The main legal point established in the judgment is that when the legislature has given its consent to a separate subject and made provisions for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly.

Lord Blanesburgh.-

In this case the only question their Lordships have now to determine is whether the decree appealed from, of 21st October 1926, which in terms is not expressed to be by consent , was in fact made by consent. In obedience to an order of His Majesty in Council of 12th February 1931, [AIR 1931 PC 107], made in accordance with advice humbly tendered by their Lordships to His Majesty, a remit was sent to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces, being the Court which pronounced the decree in question requesting that Court to inform their Lordships whether or not the decree was in fact made by consent.

Their Lordships have now been informed by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in a report made to the Board, that its judgment of 21st October 1926, and the decree appealed from following thereon, were professedly made with the consent of the parties: that is to say, the decree was consensual and did not, except so far as authorized by consent, embody any judicial finding by the Court itself. Accordingly the decree is one from which no appeal to His Majesty in Council can be entertained. Only in substantive proceedings appropriate to that particular remedy can it, if at all, be set aside. As the Court of the Judicial Commissioner has declared that it proceeded entirely upon the consent of parties in making the decree appealed from their Lordships have not thought it necessary to consider the other statements in its report as to the sufficiency or otherwise of that consent. Upon that declaration alone, they must deal with the appeal on the footing that it is entirely incompetent, and they must humbly advise His Majesty that it be dismissed, and with costs,

Orders accordingly.

__________

*AIR 1932 PRIVY COUNCIL 252 "Muntreal Corporn. V. Montreal Industrial Land Co."

(From Canada)

Coram : 4 Lords Tomlin Thankerton, Macmillan and Wright and Sir George Lowndes

Corporation of the City of Montreal, Appellants v. Montreal Industrial Land Co. Ltd., Respondents.

Privy Council Appeal No. 83 of 1931

D/- 28-7-1932.

* INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES - Interpretation of Statutes - Whether general statute interferes with previous special one is to be determined in each case - Presumption is against interference.

When the legislature has given its consent to a separate subject and made provisions for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. But each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms : Barker v. Edgar (1858) AC 749, Foll [P 254 C 2]

L.E. Beaulieu and G.Saint Pierre, for Appellants; Aime Goeffrion (Canadian Bar), for Respondents.

Solicitors for Appellants, Blake and Redden; Solicitors for Respondents, Lawrence Jones and Co.

Lord Wright-

In this appeal the appellants, the City of Montreal, were defendants in the action and were resisting a claim by the respondents, the plaintiff company, that the Court should set aside an assessment made on them in respect of the cost of certain works of paving executed by the appellants on a road or street called Sherbrooke Street, the respondents being frontagers or bordering owners. The district in which that street was, had before 1910 formed part of the town of Longue Pointe, but in 1910 that town was annexed by the appellants and included in the City of Montreal, as part of a larger scheme for the enlargement of the City boundaries. To carry out these annexations an Act was passed in 1910 by the Legislature of the Province of Quebec, Statutes of Quebec, 1 Geo. V., c. 48-which amended the charter of the City of Montreal, embodied in Statutes of Quebec, 62 Victsc. 58 (1899) ; by S. 1, sub-S. (i) of this amending Act a number of provisions were enacted relating to the annexation of the town of Longue Pointe, which was to form a ward of the appellant City under the name of Longue Pointe Ward, the City was to do