ORDER

1. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16-7-2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 5756 of 2008 by which the High Court, in the exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, had set aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below by which an application for injunction filed by the appellant in a pending suit was allowed I in the manner indicated in the said order.

2. The appellant before us is the original plaintiff in the suit which has been filed for declaration and injunction. As noted here in earlier, against the order of the High Court setting aside the concurrent orders of the courts below allowing an application for injunction pending disposal of the suit, the appellant-plaintiff has come up to this Court by way of a special leave petition which on grant of leave was heard in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. We have heard Mr Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff and Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-defendant. We have examined the impugned order as well as the orders of the courts below in depth and in detail. We have also heard the learned Senior Counsel for both the parties in extenso. In our view, the findings arrived at by the courts below cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary for which the High Court could set aside the said orders in the exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution.

4. On a thorough reading of the judgment of the High Court which is under challenge before this Court and also the orders of the courts below, it can be said that there is some arguable point to be gone into for the purpose of deciding whether the appellant-plaintiff is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the access ~o the said premises from Mogul Lane side by the appellant and its customers in addition to the gate on the other side of its hypermarket. Since this is a question to be gone into on evidence at the time of trial and' in view of the fact that the appellant-plaintiff and their customers were using the said entry from Mogul Lane to the hypermarket, we are of the view that at this stage, the High Court was not justified in exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution to set aside the concurrent orders of the courts below which by any means cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary.

5. In Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri & Co. I this Court has observed that when the findings of fact recorded by the courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the Revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own.

6. In the present case, the question arose whether under the leave and , licence agreement entered into by the parties, the appellant-plaintiff was entitled or is entitled to use the gate from Mogul Lane for the access to its hypermarket or not. At this stage, it is very difficult to say that the two courts below were not justified in holding prima facie that such right exists to the appellant-plaintiff, this aspect can only be gone into by the parties on the evidence to be produced at the time of final hearing of the suit.

7. A substantial question on the interpretation of the rights of the parties to use the gate from Mogul Lane to the hypermarket of the appellant-plaintiff had arisen and, therefore, there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent orders of the courts below in the exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution.

S. In Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway2, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 5)

"5. In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court