JUDGMENT

Ranjan Gogoi, J.:- The petitioner has been convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter for short “the NDPS Act”) by an order of the learned Sessions Judge, Sirsa, Haryana dated 27.7.1990. He has been sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 10 years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One lakh only), in default, to suffer further RI for a period of 3 years. The said order has been confirmed in appeal. The petitioner, on the date of the filing of the present writ petition, had undergone custody for a period of more than 7 years. He contends that taking into account the remissions which would have been due to him under different Government Notifications/Orders issued from time to time he would have been entitled to be released from prison. However, by virtue of the provisions of Section 32A of the NDPS Act, the benefit of such remissions have been denied to him resulting in his continued custody. Consequently, by means of this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, he has challenged the constitutional validity of Section 32A of the NDPS Act, inter-alia, on the ground that the said provision violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14, 20(1) and 21 of the Constitution.

2. Insofar as the challenge founded on violation of Articles 14 and 21 is concerned, the issue stands squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Dadu alias Tulsidas vs. State of Maharashtra[(2000) 8 SCC 437]. The following extract from para 15 from the decision in Dadu (supra) which deals with the contentions advanced on the basis of Articles 14 and 21 and the views of this Court on the said contentions amply sums up the situation.

“The distinction of the convicts under the Act and under other statutes, insofar as it relates to the exercise of executive powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code is concerned, cannot be termed to be either arbitrary or discriminatory being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such deprivation of the executive can also not be stretched to hold that the right to life of a person has been taken away except, according to the procedure established by law. It is not contended on behalf of the petitioners that the procedure prescribed under the Act for holding the trial is not reasonable, fair and just. The offending section, insofar as it relates to the executive in the matter of suspension, remission and commutation of sentence, after conviction, does not, in any way, encroach upon the personal liberty of the convict tried fairly and sentenced under the Act. The procedure prescribed for holding the trial under the Act cannot be termed to be arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. There is, therefore, no vice of unconstitutionality in the section insofar as it takes away the powers of the executive conferred upon it under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code, to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of a convict under the Act.”

3. It is to the challenge founded on alleged violation of Article 20(1) that the attention of the Court will have to be primarily focused in the present case. Article 20(1) is in the following terms:

“20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.- (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.”

4. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that though the petitioner has been sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 10 years on being found guilty under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, the said period of imprisonment must be understood to be subject to such remissions to which the petitioner would have been entitled to in the normal course. However, Section 32A of the NDPS Act by denying the benefit of remissions has, in fact, enlarged the period