The court has discretionary power to extend the time for furnishing security for costs under the Code of Civil Procedure, and this power remains available regardless of whether the application for extension is made before or after the original deadline has expired.

Judgement

Appeal from an order of the High Court (June 2, 1885), made under Civil Procedure Code, s. 549.

The circumstances are stated in the judgment of their Lordships.

Branson, for the Appellant.

C. W- Arathoon, for the Respondent.

The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

SIR RICHARD COUCH —

This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Calcutta, made on the 2nd of June, 1885.

On the 12th of February, 1885, an order was made by that Court, directing that the Appellant should

Law. Rep. 17 Ind. App. 1 ( 1889- 1890)

Budri Narain V. Mussummat Sheo Koer 103

within two months furnish security to the extent of Rs.5000 in respect of the costs of the appeal before it, and of the original suit. It appears that on the 10th of April, two days before the expiration of the period of two months, the Appellant offered as security a bond by two parties of two sets of properties, and on the 13th of April the pleader of the Respondent asked that the matter might stand over, and that it should be referred to the Registrar to inquire whether the security was sufficient, that being the day after the expiration of the two months. The matter went to the Registrar. There was first an extension of time until the 20th of April, and on the 18th of April a further extension until the 27th. On the 28th of April the Registrar submitted a report in which he stated that each of the two sets of properties included in the security bond, which had been executed on the 24th of March, 1885, and registered on the 1st of April, was of sufficient value, but he sub mitted for the judgment of the High Court questions of law which had been raised before him with regard to the power of the parties executing the bond to deal with the properties. On the 2nd of June the High Court, on the matter coming before them, made a decree by which they said M It is ordered, under the provisions of sect. 549 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that this appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed." Their reason for dismissing it appears in their judgment, in which they say u We find that it has been decided by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Haidri Bai v. East Indian Railway Company (Ind. L. R. 1 Allah. 688.) that where the High Court orders an Appellant to give security for costs, the Court may extend the time within which it orders the security to be furnished, if an application is made within that time, but if the security is not given within the time ordered by the Court, and no application is made within that time to extend the time for giving security, the Court is bound, by sect. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code, to reject the appeal." It is contended before their Lordships that the effect of that section is that the security which was tendered on the 10th of April is the only security which can be looked at, and if, upon the inquiry which was afterwards made, it turns out to be insufficient, the Court has no power under the Act to extend the time for giving security so as to enable the Appellant to do what, when it appeared that there was this doubt about the right of the parties to pledge the property included in the bond, he was willing to do, namely, deposit the sum of Ks.5000. In the present case this observation arises, that, in fact, the Court did give an extension of time beyond the 12th of April, and, if the Appellant is right, the proceedings by which the matter was referred to the report of the Registrar on the 13th, on the application of the Respondents pleader, would be altogether nugatory and idle. The Court, up to the time of the Registrar making his report, did give time for inquiry, and substantially did give an extension of time up to that period. The question is this, Is the Act so framed as to make it imperative upon the Court to reject the appeal if it turns out, upon the inquiry, that the security is insufficient ? The words do not seem to be such as to require that conclusion. The section says " That the Appellate Court may, at its discretion, e