Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. (On behalf of himself, B. P. Sinha C.J.I., K.N. Wanchoo and K C. Das Gupta, JJ.): This is a petition under Art. 32 and it raises an interesting and important question about the validity of one of the Rules made by this Court in exercise of its powers under Art. 145 of the Constitution. The impugned Rule is Rule 12 in Order XXXV. It provides that the Court may, in the proceedings to which the said Order applies, impose such terms as to costs and as to the giving of security as it thinks fit. One of the proceedings covered by Order XXXV is a petition under Art. 32. The petitioners Prem Chand Garg and Anr., partners of M/s. Industrial Chemical Corporation, Ghaziabad, have filed under Art. 32 Petition No. 348 of 1961 impeaching the validity of the order passed by the Excise Commissioner refusing permission to the Distillery to supply power alcohol to the petitioners. This petition was admitted on the 12th December, 1961 and a Rule was ordered to be issued to the respondents, the Excise Commissioner of UP., Allahabad, and the State of U.P. At the time when the rule was thus issued, this Court directed under the impugned Rule that the petitioners should deposit a security of Rs. 2,500/- in cash within six weeks. According to the practice of this Court prevailing since 1959, this order is treated as a condition precedent for issuing rule nisi to the impleaded respondents. The petitioners found it difficult to raise this amount and so, on the 24th January, 1962, they moved this Court for a modification of the said order as to security. This application was dismissed, but the petitioners were given further time to deposit the said amount by March 26, 1962. This order was passed on March 15, 1962. The petitioners then tried to collect the requisite fund, but failed in their efforts, and that has led to the present petition filed on March 24, 1962. By this petition, the petitioners contend that the impugned Rule, in so far as it relates to the giving of security, is ultra vires, because it contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution. That is how the question about the validity of the said Rule falls to be determined on the present application.

2. Article 32 (I) provides that the right to move the SC by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed, and sub Art. (4) lays down that this right shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution. There is no doubt that the right to move this Court conferred on the citizens of this country by Art. 32 is itself a guaranteed right and it holds the same place of pride in the Constitution as do the other provisions in respect of the citizens fundamental rights. The fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III which have been made justiciable, form the most outstanding and distinguishing feature of the Indian constitution. It is true that the said rights are not absolute and they have to be adjusted in relation to the interests of the general public. But as the scheme of Art. 19 illustrates, the difficult task of determining the propriety or the validity of adjustments made either legislatively or by executive action between the fundamental rights and the demands of socio-economic welfare has been ultimately left in charge of the High Courts and the SC by the Constitution. It is in the light of this position that the Constitution-makers thought it advisable to treat the citizens right to move this Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights as being a fundamental right by itself. The fundamental right to move this Court can, therefore, be appropriately described as the corner- stone of the democratic edifice raised by the Constitution. That is why it is natural that this Court should, in the words of Patanjali Sastri J., regard itself "as the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights." and should declare that "it cannot, consistently