 30 - 8 - 2005. Counsel appearing for the appellant had relied upon a judgment of this Court in N. V. Srinivasa Murthy v. Mariyamma1 for the proposition that a plaint could be rejected if the suit is ex facie barred by limitation. As against this, counsel for the respondents relied upon a later judgment of this Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn.2in respect of the proposition that Order 7 Rule 11(d) was not applicable in a case where a question has to be decided on the basis of fact that the suit was barred by limitation. The point

as to whether the words "barred by law" occurring in Order 7 Rule II(d) CPC would include the suit being "barred by limitation" was not specifically dealt with in either of these two judgments, cited above. But this point has been specifically dealt with by the different High Courts in Mohan Lal Sukhadia University v. Priya Soloman3, Khaja Quthubullah v. Govt. of A.P.4, Vedapalli Suryanarayana v. Poosarla Venkata Sanker Suryanarayana5, Arjan Singh v. Union of India6 wherein it has been held that the plaint under Order

7 Rule 11(d) cannot be rejected on the ground that it is barred by limitation. According to these judgments the suit has to be barred by a provision of law to come within the meaning of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. A contrary view has been taken in Jugolinija Rajia Jugoslavija v. Fab Leathers Ltd.7, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Navrom Constantza8, J. Patel & Co. v. National Federation of Industrial Coop. Ltd.9 and State Bank of India Staff Assn. v. Popat & Kotecha Property 10. The last judgment was the subject - matter of challenge in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. 2 This Court set aside the judgment and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 517)

"25. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo case11 the inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with f the assumption that only the non - execution of leas