IMPORTANT POINT
Location of the drawee bank dishonouring the cheque determines the jurisdiction of competent court u/s 138 of NI Act, 1881; not the place of issue of statutory notice.

JUDGMENT

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of a judgment dated 23rd September, 2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 11911 of 2009 whereby the High Court has invoked its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and directed return of all complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 in which the Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi have taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of proviso to Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of the cheque from Delhi. The matter arose out of a writ petition filed by the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee in public interest pointing out that a very large number of complaints under Section 138 of the Act were pending in Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in which cognizance had been taken although the Courts concerned had no territorial jurisdiction to do so. The Committee’s case before the High Court was that such complaints were filed among others by financial institutions and banks only on the ground that the statutory notices demanding payment against the dishonoured cheque had been issued from Delhi. Issue of a notice demanding payment of the dishonoured cheque was not, however, sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Courts in Delhi argued the Committee. Reliance in support was placed upon the decision of this Court in Harman Electronics Private Limited and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Private Limited (2009) 1 SCC 720. The Committee’s grievance was that notwithstanding a clear exposition of law on the subject by this Court in Harman’s case (supra) complaints had been filed and cognizance taken by the Courts in Delhi, relying upon the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510. It was in terms contended before the High Court that in the light of the pronouncement of this Court in Harman’s case (supra) the complaints could not have been entertained nor could the accused persons be summoned for trial in the Courts in Delhi. It was also argued that number of such complaints is so large that the Magistrates in Delhi were unable to handle and effectively manage the docket explosion and attend to what was otherwise within their jurisdiction and called for their immediate attention.

3. The contentions urged by the Committee found favour with the High Court who relying upon the decisions of this Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (AIR 1966 SC 81) and Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors. V. United Labour Union and Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 377 held that the Constitution did not place any fetters on the extraordinary jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court in a situation where Courts are flooded with complaints which they had no jurisdiction to entertain. The High Court further held that a direction for return of the complaints for presentation before the competent Courts was in the circumstances necessary, as Magistrates who had issued the summons were unable to dismiss the complaints suo moto in the light of the decision of this Court in Adalat Prasad Rooplal v. Jindal & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 338. The High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition with the following directions:

“Consequently, in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, we direct return to the complainants for presentation in the Court of competent jurisdiction all those criminal complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act that are pending in the courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in which cognizance has been taken by them without actually having territorial jurisdiction.”

4. The appellant who is a practicing Advocate of the High Court of Delhi has, with the permission of this Court, filed this appeal which was referred for hearing to a three-Judge Bench by an order dated