IMPORTANT POINT
The father of the victim, being victim u/s 2(wa) could prefer an appeal against acquittal of the accused persons u/s 372, Proviso, but after obtaining leave of the High Court u/s 378(3).

Judgment

V. Gopala Gowda, J.

Leave granted.

2. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 04.03.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2013 by the High Court of M.P. at Gwalior whereby the High Court has upheld the decision of the Sessions Court, Bhind, M.P. (the trial court) in Sessions Case No. 293/2010 by acquitting all the accused i.e. respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein.

3. The appellant herein made a written complaint dated 19.07.2010 regarding the death of his daughter, Ranjana (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) to the Addl. Superintendent of Police, Bhind, M.P. The FIR was registered on 27.07.2010. The trial court after the examination of evidence on record passed the judgment and order dated 13.06.2013 acquitting all the accused of the charges levelled against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and alternatively for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Being aggrieved of the decision of the trial court, the appellant approached the High Court against the order of acquittal of respondent nos. 2 to 6. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 04.03.2014 has upheld the trial court’s decision of acquittal of all the accused persons. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is challenged in this appeal before this Court questioning its correctness.

4. Being aggrieved of the impugned judgment and order the appellant being the legal heir of the deceased filed an appeal before the High Court under proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.”). The High Court, however, has mechanically disposed of the appeal by passing a cryptic order without examining as to whether the leave to file an appeal filed by the appellant as provided under sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can be granted or not. The correctness of the same is questioned by the appellant in this appeal inter alia urging various grounds.

5. Mr. Prashant Shukla, the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance upon the judgment rendered by Delhi High Court in Ram Phal v. State & Ors., 221 (2015) DLT 1 wherein the Full Bench, after interpreting the proviso to Section 372 read with Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C., has held that the father of the victim has locus standi to prefer an appeal, being a private party coming under the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. It was contended by him that in the instant case, the appellant, being father of the deceased, has locus standi to file an appeal before the High Court against the order of acquittal under proviso to Section 372 without seeking the leave of the High Court as required under sub-Section (3) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the appeal filed by the appellant was maintainable before the High Court of M.P. under the abovesaid provisions of Cr.P.C. He further urged that undoubtedly, the said legal aspect of the matter has not been dealt with by the High Court and the appeal was decided on merits but without examining as to whether the leave to file an appeal by the appellant is required to be granted or not under the above provisions of Cr.P.C.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court towards the decision rendered by Delhi High Court in the case referred to supra, wherein it has elaborately adverted to the definition of victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. and proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and has examined them in the light of their legislative history. It has also adverted to 154th Law Commission Report of 1996 in connection with the said legal provision of Cr.P.C. and has succinctly held that where the victim is unable to prefer an appeal then the appeal can be preferred by persons -such as relatives, foster children, guardians, fiancé or live-in partners, etc. of the victim, who are in