The main legal point established in the judgment is the mutual exclusivity of the provisions of Section 29, 31, and 32F of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, when a landlord applies for recovery of possession.

JUDGMENT:

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1.These appeals are preferred against the final order 1st October, 1997 and order dated 15th September, 1999 passed in C.A.No.8320 of 1997 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.139 of 1984. By the order dated 1st October 1997, the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the aforesaid writ petition in which the appellants prayed for quashing a judgment and order of Maharasthra Revenue Tribunal [in short MRT] dated 30th August, 1983 in Revision Application No. MRT P 14 of 1981 by which the Tribunal had confirmed the order passed by the Tehsildar in Tenancy Case No.32 FG/54/78 dated 31st August, 1978. In the application under Article 227 of the Constitution, a prayer was also made by the appellants to restore the order passed by the Appellate Court in Tenancy Appeal No.56 of 1979 dated 27th October, 1980.

2. The facts leading to the filing of these appeals in short may be stated as follows:

3. Agriculture land (for short "the aforesaid land") bearing Survey No.175/1 admeasuring 2 acres and 11 gunthas situated at Village Biwadi, Tal Purandhar, District Pune was owned by Sadashiv Purandhare, father of the respondent No.1 Chintaman Sadashiv. Babu Vithu Gaikwad whose heirs and legal representatives are the appellants in this Court was the original tenant in respect of the aforesaid land. A partition of the aforesaid

land was affected by the deceased father of the respondents by which the disputed land was allotted to him. On the tillers day, i.e., 1st April, 1957 the respondent No.1 was a minor. He attained majority on 6th October, 1960. In compliance with Section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act), the respondent No.1 issued notice to Babu Vithu Gaikwad [since deceased] for termination of his tenancy in respect of the aforesaid land. This termination notice was issued within one year of attaining the age of majority. The landlord-respondent No.1 had failed to take out proceedings under Section 29 of the Act until he filed an application on 27th March, 1962. Since the application under Section 29 of the Act was time barred, the proceedings taken out by the landlord-respondent No.1 were withdrawn on 5th September, 1964. After one year of such withdrawal, Babu Vithu Gaikwad -the tenant- had filed an application under Section 32F read with Section 32G of the Act on 2nd August, 1965. In these proceedings, on 6th October, 1967, a statement of the tenant was recorded that he was willing to purchase the disputed land. The additional Tehsildar rejected the application of the tenant by his order dated 28th January, 1973. The tenant filed an appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer which was allowed and the matter was remitted back to the Additional Tehsildar for fresh disposal. After a month by his order dated 31st August, 1978, the Additional Tehsildar held that under Section 32F the right of the tenant to purchase the aforesaid land was forfeited and, hence, directed that proceedings could be initiated under Section 32P of the Act. Aggrieved by this order, the tenant preferred an appeal before the Additional Collector, Pune and by an order dated 27th October, 1980 he allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to Additional Tehsildar for holding an enquiry under Section 32G to 32R of the Act for fixing the price or purchase in accordance with law. Being aggrieved, the landlord-respondent No.1 filed a revision petition before the MRT, Pune which was allowed by the tribunal by an order dated 30th August, 1983 and against this order the tenants had filed a writ petition in the High Court of judicature at Bombay, which was dismissed by the impugned order in respect of which special leave petition was filed and leave was granted.

4.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined all the orders mentioned above and the materials on record. Before considering whether the High Cour