IMPORTANT POINT
Notwithstanding power of contempt like the High Court, a Tribunal still remains subordinate to High Court.

JUDGMENT

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for both the parties. This appeal has been preferred to assail an order dated 20th March 2009 by the High Court at Calcutta in W.P.L.R.T. No.54 of 2009. The High Court placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of that very Court in the case of Manju Banerjee v. Debabrata Pal reported in (2006) 1 WBLR (Cal) 147 and held the writ petition preferred by the appellant to be not maintainable.

2. The issue raised in this appeal is whether a writ application is maintainable against an order of West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), refusing to initiate contempt proceedings against an authority arrayed as respondent no.5 before the Tribunal. Such pristine question of law does not require any reference to the facts which led the appellant to file O.A.No.2744 of 2007 corresponding to M.A.No.24 of 2008 before the Tribunal with a prayer to initiate proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us the Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Manju Banerjee (supra) and has submitted that the view taken therein that there is no right of appeal against dismissal of contempt proceeding, is correct and requires no discussion but the further view that even in gross cases of palpable contempt the concerned informant aggrieved by refusal to initiate contempt proceeding can move only the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has been assailed on the ground that such observation in the judgment is on account of non-appreciation of relevant facts in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261.

4. On behalf of appellant, it was further submitted that judgment in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) was rendered on 18th March 1997. The relevant Act, i.e., The West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for brevity referred to as the 'Act of 1997') was enacted subsequently in terms of the enabling provisions under Article 323B of the Constitution of India. Under Section 15 of the Act of 1997 the Tribunal has been vested with such power to punish for its contempt as is vested in the High Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. For convenience, Section 15 is set out hereinbelow :

"15. Power to punish for contempt of Tribunal.-The Tribunal shall have, and shall exercise, the same jurisdiction, power and authority in respect of contempt of the Tribunal as a High Court has and may exercise, and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, shall have effect, subject to the modifications that -

(a) the reference therein to a High Court shall be construed as a reference to the Tribunal, and

(b) the reference therein to the Advocate-General in Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed as a reference to the Advocate-General of the State."

5. There is no caveat to the proposition of law that under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 an appeal lies before the Supreme Court only against such order of the High Court which imposes punishment for contempt and no appeal will lie against an interlocutory order or an order dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceedings. This was clearly laid down in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy (1996) 4 SCC 411. This view was also followed in several cases including in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399.

6. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court declared certain clauses in Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution of India to be unconstitutional to the extent they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227and 32 of the Constitution. This was on the premise that power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and, there