IMPORTANT POINT
When a special statute puts an express limitation of 60 days on filing of appeal, delay of 71 days cannot be condoned under provisions of Limitation Act or Article 142 of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT :

Dipak Misra, J.

The present appeal preferred under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for brevity, 'the Act') assails the correctness of the judgment rendered by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (for short, ‘the tribunal’) in Appeal No. 276 of 2006 whereunder the order dated 10.10.2006 passed in Application No.812 of 2004 filed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), the appellant herein, before the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (for short, 'the Commission') seeking a refund of Rs.1,22,27,225/-. The tribunal, as is perceivable, stated the facts in detail, noted the arguments advanced before it, analysed the order passed by the Commission and came to hold that the ONGC was not entitled to refund and the claim was wholly unsustainable.

2. The present appeal was presented before the Registry of this Court on 7.2.2008. An office note recorded that the appeal was barred by 71 days. The appeal was listed before the Bench on 29.1.2010 on which date this Court condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. When the matter was taken up for hearing today, Ms. Ranjeeta Ramachandran, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent raised a preliminary objection that this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days in view of the language employed in Section 125 of the Act and further the condonation of delay by this Court was done without notice to the respondent and hence, deserves to be recalled and as a sequitor, the appeal has to be dismissed without any adverting to the same on merits. For the aforesaid purpose, she has placed reliance on the authority in M/s. Suryachakra Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Electricity Department, Rep. By its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors., 2016 (10) SCALE 46.

3. Mr. Saurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that it had applied for the certified copy of the order which was made available on 9.10.2007 and, therefore, the said period has to be excluded. Additionally, it is urged by him that after the main order was pronounced by the tribunal, as there were manifest errors, Review Petition No. 4 of 2008 was filed and the said petition was dismissed on 7.3.2008 and in such a situation, the delay, if any, has been correctly condoned and does not require to be dwelt upon and the preliminary objection is without any merit. In essence, the submission is that the application preferred for review of the principal order and the time consumed therein should be excluded by taking recourse to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Limitation Act’).

4. Section 125 of the Act reads as follows:-

“125. Appeal to Supreme Court.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):

Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.”

5. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as crystal that this Court, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the period of 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the appellate tribunal to him, may allow the same to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. It is quite clear that this Court has the jurisdiction to condone the delay but a limit has been fixed by the legislature, that is, 60 days.

6. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., (2010) 5 SCC 23 the issue that arose before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for allowing the aggriev