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2017 Supreme(SC) 870

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
Kinnari Mullick and Another - Appellant
Versus
Ghanshyam Das Damani - Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5172 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2370 of 2015)
Decided On : 20-04-2017

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Shekhar Kumar
For the Respondent: M.C. Dhingra

The court does not have the power to remit the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in sub-section 4 of Section 34. The limited discretion available to the Court under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings.

Headnote:

Section 34 (4) - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - The court does not have the power to remit the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in sub-section 4 of Section 34. The court cannot exercise this limited power of deferring the proceedings before it suo moto. The limited discretion available to the Court under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings. The impugned direction suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error and thus cannot be sustained.

Fact of the Case:

The Appellants entered into development agreements with the Respondent for a construction of a multi storied building. Disputes arose, and the Respondent initiated arbitration proceedings. The Appellants challenged the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and the jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration. The arbitrator rejected the application, and subsequently, the Appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act to set aside the awards. The learned Single Judge set aside the award, and the Division Bench affirmed the decision. The Division Bench, however, suo moto decided to relegate the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal by sending the award back with a direction to assign reasons in support of its award.

Finding of the Court:

The court does not have the power to remit the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in sub-section 4 of Section 34. The impugned direction suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error and thus cannot be sustained. The award has been set aside, and the parties are left to pursue their remedies in accordance with law.

Issues: The main issue was whether the court has the power to relegate the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal after setting aside the arbitral award and moreso suo moto in absence of any application made in that behalf by the parties to the arbitration proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: The court does not have the power to remit the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in sub-section 4 of Section 34. The limited discretion available to the Court under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings.

Final Decision: The impugned direction issued by the Division Bench to send back the award to the Arbitral Tribunal for assigning reasons in support of the award is quashed and set aside. The award has been set aside, and the parties are left to pursue their remedies in accordance with law.

JUDGMENT :

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

This appeal raises a short question as to whether Section 34 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") empowers the Court to relegate the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal after having set aside the arbitral award in question and moreso suo moto in absence of any application made in that behalf by the parties to the arbitration proceedings?

2. The Appellants, being joint owners of premises No.4 Wood Street, Kolkata, known as 4C, Dr. Martin Luther King Sarani, Kolkata, entered into two development agreements with the Respondent for a construction of a multi storied building. On completion of construction of the building sometime in 2003, the Appellants entered into a further agreement with the Respondent in terms of which the Respondent, for better enjoyment of the property, distributed the owner's allocation. In terms of the said agreement, the Respondent fully sold and transferred his share of the premises to various prospective buyers with proportionate area of the land to them as well as in common areas. According to the Appellants, the Respondent is not in possession of any portion of the suit premises. The Appellants have also executed and registered the conveyance along with the proportionate right in common areas and land of the said premises to various transferees, save and except two flats. The said agreement contained an Arbitration clause which reads thus:

"21. That all disputes and/or differences between the parties herein shall be referred to arbitration in terms of the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996."

3. The Respondent asserted that he was entitled to execution and registration of conveyance in respect of 50% built up area on the ground floor of such premises. That claim was rejected by the Appellants. The Respondent, through his advocate's letter dated 21.11.2009 addressed to the Appellants, inter alia informed them about the appointment of one Siddhartha Sankar Mandal, Advocate as arbitrator and further, that the said arbitrator would send intimation to the Appellants about the date, time and venue in respect of the arbitration proceedings to be held by him. The said letter, however, did not specify that Siddhartha Sankar Mandal was appointed as Sole Arbitrator nor did it call upon the Appellants to appoint their nominee arbitrator. The Appellants then received communication through Siddhartha Sankar Mandal dated 01.11.2009 stating that he has been appointed as arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the Appellants and the Respondent and that he would enter upon the reference on 10.11.2009. By this letter, the Appellants were called upon to remain present so as to hold a meeting as scheduled. According to the Appellants, the letter did not even provide for 30 days' time between the date of meeting and the receipt of the communication by the Appellants. Nevertheless, the arbitrator proceeded with the arbitration proceedings and held meetings. The Appellants did not file their statement of defence. Instead, they filed an application on 10.05.2010 before the arbitrator under Section 16 of the Act, inter alia challenging the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and also raising the issue of jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration as a Sole Arbitrator. The arbitrator, however, rejected the said application on 27.08.2010 by an interim award.

4. The Appellants then filed their counter statement in November 2010 to the statement of claim in the said arbitral proceedings without prejudice to their contention that, the Arbitral Tribunal has not been properly constituted and that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged dispute referred to him. The Appellants were also advised to file an application under Section 14 before the High Court, alleging bias on the part of the arbitrator and for a declaration that the arbitrator had become incompetent to perform his functions. The learned Single Judge of the High Court


































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