KURIAN JOSEPH, ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
Uttam – Appellant
Versus
Saubhag Singh – Respondent
Based on the provided legal document, the property does not remain a coparcenary after certain events, particularly the death of a male coparcener. When a male owner dies intestate, the property devolves among his heirs according to the rules of succession, and the joint family property is deemed to be partitioned by operation of law. This results in the property being held as tenants in common by the heirs, rather than as a unified coparcenary entity (!) (!) .
Furthermore, if the interest of a deceased coparcener devolves through intestate succession, the property ceases to be a coparcenary in the hands of the successors. It is then divided into separate shares, and the heirs hold their respective portions as individual tenants in common, thereby losing the joint status of the coparcenary property (!) (!) (!) .
In cases where the property was originally joint and a partition was made prior to the death, the joint status may be preserved up to that point. However, after the death of a coparcener and the application of succession laws, the property is generally no longer considered a coparcenary in the hands of the successors, as they hold the property as tenants in common (!) (!) (!) .
Therefore, property does not remain a coparcenary after the death of a male coparcener and the subsequent devolution of his interest among heirs, especially when the property is divided by operation of law or through succession. It transitions from a joint coparcenary to individual holdings as tenants in common.
JUDGMENT :
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is by the plaintiff who filed a suit for partition, being Suit No.5A of 1999 before the Second Civil Judge, Class II Devas, Madhya Pradesh, dated 28.12.1998, in which the first four defendants happened to be his father (defendant No.3), and his father’s three brothers i.e. defendant Nos. 1,2 and 4. He claimed a 1/8th share in the suit property on the footing that the suit property was ancestral property, and that, being a coparcener, he had a right by birth in the said property in accordance with the Mitakshara Law. A joint written statement was filed by all four brothers, including the plaintiff’s father, claiming that the suit property was not ancestral property, and that an earlier partition had taken place by which the plaintiff’s father had become separate. The trial court, by its order dated 20.12.2000 decreed the plaintiff’s suit holding that it was admitted by DW.1 Mangilal that the property was indeed ancestral property, and that, on the evidence, there was no earlier partition of the said property, as pleaded by the defendants in their written statements.
3. The first Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 12
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