2007(6) Supreme 340
Supreme Court of india
(From Karnataka High Court)
S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ.
State of Karnataka — Petitioner
versus
Ameer Jan — Respondent
Appeal (crl.) 766 of 2001
Decided on : 18-09-2007
AIR 1948 PC 82; AIR 1958 SC 124; (1979) 4 SCC 172; (1984) 2 SCC 183; (1997) 7 SCC 622; (1998) 9 SCC 268; (2006) 4 SCC 584 : JT 2006 (4) SC 34 – Relied upon.
(2007) 1 SCC 1 – Distinguished.
Facts of the case:
Respondent herein was working as a Second Division Assistant in the Office of the Registrar of Firms and Cooperative Societies. D.V. Thrilochana (PW-3) approached him for grant of a certificate. He allegedly demanded a sum of Rs. 300/- from him. He was put to trial for alleged commission of an offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.
An order of sanction was issued by the Commissioner of Stamps solely relying on or on the basis of a purported report issued by the Inspector General of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha.
Trial court opined that the respondent was guilty of commission of the said offence.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the order of the trial court on the ground that the order of sanction was illegal.
Findings of the Court:
Sanction vitiated for non-application of mind. No infirmity in the order of the High Court, although some of its observations do not lay down correct legal position.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
judgment
S.B. SINHA, J. —
1. Interpretation and/ or application of the provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) falls for our consideration in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 19.06.2000 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 222 of 1995.
2. Respondent herein was working as a Second Division Assistant in the Office of the Registrar of Firms and Cooperative Societies. D.V. Thrilochana (PW-3) approached him for grant of a certificate. He allegedly demanded a sum of Rs. 300/- from him. He was put to trial for alleged commission of an offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act.
3. An order of sanction was issued by the Commissioner of Stamps solely relying on or on the basis of a purported report issued by the Inspector General of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha. The purported order of sanction being dated 20.07.1992 reads as under:
“In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, I hereby accord sanction to prosecute Sri Ameerjan, Second Division Assistant in the office of the Registrar of Firms and Societies, Bangalore, Urban District, Bangalore for offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the competent court of law.”
4. The sanctioning authority examined himself before the learned Trial Judge as PW-8. He, however, did not produce the report of the Inspector General of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha. Even otherwise the same was not brought on records. The learned Trial Judge upon considering the materials brought on records by the prosecution opined that the respondent was guilty of commission of the said offence.
By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court, however, reversed the same opining that the order of sanction being illegal, the judgment of conviction could not be sustained.
5. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Karanataka, in support of this appeal would submit that an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner. The learned counsel urged that the High Court committed a manifest error in proceeding to determine the legality or validity of the order of sanction having regard to an irrelevant factor, viz., that the offence involved only a sum of Rs. 300/-.
In particular, the following findings of the High Court was criticized submitting that the same do not lay down the correct legal position:
“...The additional reason for this view is because there is an entirely different aspect of the law which applies to cases of this category insofar as the courts have now held that if the amount involved is relatively small if it is a single isolated instance and there is no evidence of habitual bribe taking or assets dis-proportionate to the known sources of income, that the sanctioning authority will have to carefully evaluate as to whether the interest of justice will not be adequately served by taking disciplinary action rather than by burdening the courts with full fledged prosecution in a case of relatively trivial facts. These are all areas of deep seated evaluation which can only be truly justified through a proper perusal of the records. I am unable to accept the submission put forward by the learned Public Prosecutor that the reference to the receipt of the records is sufficient to get over the basic infirmity in the sanction order wherein the authority is quick to state that he acted only on the basis of the letter from the Inspector General of Police...”
6. Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, would submit that the purported order of sanction dated 20.07.1992 ex facie shows a total non-application of mind on the part of PW-8 and, thus, the impugned judgment is unassailable.
7. We agree that an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner. But, it is also well sett
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