JUDGMENT

1. Leave granted.

2. On November 30, 2007 when the matter was placed for admission-hearing, this Court passed the following order: Delay condoned. Issue notice on the special leave petition as on the application for bail. Notice will state as to why the special leave petition should not be disposed of at this stage.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on May 3rd, 2007, Criminal Appeal No. 592-SB of 1997 was placed on Daily Board of the High Court showing them to be Motion petitions. It was, therefore, submitted that the case was not placed for regular final hearing. It was, however, taken up for final hearing. One Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae for the accused who was heard and the matter was disposed of. The order which was passed by the High Court reads as under: Present : Mrs. Ritu Punj, DAG, Haryana. Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate is appointed as Amicus Curiae. Heard. Dismissed, reasons to follow.

(emphasis supplied)

4. From the above order, passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 592-SB of 1997, it was submitted by the learned counsel that Deputy Advocate General for the State of Haryana was present. For the accused, Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae on that date. On the same day, the matter was dismissed and the High Court stated - Dismissed, reasons to follow.

5. In our opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that the High Court ought not to have disposed of the appeal without recording reasons. This Court has deprecated the practice of disposing of matters without recording reasons in support of such decision. It has been insisted that when the matter is decided by a Court, reasons must be recorded in support of such decision. It is because the aggrieved party may make grievance in the superior Court that the reasons recorded by the trial Court were non- existent, extraneous, irrelevant, etc. The successful party, on the other hand, may support the reasons recorded by the Court in his favour. Finally, the superior Court may also consider whether reasons recorded by the Court in support of the order passed by it were in consonance with law and whether interference is called for. If the final order is without any reason, several questions may arise and it will be difficult for the parties to the proceedings as well as the superior Court to decide the matter one way or the other. This Court has, therefore, deprecated the practice of pronouncing final order without recording reasons in support of such order.

6. Before more than two decades, in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (9184) 1 SCC 596, the Court said: We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the order, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reason