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1883 Supreme(SC) 1

PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BLACKBURN, SIR BARNES PEACOCK, SIR ROBERT P. COLLIER, SIR RICHARD COUCH, AND SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
BALWANT RAO BISHWANT CHANDRA CHOR - Appellant
Versus
PURUN MAL CHAUBE - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Allahabad.
Decided On : February 27, 1883.

Advocates:
Solicitors for the Appellant: Oehme & Summerhays.

Section 10 of the Limitation Act 1871 applies only to recovering trust property diverted from its purpose; it does not exempt suits for the personal right to manage an endowment from limitation, especially if the property is being used for the trust's objects.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1871 - Section 10 - Suit for recovery of trust property - The expression "for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property" means recovering property for the trusts when it is used for a purpose other than the proper purpose of the trusts - Where the manager admits the property is an endowment and applies it to the trusts, a suit for the personal right to manage or control the endowment does not fall within the scope of Section 10 and is subject to the period of limitation prescribed in the schedule. (Paras 75-76)

(B) Limitation Act, 1871 - Articles 123, 145 and 118 - Suit for declaration of right to manage temple services and recovery of possession - If the suit does not fall under the exception of trust property for the purpose of following the property, it is barred by the applicable limitation period if the cause of action arose beyond the prescribed time. (Para 76)

Facts of the case:
The appellant, as an heir to the founder of a temple, sought to remove the respondent from the management of the temple and its properties and to be declared authorized to appoint a new manager. The respondent and his ancestors had managed the property for several decades. The appellant had previously raised concerns about the misappropriation of funds but did not institute a civil suit for nearly twelve years. The respondent contended that the suit was barred by limitation and that he had been in adverse possession.

Findings of Court:
The court found that no evidence of misappropriation or misconduct by the respondent was adduced. The respondent admitted that the property was an endowment and that the income was being spent for the purposes of the temple.

Issues: Whether a suit to remove a manager of an endowment and claim the right to manage it is barred by limitation, and whether such a suit falls under the exception provided in Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1871.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1871, applies only to suits for recovering trust property that has been diverted from its intended purpose. It does not apply to suits where the plaintiff seeks a personal right to manage the trust, particularly when the property is still being used for the trust's objects. Consequently, such suits are subject to the limitation periods specified in the schedule of the Act.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • practice and procedure
    • limitation
      • trust property
  • property law
    • trusts and endowments
      • religious endowments

Judgement

APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court (Feb. 10, 1879), which reversed a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Agra (March 30, 1878).

The Appellant sued to remove the Respondent from the management of the worship and service performed at the temple of Thakur Ganeshji and the management of the garden; to remove the power and control of the Respondent from the temple, garden, and mouzah Mandesi; and to be declared authorized to appoint a second manager for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the endowment.

The Respondent by his written statement contended that the suit was barred by limitation; that neither the Appellant nor any of his ancestors had had any possession of or concern with the disputed property; that the Respondent and his ancestors had all along been in independent and adverse possession of it; that the disputed property was an endowment appertaining to the temple, and the income had always been spent for the purposes of the temple, and the Respondents possession had always remained what it then was.

The facts appear in the judgment of their Lordships.

Law. Rep. 10 Ind. App. 90 ( 1882- 1883) Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Chor V. Purun Mal Chaube 73

The Subordinate Judge decided that the Respondents possession was that of the manager of an endowment, that "consequently his possession could not with reference to its very nature be regarded as adverse," and that the definition given in sect. 10 of Act IX. of 1871 was in all respects applicable to the property in suit, which therefore was not barred by limitation, whether the cause of action accrued beyond or within the last twelve years. He decreed the Appellants suit with costs.

The judgment of the High Court (Pearson and Spankie, JJ.), so far as material, was as follows —

" The primary question is, whether the suit is barred by limitation, or not ?

"The Lower Court has erroneously held the provisions of sect. 10, Act IX. of 1871, to remove any bar of limitation. This is not a suit of the nature contemplated by that section.

" Neither of the parties has any personal ownership in the property. In so far as the suit is for a declaration that the Plaintiff is by right of inheritance the chief manager of the temple services and properties, and as such is entitled to dismiss the Defendant and appoint another person as sub-manager, art. 123, and (in so far as it seeks recovery of possession of the temple properties), art. 145, Sched. 2, Act IX. of 1871, appear to be applicable and to bar the suit, inasmuch as it has not been brought within twelve years from the time when the Defendant obtained adverse possession of the office and property.

" The appeal is therefore decreed and the suit dismissed, with costs of both Courts, by reversal of Lower Courts decree."

Cowie, Q.C., and Raikes, for the Appellant, contended that a suit to change a trustee was a suit to follow the property within the meaning of sect. 10 of Act IX. of 1871. The Plaintiff in such a suit as this, which is practically for the administration of the trusts of the endowment, follows up the property as heir to the founder, who is in the position of cestui que trust, while the manager is trustee see Prosunno Moyee Dossee v. Koonjo Beharee Chowdhree (Suth. W. R. ( 1864) p. 157.), Bhurruck Chunder Sahoo v. Golam Shuruff (10 Suth. W. R. 458); Juggutmoheenee Dossee v. Solchamonee Dossee (10 Beng. L. R. 33.). As to how far private rights and interests are interfered with by the legislation which removes the superintendence of temples from the Government, see Act XX. of 1863, ss. 10, 14 Jeyangarulavaru v. Durma Dorsji (4 Madras H. C. R. p. 2.); Agri Sharma Embrandri v. Vistnu Embrandri (3 Madras H. C. R. 198.). This is not a suit under that Act so as to require the leave of the Court under sect. 18. That was an enabling Act to give power to sue to those who previously did not possess it— not to restrict the rights of those who did. The Appellants right of suit is independent of the Act—as heir to



















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