IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution.
2. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.

Judgment :-

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 8.4.2008 in Criminal Application No. 157 of 2008 in Criminal Appeal No. 1243 of 2007 passed by the High Court of Bombay, by way of which, the High Court passed an order of suspension of the conviction of the respondent under Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act 1988’), passed by the Special Judge, vide order dated 15.10.2007 in Special Case No. 93 of 2000.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as follows:

A) On 8.1.1999, Special Case No. 93 of 2000 in R.C. No. 39-A of 1999 was registered against the respondent, the then Superintendent of Central Excise, Mumbai, for the offences punishable under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act 1988, alleging that he possessed assets disproportionate to his disclosed source of income which was to the extent of Rs. 7,64,368/-

B) After completing the investigation of the case, the investigating agency filed a charge-sheet dated 27.12.2000, under the said provisions of the Act, 1988. The trial court concluded the trial and convicted the respondent under the said provisions and awarded him a sentence of two years, along with a fine of Rs.1 lakh and, in default, to undergo imprisonment for a further period of three months, vide judgment and order dated 15.10.2007.

C) Subsequent to his conviction, the respondent was put under suspension by the competent authority vide order dated 1.11.2007 and was served a show-cause notice dated 25.1.2008, to explain that in view of his conviction for the offence punishable under the Act 1988, why he should not be dismissed from service, in view of the provisions of Rule 11 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The respondent was given 15 days time to make his representation against the said show cause notice.

D) The respondent approached the High Court by filing an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) requesting that during the pendency of his appeal against the said impugned judgment, the order of conviction against him be suspended. The said application of suspension of conviction has been allowed vide impugned order dated 8.4.2008.

Hence, this appeal.

3. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned ASG, appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the High Court could exercise its power under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C., for suspension of such conviction only in the rarest of rare case. In the instant case, as the respondent was a public servant and had been convicted on charges of corruption, the High Court was not justified in passing the said order of suspension of conviction. The High Court should have considered the ramifications of such suspension, as such an order would, no doubt demoralise the employers and also other public servants. Under no circumstance, does the case of the respondent fall under the exceptional circumstances under which, such an order would be warranted. Thus, it is nothing but an abuse of the adjudicatory process of law and justice demands that he should be treated as a corrupt and guilty person, unless he is proved to be innocent. The appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside.

4. On the contrary, Shri Sushil Karanjkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the respondent did not have disproportionate assets as alleged. There has been a serious error on the part of the trial court in making such assessment and convicting the respondent on the basis of the same. In fact, it is the income of his wife which was duly proved before the statutory authorities, under the Income Tax Act 1961. Subsequent to the conviction of the respondent, the appeal was allowed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, vide order dated 17.3.2009 wherein, it was accepted th