Judgment :-

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of the Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Delhi in WP No.6527/2008 filed by the appellant-Rajkumar Shivhare.

3. A Writ Petition was filed challenging the order dated 17.7.2008 of the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, Janpath, New Delhi, (hereinafter `the Tribunal'), on various grounds with which this Court is not concerned. By that order, the Tribunal refused to dispense with the pre-deposit of penalty by the appellant and the concluding portion of that order is:

"...Therefore, the application for dispensation of pre-deposit of penalty is dismissed and rejected but the appellant is permitted to deposit full amount of penalty within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order failing which the appeal will be dismissed on this ground alone. The appeal is fixed for hearing on 4th September, 2008".

4. The facts of the case in brief are as follows:

The appellant, along with another person, were issued a notice dated 12.1.2005 under Section 3(c) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) for receiving unauthorized payments worth Rs.5 crores under instructions from persons living outside India in connection with his illegal cricket betting operation. He was also asked to explain why the amount of Rs.1 lac, confiscated during search from his residence, should not be credited to the account of the Central Government under Section 13(2) of FEMA, 1999.

5. As the charges were proved against him, a penalty of Rs.2 crores was imposed on him and the confiscated money was disposed of according to Section 13(2) vide order dated 29.02.2008.

6. On appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19(2) of the Act, the Tribunal passed the order dated 17.7.2008, the concluding portion whereof is quoted above.

7. Then, a writ petition came to be filed challenging the order dated 17.7.2008.

8. The High Court, without going into the merits of the petition, accepted the preliminary objection raised by the respondent that the High Court of Delhi did not have territorial jurisdiction to decide the matter. High Court of Delhi rejected the writ petition on that ground and gave liberty to approach the appropriate High court.

9. While dismissing the writ petition, on the ground that it lacked territorial jurisdiction, the High Court relied on the decision of this Court rendered in Ambica Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) (6) SCC 769, on the interpretation of Section 35 of FEMA.

10. The High Court in its judgment gave the following reasoning:

"The position is analogous to that of the Union Government. The statement that the Union Government is located throughout every part of Indian Territory and hence can be sued in any Court of the country, brooks no cavil. This does not, however, inexorably lead to the consequence that a litigant can pick and choose between any Court as per his caprice and convenience..."

11. It held that in exercising its powers under Article 226, a High Court must consider that the person, Authority or Government is located within its territories or a significant part of the cause of action has arisen within its territories. It referred to Ambica Industries (supra) again where this Court held that

".....the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litis, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or courts or tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdict