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1876 Supreme(SC) 13
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
SIR JAMES W. COLVILE, SIR BARNES PEACOCK, SIR MONTAGUE E. AND SIR SMITH, AND SIR ROBERT P. COLLIER.
REASUT HOSSEIN - Appellant
Versus
HADJEE ABDOOLLAH - Respondents
On Appeal Prom The High Court at Bengal.
Decided On : May, 24, 1876.
Agent for Appellant:T. L. Wilson. Agent for Respondents: Horace Earle.
Orders rejecting registration under the Registration Act are final adjudications subject to review under the procedure of Act VIII of 1859. The admission of such a review is a matter of judicial discretion, and an error in that discretion does not constitute a lack of jurisdiction.
Headnote:(A) Indian Registration Act, 1871 - Section 76 - Act VIII of 1859 - Sections 376 and 378 - Amending Act of 1861 - Section 38 - Review of order rejecting registration - Jurisdiction of District Court - Power of High Court of superintendence - Whether an order rejecting an application for registration is subject to review - Procedure in miscellaneous proceedings - Exercise of judicial discretion.
(B) Jurisdiction of High Court - The District Courts mentioned in the Registration Act are the courts exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction within the district and are therefore subject to the superintending power of the High Court.
(C) Review of Order - An order rejecting an application for registration under the Registration Act is a final adjudication between the parties and, by virtue of the Amending Act of 1861, the procedure prescribed by Act VIII of 1859, including the power to grant a review, is applicable to such miscellaneous proceedings.
(D) Scope of Review - The power to grant a review based on "other good and sufficient reason" or to "correct an evident error or omission" or for the "ends of justice" is broad. The admission of a review is an exercise of judicial discretion; an error in exercising such discretion is a matter for appellate reversal and does not equate to a total lack of jurisdiction.
Facts of the case:
A deed of gift was presented for registration, but the heirs of the donor denied its execution. The registering officer refused registration, and a subsequent application to the District Judge for an order to register was rejected. A successor Judge admitted a petition for review of this rejection. The High Court set aside the order admitting the review, ruling that the Judge had acted without jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the District Court in the Registration Act refers to the ordinary civil court of the district. It further held that the procedure of the 1859 Act applies to miscellaneous proceedings under the Registration Act via the Amending Act of 1861. The order of rejection was a final adjudication, making it eligible for review. The Judge's decision to admit the review was an exercise of discretion, not an act without jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the District Judge's order; whether an order rejecting registration is subject to review under the 1859 Act; and whether the admission of a review without a specific allegation of error of law or new evidence constitutes a lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi: The procedure of Act VIII of 1859 is applicable to miscellaneous proceedings under the Registration Act. A final order of adjudication, even in a summary proceeding, is subject to review. The discretion to grant a review for the "ends of justice" is wide, and an incorrect exercise of this discretion is an error of judicial discretion rather than a jurisdictional defect.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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civil procedure
- review of judgments
- jurisdiction and superintendence
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civil procedure
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property law
- registration of documents
Judgements
THIS appeal was preferred in accordance with an order of Her Majesty in Council of the 12th of December, 1873, granting special leave to appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court at Calcutta, dated the 2nd of April, 1873, by which an order of the Judge of Gya, dated the 4th of January, 1873, was set aside, and a petition for review which had been by the said order admitted for argument was directed to be dismissed.
The questions in this appeal arose upon the Indian Registration Act, VIII. of 1871; and are, firstly, whether the Judge of Gya, Mr. Craster, representing the "District Court," defined by that Act, had jurisdiction to admit for argument a petition for review filed within ninety days of an order made by his predecessor in office, Mr. Tayler, who had left that district after making it, by which the latter had refused to direct the registration at the application of the Appellant of a deed of gift of certain lands; and secondly, whether, irrespective of the District Court having or not such jurisdiction, a division bench of the said High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the Judges order.
The facts and proceedings in the case are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
Doyne, for the Appellant, contended that the order appealed from of the High Court was ultra vires, inasmuch as the High Court had no general power of superintendence under sect. 15 of 24 & 25 Viet.
c. 104, over the district Courts created by the Registration Court. He referred to the interpretation clauses of the Registration Act (VIII. of 1871) contained in sect. 3, and submitted that the " District Court" referred to in the Act was not at all synonymous or necessarily co-extensive as to the area of jurisdiction with the District Court ordinarily so called, which alone is subject to the appellate jurisdiction and superintendence of the High Court. He referred also to sect. 10 of the Act, and contended that the special jurisdiction conferred by the Act on the district Judge is not within the superintending power of the High Court. The petition of review was presented, because under sect. 76 of the Registration Act of 1871, there was no right of appeal. The order rejecting an application to register was in the nature of a decree, and at all events was liable to be reviewed; see Haradhun Mookerjee v. Chunder Mohun Roy ((1) Marshalls Rep. 207.) ; and the pro cedure prescribed by sects. 376 and 378 of Act VIII. of 1859 is applicable to a proceeding for the purpose of reviewing such order. The Judge therefore had the power to grant a review as prayed, and it is contended that he rightly exercised that power.
Bell, and C. W. Arathoon, for the Respondent, contended that, under sect. 23 of Act XXIII. of 1861, the proper course for the Appellant to have adopted was to have appealed from the order of rejection. See also sect. 38 of the said Act. That order did not fall within sect. 76 of the Registration Act. Even if the sects 376-378 of Act VIII. of 1859, referred to on the other side, applied to the case, they do not justify the particular exercise of jurisdiction which the High Court set aside. There was neither allegation of error of law, nor of the discovery of new evidence to justify the application for review, or to give jurisdiction to the Judge to entertain it. The rules which limit the discretion of the Court in granting orders of review are laid down in Nusseeroodeen Khan v. Indernaryan Chaudury ((1) 1 Ind. Jur. p. 147.). See also Juggudumba Debea v. Muneeruthn Mookerjee ((2) S. D. A. 1858, p. 1539.). Even if the order of rejection in this case was final under sect. 76 of the Registration Act, and subject neither to appeal nor to review, it was not a decree which precluded further litigation, and it was open to the parties aggrieved to obtain registration of their deed of gift by a regular suit. See Futteh Chund Sahoo v. Leelumber Singh Doss and Others ((3) 14 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 129.). [Sir Barnes Peacock referred to the sect
