SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KURIAN JOSEPH, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.
DHEERAJ MOR - PETITIONERS
VERSUS
HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI - RESPONDENTS
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.14156 of 2015 WITH SLP(C) No. 14676 of 2015, SLP(C) No. 24219, 30556 of 2015, W.P.(C) No. 77, 130, 171, 405, 414, 423 600, 598, 601, 602, 733 of 2016, W.P.(C) No. 189, 222, 334, 1171 of 2017, SLP(C) No. 23823 of 2016, S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 15018, 15304 of 2016, SLP(C) No. 15764, 24506 of 2016
Decided on : 23-01-2018.
AIR 1961 SC 816; AIR 1966 SCC 1987; (1985) 1 SCC 225; (2013) 5 SCC 277; (2016) 9 SCC 313; (2002) 4 SCC 247; (1992) 2 SCC 428; [1967] 1 SCR 484 – Referred
Facts of the case:
The issues raised in these petitions pertain to the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India in the matter of appointment of District Judges by way of direct recruitment.
Finding of the Court:
Case involving substantial question of law and interpretation of Article 233 of the constitution, matter referred to larger Bench.
ORDER :
1. The issues raised in these petitions pertain to the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India in the matter of appointment of District Judges by way of direct recruitment.
2. The petitioners have raised mainly two contentions -(i) in case a candidate has completed seven years of practice as an advocate, he/she shall be an eligible candidate despite the fact that on the date of the application/appointment, he/she is in the service of Union or State; (ii) the members who are in judicial service as Civil Judge, Junior Division or Senior Division, in case they have completed seven years as Judicial Officers or seven years as Judicial Officer-cum-Advocate, they should be treated as eligible candidates.
3. Extensive reference has been made to various judgments of this Court which pertain to Article 233 of Constitution of India. To provide a complete picture of the matter, we shall briefly discuss the relevant cases.
4. The case of Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1961 SC 816 pertains to eligibility for appointment as District Judge counting also the period of practice in Lahore High Court, before partition. At paragraphs 11 and 13, this Court made the following observations:
“11. This is the background against which we have to consider the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant. Even if we assume without finally pronouncing on their correctness that learned Counsel is right in his first two submissions, viz., that the word " advocate" in Cl. (2) of Art. 233 means an advocate of a Court in India and the appointee must be such an advocate at the time of his appointment, no objection on those grounds can be raised to the appointment of three of the respondents who were factually on the roll of Advocates of the Punjab High Court at the time of their appointment; because admittedly they were advocates in a Court in India and continued as such advocates till the dates of their appointment. The only, question with regard to them is whether they can count. in the period of seven years their period of practice in or under the Lahore High Court…”
xxx xxx xxx
13. … It is perhaps necessary to add that we must not be understood to have decided that the expression 'has been' must always mean what learned Counsel for the appellant says it means according to the strict rules of grammar. It may be seriously questioned if an organic Constitution must be so narrowly interpreted, and the learned Additional Solicitor-General has drawn our attention to other Articles of the Constitution like Art. 5(c) where in-the context the expression has a different meaning. Our attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji AIR 1953 All 323 where a different meaning was given to a similar expression occurring in the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of S. 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We consider it unnecessary to pursue this matter further because the respondents we are now considering continued to be advocates of the Punjab High Court when they were appointed as district judges and they had a standing of more than seven years when so appointed. They were clearly eligible for appointment under Cl. 2 of Art. 233 of the Constitution.” (Emphasis Supplied)
5. In Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC 1987, this Court interpreted the expression “the service” in clause 2 of Article 233 to mean judicial service.
6. In Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 225, this Court considered the question as to whether judicial officers who had seven years standing at the Bar before entering service would be eligible for appointment as District Judges. To quote:
“1. The petitioners in the several writ petitions now before us as well as the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1982 and the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 6346-6351 of 1980 which we dismissed on October 11, 1984 were members of the
All India Judges’ Association and others v. Union of India and others
Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others
Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik and Others
Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji AIR 1953 All 323
Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab and others
Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Others
Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India and others
State of Assam v. Horizon Union and another
Vijay Kumar Mishra and Another. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna and Others
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