2006(4) Supreme 645
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Calcutta High Court)
Y.K. Sabharwal, CJI., C.K. Thakker and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
Sankaran Moitra—Appellant
versus
Sadhna Das & Anr.—Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2006
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3347 of 2003)
Decided on 24-3-2006
Counsel for the Parties
For the Appellant : K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr. Advocate, H.K. Puri, S.K. Puri and V.M. Chauhan, Advocates.
For the Respondent No.1 : Pradip Kumar Ghosh, Sr. Advocate, Somiran Sharma, Amit Sharma, S. Muralidhar, Advocates.
For the State : Avijit Bhattacharjee, Ms. Saumya Kondu, Advocates.
Majority Judgment (Y.K. Sabharwal, CJI and P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.
Held : Coming to the facts of this case, the question is whether the appellant was acting in his official capacity while the alleged offence was committed or was performing a duty in his capacity as a police officer which led to the offence complained of. That it was the day of election to the State Assembly, that the appellant was in uniform; that the appellant traveled in an official jeep to the spot, near a polling booth and the offence was committed while he was on the spot, may not by themselves attract Section 197(1) of the Code. But, as can be seen from the facts disclosed in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State based on the entries in the General Diary of the Phoolbagan Police Station, it emerges that on the election day information was received in the Police Station at 1400 hours of some disturbance at a polling booth, that it took a violent turn and clashes between the supporters of two political parties was imminent. It was then that the appellant reached the site of the incident in his official vehicle. It is seen that a case had been registered on the basis of the incidents that took place and a report in this behalf had also been sent to the superiors by the Station House Officer. It is also seen and it is supported by the witnesses examined by the Chief Judicial Magistrate while taking cognizance of the offence that the appellant on reaching the spot had a discussion with the officer-in-charge who was stationed at the spot and thereafter a lathi charge took place or there was an attack on the husband of the complainant and he met with his death. Obviously, it was part of the duty of the appellant to prevent any breach of law and maintain order on the polling day or to prevent the blocking of voters or prevent what has come to be known as booth capturing. It therefore emerges that the act was done while the officer was performing his duty. That the incident took place near a polling booth on an election day has also to be taken note of. The complainant no doubt has a case that it was a case of the deceased being picked and chosen for illtreatment and he was beaten up by a police constable at the instance of the appellant and the Officer-in-charge of the Phoolbagan Police Station and at their behest. If that complaint were true it will certainly make the action, an offence, leading to further consequences. It is also true as pointed out by the learned counsel for the complainant that the entries in the General Diary remain to be proved. But still, it would be an offence committed during the course of the performance of his duty by the appellant and it would attract Section 197 of the Code.(Para 15)
The High Court has stated that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in purported performance of duty. If it was done in performance of duty or purported performance of duty Section 197(1) of the Code cannot be by-passed by reasoning that killing a man could never be done in an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the Code could not be attracted. Such a reasoning would be against the ratio of the decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Section 197(1) was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for us now to answer the submission of learned counsel for the complainant that this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction.(Para 17)
We thus allow this appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court quash the complaint only on the ground of want of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 18)
Minority Judgment (C.K. Thakker, J.)
The primary object of the Legislature behind Section 197 of the Code is to protect public officers who have acted in discharge of their duties or purported to act in discharge of such duties. But, it is equally well settled that the act said to have been committed by public officer must have reasonable connection with the duty sought to be discharged by such public officer. If the act complained of has no nexus, reasonable connection or relevance to the official act or duty of such public servant and is otherwise illegal, unlawful or in the nature of an offence, he cannot get shelter under Section 197 of the Code. In other words, protection afforded by the said section is qualified and conditional.(Para 51)
It is precisely in such cases that the Court is called upon to consider whether the public servant was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his duty or it was merely a cloak for doing illegal act under the excuse of his status as a public servant and by taking undue advantage of his position, he was committing an offence or an unlawful act. In such situations, when the question comes up for consideration before a Court of law as to the applicability or otherwise of Section 197 of the Code, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to apply its mind to the fact-situation before it. It should ensure that on the one hand, the public servant is protected if the case is covered by Section 197 of the Code and on the other hand, appropriate action would be allowed to be taken if the provision is not attracted and under the guise of his position as public servant, he is trying to take undue advantage.(Para 53)
In the instant case, from the material which has been placed on record, it is amply clear that the appellant and other police officers had acted illegally, unlawfully and highhandedly. In the complaint, it was stated by the widow of deceased Topi Das that the accused chased her husband and assaulted him by causing several injuries which resulted in his death. But, apart from what is stated in the complaint, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had recorded statements of witnesses mentioned in the complaint. The learned counsel for the first respondent-complainant, drew our attention to those statements who were eye-witnesses. It was stated by them that the deceased had not indulged in any illegal activity. He had not done any unlawful act. He had no weapon with him. He was distributing food packets at the polling booth of a particular political party. He was assaulted and beaten by accused persons who were police officers. When the deceased left the place, the police officers chased him and continued to beat him. When deceased reached near a lake, he requested the police officers not to beat him. He also stated that he did not know how to swim and prayed to leave him. But the police officers did not pay any heed to his request and continued beating, which resulted in his death.(Para 54)
The High Court, in my judgment, considered this aspect in its proper perspective and was wholly justified in observing that “it was a merciless beating by a police officer” causing death of a person which could not be said to be an act in discharge of official duty. The High Court was also right in stating that postmortem report clearly indicated the nature and extent of injuries on the victim. Other witnesses had given vivid description of the offence committed by the accused persons. The said finding, which is supported by material on record, cannot be said to be based on no evidence’ or otherwise perverse, nor it can be concluded that an error of law has been committed by the High Court which requires to be corrected by this Court in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence, in my opinion, no interference is called for against the said order.(Para 56)
I am constrained to observe here that there is considerable force in the allegation of the learned counsel for the complainant that the State agency had shown partisan attitude and favoured the appellant. This is clear from the fact that though the application of the appellant for anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court as well as by this Court before about three years, the appellant was never arrested by the police. For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, the order passed by the High Court is in consonance with well settled principles of law and does not deserve interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.(Paras 63 & 64)
Key Points: - The judgment discusses the protective scope and test for Section 197 Cr.P.C., requiring a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. (!) (!) (!) - It emphasizes sanction under Section 197(1) is a condition precedent and may be required at any stage, depending on facts, with a broad ratio from Matajog Dobey and subsequent cases. (!) (!) (!) (!) - It analyzes the applicability of Sections 210 and 482 Cr.P.C. in balancing private complaints and ongoing police investigations, including conditions and procedures for staying or trying together cases. (!) (!) (!) (!)
JUDGMENT
P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.—1. Leave granted.
2. The husband of Respondent No.1 herein, met with his end on 10.5.2001. On 12.5.2001, Respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘complainant’) filed a complaint before the Deputy Commissioner of Police that she had come to know from the members of the public that while her husband was coming from Beliaghata Subhas Sarobar he was beaten to death by the police. She stated that she wanted the post-mortem examination of her innocent husband Robindranath Das to be held in the presence of a Magistrate and video recording of the portions of the body of her husband whereon it had been hit by the police. She demanded stern punishment for the murderer of her husband. On 28.5.2001, she filed a complaint in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore in respect of offences, punishable according to her under Sections 302, 201, 109 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In the complaint, she stated that she was a house-wife and, that her husband Robindranath Das, was a businessman and a social worker. The antecedents of her husband were above board and he always acted on the right side of the law. He was also an active supporter of a particular political party. On 10.5.2001, the General Election to the Assembly in West Bengal was held. Her husband was in-charge of giving food packets to the polling agents of a contesting political party in the booth in C.I.T. office situated at Subhas Sarobar (Beliaghata Lake). When her husband did not turn up for lunch, before she left for casting her vote, she asked her brother to summon her husband for lunch. She was returning at about 1415 hours after casting her vote. While she was returning, a Tata Sumo Car came along, being driven at speed and in that car she found a local resident Anath sitting. When she reached the vicinity of Vivekananada Club, she found there assembled, a crowd of local people. When she enquired what had happened, one of those assembled said that the police had severely assaulted her husband with lathi in the lake, her husband had became unconscious, and he had been taken to the doctor in a Tata Sumo Car. On further enquiry, she was told that her husband was assaulted for no reason by the police with lathis on his head near the C.I.T. office at the Lake instigated by the “Bara Babu” of Phoolbagan Thana and Moitra Babu, previous “Barababu” of Beliaghata Thana at about 1400 hrs. Subsequently, she came to learn from various persons of the locality including her brother and her brother-in-law that her husband was talking near the outer gate of the C.I.T. office area at Subhas Sarobar with Mr. S.K. Kundu, the ‘Barababu’ of Phoolbagan Police Station at about 1400 hours. At that point of time, the previous officer-in-charge of Beliaghata Police Station, at the time of the complaint, the Assistant Commissioner of E.S.D. (Eastern Suburban Division), Calcutta came there by a police jeep and after talking with the Officer in charge, Phoolbagan Police Station ordered the beating up of her husband and accordingly the Officer in charge, Phoolbagan Police Station instigated the police constables who were accompanying them to beat her husband and to kill him. Thereupon, a constable, namely, Sudhir Sikdar assaulted her husband with a lathi and her husband tried to run away to save his life but the police personnel chased him. Her husband fell down in the water at the edge of the lake. He requested the chasing police personnel not to assault him and he told them that he did not know how to swim. In spite of repeated requests and begging for his life by her husband, the police constable Sudhir Sikdar struck successive blows on the head of her husband, and other different portions of his body with a lathi, as a result of which her husband became unconscious and fell in the lake. Then the police personnel left the place. Her brother and brother-in-law, with the help of others who were eye-witnesses to the incident pulled out
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