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2013 Supreme(SC) 354

Supreme Court of India
B.S. CHAUHAN & FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.
Ram Prakash Agarwal & Others – Appellants
Versus
Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs.) & Others – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2798 of 2013 and Civil Appeal No. 2799 of 2013
Decided On : 11-04-2013

Headnote:

Civil Procedure Code,1950 - Section 151 - Order IX -Rule 13 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 4 - claiming compensation - apportionment before the Reference Court - Court of the Civil Judge Mohanlal Ganj, Lucknow, seeking the relief of declaration, stating that Janki Bibi was only a life estate holder in respect of the properties shown in Schedule ‘A’, and that further, she was not entitled to receive the compensation or rehabilitation grant bonds with respect to the village Nawai Perg., Jhalotar Ajgain, Tehsil Hasangunj, District Unnao. He stated all this, claiming himself to be her adopted son -contested the suit, denying the aforesaid adoption. However, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 23.4.1958, holding that while Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was in fact the life estate holder of Radhey Shyam’s property, she was also entitled to receive the said compensation in respect of the property in question herein -property bearing no.264/1-53 admeasuring 17 bighas, 2 biswas, 2 biswansi and 19 kachwansi to the extent of half share situated in village Suppa Rao, Pargana Tehsil, District Lucknow, was owned by Radhey Shyam. The aforesaid suit land was acquired by the State Government for Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as, the ‘Parishad’), for the development of the Talkatora Road Scheme, Lucknow, vide notification -Held, Court by playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the Court to recall the said order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can also be exercised by the appellate court - Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing an independent suit -person aggrieved may maintain an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, but cannot make an application for impleadment or apportionment before the Reference Court instant case has been examined in light of the aforesaid legal propositions. We are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and is hence liable to be set asidecase is required to be examined from another angle. Undoubtedly, the respondents did not make any application either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act, 1894 to the Land Acquisition Collector. The jurisdiction of the Reference Court, vis-à-vis “persons interested” has been explained by this Court in Shyamali Das v. Illa Chowdhry & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 215, holding that the Reference Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain any application of pro interesse suo, or in the nature thereof. The Court held as Act is a complete code by itself. It provides for remedies not only to those whose lands have been acquired but also to those who claim the awarded amount or any apportionment thereof. A Land Acquisition Judge derives its jurisdiction from the order of reference. It is bound thereby. His jurisdiction is to determine adequacy and otherwise of the amount of compensation paid under the award made by the Collector”. Thus holding that, “It is not within his domain to entertain any application of pro interesse suo or in the nature – appeal allowed

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

  1. An application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings. Such an application is not maintainable at the behest of a stranger to the original suit or proceeding (!) .

  2. The inherent powers under Section 151 CPC are to be exercised solely to address grievances for which no specific remedy is provided under the CPC. These powers are meant to ensure justice and should not be used to re-open settled matters or to bypass other specific provisions of law (!) .

  3. If an order has been obtained through fraud upon the court, the court has the authority to recall or set aside that order upon the application of the aggrieved party. This power can also be exercised by an appellate court (!) .

  4. When fraud is committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate the factual issue of the fraud in its inherent jurisdiction. Instead, the aggrieved party has the right to seek the order or judgment's setting aside through an independent suit (!) .

  5. A person who has not made an application before the Land Acquisition Collector under Sections 18 or 30 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot directly seek to be impleaded or seek apportionment of compensation before the Reference Court. Such remedies are only available through proper proceedings initiated by a person interested and through the prescribed channels (!) .

  6. The legal principles and the specific facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court are not sustainable under law. Therefore, the appeals are allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The respondents are free to pursue appropriate legal remedies as per law (!) .

These points summarize the core legal propositions and the outcome based on the analysis in the document.


Judgment :-

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order, dated 20.10.2011, passed by the High Court of Allahabad, (Lucknow Bench) in Writ Petition No.764 of 2002 (MS), by way of which, the High Court has set aside the order of the trial court dated 20.2.2002 by which it had rejected the application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’), for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 22.5.2000 in Misc. Case No. 66 of 1999.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

A. The dispute pertains to the ownership of shop no.53/11 (old number) corresponding to its new number, i.e. 53/8, Nayayaganj, Kanpur Nagar. Janki Bibi (Ist) daughter of Har Dayal, was married to one Durga Prasad, son of Dina Nath. Radhey Shyam was the adopted son of Durga Prasad, whose son Shyam Sunder was married to Janki Bibi (2nd). Shyam Sunder died in the year 1914. Thus, Radhey Shyam created a life interest in the property in favour of Janki Bibi (2nd), by way of an oral Will, which further provided that she would have the right to adopt a son only with the consent of Mohan Lal, the grand son of Har Dayal. Gopi Krishan, the great grand son of Mohan Lal, claims to have been adopted by Janki Bibi (2nd), with the consent of Mohan Lal, and as regards the same, a registered document was also prepared.

B. Gopi Krishan filed Regular Suit No.45 of 1956 against Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd), in the Court of the Civil Judge Mohanlal Ganj, Lucknow, seeking the relief of declaration, stating that Janki Bibi was only a life estate holder in respect of the properties shown in Schedule ‘A’, and that further, she was not entitled to receive the compensation or rehabilitation grant bonds with respect to the village Nawai Perg., Jhalotar Ajgain, Tehsil Hasangunj, District Unnao. He stated all this, claiming himself to be her adopted son.

C. Janki Bibi (2nd) contested the suit, denying the aforesaid adoption. However, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 23.4.1958, holding that while Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was in fact the life estate holder of Radhey Shyam’s property, she was also entitled to receive the said compensation in respect of the property in question herein.

D. That the property bearing no.264/1-53 admeasuring 17 bighas, 2 biswas, 2 biswansi and 19 kachwansi to the extent of half share situated in village Suppa Rao, Pargana Tehsil, District Lucknow, was owned by Radhey Shyam. The aforesaid suit land was acquired by the State Government for Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as, the ‘Parishad’), for the development of the Talkatora Road Scheme, Lucknow, vide notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act, 1894’) dated 20.10.1962. The possession of the said land was taken on 30.12.1971, after completion of certain formalities.

E. Gopi Krishan approached the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal, constituted under the Municipal Corporation Act, 1959, under Sections 18/30 of the Act, 1894, by filing Misc. Case No.269 of 1983, claiming compensation in respect of the properties acquired by the State of U.P., on the ground that he possessed the legal right to do so, as a vested remainder, under the judgment and decree dated 23.4.1958. In the said case, Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was a party and after her death, Madhuri Saran and his legal heirs were also brought on record, pursuant to the Will of Janki Bibi as a legatee.

F. In the meanwhile, Madhuri Saran, predecessor in interest of the present appellants, filed a Reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.66 of 1999, for enhancement of compensation in respect of half share in the aforesaid suit land. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, Madhuri Saran died and his legal heirs were substituted. Gopi Krishan, respondent no.1 was not impleaded as a par







































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