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2008 (8) SCC 564
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K.MATHUR And TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.
M/s. K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. - Appellant.
VERSUS
M/s. Development Consultant Ltd. - Respondent
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5659-5660 OF 2002
Decided On: May 12, 2008
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 - Section 13(6) - Transfer of Property Act - Section 108(o) - Suit premises - Permanent injunction - Respondent became a tenant in respect of a flat as fully described in Schedule-A of plaint in suit property for residential accommodation of a particular officer and members of his family and for no other purpose - Monthly rent was fixed at which included the rent of fixtures fittings and parking place payable in advance by of current month for which the rent became due - Monthly rent and other charges were increased - Held, Before court part with this judgment, we may deal with a short submission of that since lease agreement in question was simplicitor a tenancy agreement which is not compulsorily registrable respondent was liable to be evicted even under provisions of Act - Court are unable to agree with this contention of for simple reason that for a decree to be passed under Act landlord has to plead and prove one of grounds mentioned in Section 13 of Act - Even if court accept that appellant had made out a case under Section 13(1b) of Act to extent that respondent was liable to be evicted - Appeal Dismissed
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The dispute involves a lease agreement for a residential flat, where the tenant was initially designated for a specific officer and his family, with the condition that the premises be used solely for residential purposes for that officer and his family (!) (!) .
The lease agreement explicitly states that if the tenant intends to use the premises for any purpose other than residential accommodation for the named officer and his family, written consent from the landlord is required, and the landlord has the right to approve or disapprove such use (!) .
The tenant, respondent, vacated the premises after the officer, Mr. Keshab Das, vacated, but refused to surrender possession despite notices, leading to legal proceedings for eviction (!) (!) .
The courts examined whether the lease agreement, which was unregistered, could be used to prove that the premises was let out only for the officer’s residence and whether the respondent violated this condition by allowing another officer to occupy the premises (!) (!) (!) .
The courts held that the unregistered lease agreement could not be used to establish the specific purpose of letting out the premises as a condition for eviction, as such terms are not collateral facts permissible for proof under the relevant legal provisions (!) (!) (!) (!) .
It was also determined that the respondent's act of permitting another officer to occupy the premises after the original officer vacated did not constitute a "change of user" within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, and thus did not justify eviction on the grounds of user violation (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The courts emphasized that for eviction under the applicable tenancy law, the landlord must prove specific grounds enumerated in the statute, and the mere existence of a lease agreement with certain conditions does not automatically lead to eviction if those conditions are not legally enforceable or are not proven to be violated (!) (!) .
The courts concluded that the lease agreement's clause restricting use to a particular officer could not be relied upon for eviction purposes because it was an unregistered document and could not be used to establish a collateral purpose, nor could it be used to prove that the respondent violated the lease terms (!) (!) .
The decision also clarifies that the respondent's conduct, in allowing another officer to occupy the premises after vacating the original officer, did not amount to a breach of the lease or statutory provisions, and therefore, eviction was not justified (!) (!) (!) .
Overall, the courts dismissed the appeal, affirming that the landlord failed to establish the necessary legal grounds for eviction based on the lease terms or statutory violations, and upheld the dismissal of the suit for eviction (!) (!) (!) .
These points collectively summarize the legal reasoning, findings, and conclusions related to the lease agreement, statutory provisions, and the grounds for eviction in this case.
JUDGMENT
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.
These two appeals are directed against the common final judgment and order dated 18th of May, 2001 of the High Court of Calcutta passed in F.A. Nos. 39-40 of 1999 affirming the judgment and decree dated 11th of November, 1998 passed by the Asstt. District Judge, 9th Court at Alipore, South 24 Parganas whereby the two suits namely, Title Suit No 19/92 and 39/92 filed at the instance of the appellant were dismissed.
2.The facts leading to the filing of these two appeals are narrated in a nutshell as follows:
M/s. K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. (in short "the appellant") brought Title Suit No. 19/92 before the 9th Court of the Asstt. District Judge, Alipore, South 24 Parganas against M/s. Development Consultants Ltd. (in short "the respondent") alleging, inter alia, that the appellant was the owner of Premises No. 28/8, Gariahat Road, within Police Station Lake in the district of South 24 Parganas (hereinafter called "the suit property").
3. By a memorandum dated 30th of March, 1976, the respondent became a tenant in respect of a flat, as fully described in Schedule-A of the plaint, in the suit property (hereinafter called "the suit premises") for the residential accommodation of a particular officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family and for no other purpose. The monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 1100/-, which included the rent of fixtures, fittings and parking place payable in advance by 5th of the current month for which the rent became due. The monthly rent and other charges were increased to Rs. 1210/- from September, 1985.
4. The appellant alleged that the memorandum dated 30th of March, 1976 specifically provided that if the respondent intended to use the suit premises for any purpose other than providing residential accommodation to its named officer Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family, the respondent would have to seek a written consent from the appellant bringing the change of purpose by a notice.
5. By a letter dated 6th of March, 1992, the respondent informed the appellant that Mr. Keshab Das had vacated the suit premises and that it wanted to make repairs and to allot the same to another employee to which the appellant objected and replied by a letter dated 12th of March, 1992 that the respondent had no right to allot the suit premises to another employee and, therefore, must surrender the same once vacated by Mr. Keshab Das. However, the appellant was informed by the respondent that they would not surrender the suit premises and shall carry out the repair work in it. In this backdrop, the aforesaid Title Suit No. 19/92 was filed by the appellant for declaration and permanent injunction that as per the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 30th of March, 1976, the respondent had no right to allot the suit premises to any other employee after the same was vacated by Mr. Keshab Das and members of his family.
6. By an interim order passed on 13th of March, 1992 in the aforesaid suit, the Assistant District Judge, 9th Court at Alipore had passed an order of injunction restraining the respondent from allowing any other person except Mr. Das to occupy the suit premises. This interim order was made final on 2nd of September, 1992. On 18th of March, 1995, a notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short "the Act") was served on the respondent asking them to vacate the suit premises and on failure of the respondent to vacate the suit premises as desired in the notice, another suit was filed by the appellant being Title Suit No. 39/95 praying for ejectment of the respondent from the suit premises.
7. The aforesaid suit was brought by the appellant with similar allegations as contained in Title Suit No. 19/92 and it was alleged, inter alia, that although the respondent was bound to vacate the suit premises after Mr. Das had vacated the same, yet the respondent had not vacated the suit premises and, therefore, the appellant was constrained to file the aforesai
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