1939 Supreme(SC) 30
Privy Council At Palestine
Sir George Rankin, Lord Romer, Justice Lord Russel of Killowen, JJ.
Saadat Kamel Hanum -Appellant
Versus
Attorney-General -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 2 of 1936
Decided On : 23-05-1939
Important Points
Subject
Civil Law - Property Law (Pious Foundations)
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Interpretation of Article 1667 - The principle that limitation begins when the plaintiff has the right to sue - Example regarding "generation to generation" wakfs - Such examples illustrate the accrual of individual beneficial interests (e.g., right to income) and do not create a special rule of limitation for actions to recover the corpus of the foundation held adversely - A suit to recover foundation property is a claim made on behalf of the foundation itself, including all present and future interests, and is not limited by the personal right of a specific beneficiary or trustee.
(C) Continuous Representation - The office of the trustee provides continuous representation of the foundation and all interests therein - Limitation does not run afresh upon the appointment of a new trustee or the emergence of a new beneficiary.
Facts of the case:
A suit was filed by a trustee and beneficiary of a pious foundation to recover two properties held by the government for over 36 years. The foundation's deed provided for the distribution of income to descendants "generation after generation." The plaintiff contended that under the relevant code, the limitation period should only begin to run after the extinction of the previous generation of beneficiaries, and thus the suit was not barred by limitation.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the action to recover the corpus of the foundation from an adverse possessor falls under the 36-year limitation period. The specific provisions and examples regarding "generation to generation" succession relate to the accrual of individual beneficial interests in income, not to the right of the foundation as an entity to recover its property.
Issues: Whether the limitation period for recovering foundation property held adversely is affected by a "generation to generation" condition of succession, and whether the period resets upon the appointment of a new trustee or the accrual of a new beneficiary's interest.
Ratio Decidendi: An action to recover property for a pious foundation is a claim made on behalf of the foundation's entire interest, present and future. The limitation period of 36 years begins from the time the right of recovery could first have been asserted by anyone on behalf of those interested in the foundation. The "generation to generation" rule applies to the accrual of individual rights to benefit from the foundation, not to the foundation's right to its own property. The office of the trustee ensures continuous representation, meaning limitation is not reset by a change in the person holding that office.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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wakf
- limitation of actions
- management and mutwalliship
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wakf
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succession law
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mahomedan law
- generation to generation succession
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mahomedan law
Burchells, Stoneham & Sons, Versey Fitzgerald, K. Preedy, Attorney-General, J.M. Gover
Sir George Rankin:-
In this case the appellant's suit has been dismissed as barred by limitation and the sole question is whether the dismissal is justified upon a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Mejelle. By a deed of wakf (wakfieh) dated 11th Muharram, 1228 A. H. (1812 A.D.), Emir Ali Pasha made wakf of a number of properties directing that the income should be applied in the first place to the upkeep of a certain mosque and fountain. As regards the balance of income, he directed that it should be paid or distributed to himself for his life and after his death to his three children, Abdulla, Miriam and Hanifeh, and their children.
Then after them it shall be for their children, then to their grand-children and then to their great-grand-children, etc., etc., and so on, males and females according to the Sharia distribution, viz. the share of a male shall be twice as much as that of a female and for their descendants after them as long as they live and continually as they generate, provided that any one of them who dies leaving after him a child, or a grand-child or a great-grand-child his share shall pass down to his child or grand-child or great-grand-child. When one of them dies leaving after him no child, or grand-child or great-grand-child, then his share shall pass down to those who are of his category. The upper category (ascendants) shall enjoy it before the lower category (descendants) and the parents shall enjoy it before the children but not before the children of other beneficiaries. When one of them dies leaving after him a child, or grand-child or a great-grand-child, before becoming a beneficiary to anything in the wakf, then his child, or grand-child, or great-grand-child shall become beneficiaries to the share of their father, as if he were alive. One of them may enjoy it independently in the event if he alone remains alive.
In case of failure of all descendants there was a provision that the money was to be expended for the benefit of two named mosques, and that if this should not be feasible, it should be spent on the poor. The provision as to the office of mutwalli was as follows:
The second condition is that the mutwalliship shall be vested in his honoured son Abdallah Bey Salhashoor Khassa, and then after him it will devolve on the most prudent amongst the male children (descendants) of the dedicator, then after them it shall devolve on the most prudent amongst the female children and then it shall devolve on the most prudent amongst their grand-children and great-grand-children, etc., etc., and so on. If they (wakf properties) revert to both honoured Harams (mosques), then the management shall be vested in the nazir (manager of both of them).
The appellant, Saadat Kamel Hanum, claims to be descended from Ali Pasha through his daughter Miriam in the manner disclosed by the pedigree table hereunder:
In 1915 the appellant's uncle, Abdulla Lami Bey, was appointed to be mutwalli, and by an order of the Sharia Court at Acre, dated 10th January 1926, the appellant was found to be more prudent than either Baland Bey or Youssef Bey and was appointed mutwalli. This order does not expressly mention that Abdulla Lami Bey or the appellant's father, Said Pasha, had died, nor do the dates of their deaths appear from any other of the documents on the record. On 26th October 1931 the appellant as mutwalli and beneficiary of the wakf of Ali Pasha, brought in the Land Court, Haifa, the suit out of which the present appeal arises. She sued the Attorney-General on behalf of the Government of Palestine to recover for the wakf two properties in or near Acre as being properties comprised in the deed of 1812. The two properties are known as Kishleh and Dubaya: they have long been in the possession of the Palestine Government, the former being now used as a prison and the latter as a depot and stables. At the trial the only matter of defence which was dealt with by the Land Court was the question of limitation, thoug