1. Dispute concerning whether the proviso to Section 24 of the 2013 Act governs Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2) regarding land acquisition proceedings. (Para 1 , 2 )
2019 Supreme(SC) 230
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.F. NARIMAN, VINEET SARAN, JJ.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY – PETITIONER
VERSUS
VIRENDER LAL BAHRI AND ANOTHER – RESPONDENTS
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 37375 OF 2016 WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 37372 OF 2016 MA NO. 1423 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12247 OF 2016 MA NO. 1787 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10210 OF 2016 MA NO. 1786 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10207 OF 2016; MA NO. 45 OF 2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6239 OF 2017
Decided on : 27-02-2019
Important Points
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation and Indore Development Authority holding different views. Latter already referred to five Judges Bench. Former also referred to same Bench.
Subject
Land Acquisition - Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
Act Referred
Headnote
(2017) 15 SCC 133 – Referred
(b) Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Section 24 – Proviso to Section 24 – Providing for enhanced compensation to all beneficiaries – Section 24(1) deals with compensation whereas section 24(2) deals with lapsing of the acquisition itself – The proviso if read as exception to section 24(1)(b) there will be no repugnancy between the two – If the proviso is to apply to Section 24(2), then notwithstanding that physical possession has not been taken, yet, there will be no lapse – A proviso cannot be used to nullify or set at naught the substantive provision contained in the main enactment – Reading the proviso as proviso to section 24(2) would result in arbitrary result and would be violative of Article 14, Constitution of India – However, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation holding that Proviso to section 24 applies to section 24(2) – Matter referred to larger Bench. (Para 2, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17)
(2018) 14 SCC 161; (2016) 16 SCC 258; (1976) 1 SCC 128; (1985) 1 SCC 591; (1996) 6 SCC 665 – Relied upon
(c) Interpretation of statute – Beneficial legislation – Must be construed in a way which furthers its purpose. (Para 15)
(2017) 15 SCC 133- Relied upon
(2015) 3 SCC 353; (2018) 3 SCC 412 – Referred
(d) Administration of justice – Judicial propriety – Difference of opinion between different Benches – Delhi Metro Rail Corporation case referred to the same Bench hearing Indore Development Authority case. (Para 17)
Facts of the case:
This batch of cases relates to whether the proviso contained in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) or whether it is a proviso to Section 24(2). The reason for this confusion is because of the placement of the proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act.
Finding of the Court:
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation and Indore Development Authority holding different views. Latter already referred to five Judges Bench. Former also referred to same Bench.
Result: Matter referred to larger Bench.
Legal Category Hierarchy
For the Appellant : Mr. Amrinder Saran, Sr. Adv. Ms. Garima Prashad, AOR Mr. Mohit Kumar Bansal, Adv. Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR Mr. Jay Kumar, Adv. Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Adv. Mr. Ravinder Nain, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Mansoor Ali, AOR Ms. Rachana Srivastava, AOR Ms. Umme Salma, Adv. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv. Mr. Siddharth Batra, AOR Ms. Garima Sehgal, Adv. Mr. Ravinder Kumar, Adv. Mr. Vishwajeet Arora, Adv.
Table of Contents
2. Whether the proviso to Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) to provide enhanced compensation or to Section 24(2) to prevent the lapsing of acquisition. (Para 3 )
3. The proviso relates to compensation rather than lapsing; interpreting it under Section 24(2) would nullify substantive provisions and create arbitrary results under Article 14. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 )
4. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause and cannot be used to nullify the real object of the main enactment. (Para 11 )
5. Request to the Chief Justice of India to refer the matter to a larger Bench for reconsideration. (Para 17 )
6. Does the proviso to Section 24 of the 2013 Act apply to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2)?
The court observed that the proviso is an exception to Section 24(1)(b), ensuring beneficiaries receive compensation under the 2013 Act if compensation for a majority of land holdings was not deposited, rather than affecting the lapsing of acquisition. (Para 9 , 10 )
7. Why would reading the proviso as part of Section 24(2) be legally problematic?
It would nullify the substantive provision regarding the lapsing of acquisition when physical possession is not taken and create arbitrary outcomes under Article 14, as lapsing would depend on whether land was acquired individually or collectively. (Para 11 , 12 )
8. What is the general rule of construction regarding the scope of a proviso?
A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, read in relation to the principal matter, and cannot be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment. (Para 11 )
9. How should the 2013 Act be interpreted given its nature as beneficial legislation?
As a beneficial legislation aimed at humane land acquisition and fair compensation, it must be construed in a manner that furthers its purpose and favors the view that benefits the land owners. (Para 15 )
JUDGMENT
R.F. Nariman, J
This batch of cases relates to whether the proviso contained in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ["2013 Act"] is a proviso to Section 24 (1)(b) or whether it is a proviso to Section 24 (2). The reason for this confusion is because of the placement of the proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. This is a case where the old British ditty comes to mind:
"I'm the Parliament's draftsman,
I compose the country's laws,
And of half the litigation I'm undoubtedly the cause [See Eera (through Dr. Manjula Krippendoif) v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2017) 15 SCC 133 at paragraph 115]
2. The High Court of Delhi, in a judgment dated 21.05.2015, namely, Tarun Pal Singh v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., W.P.(C) 8596/2014["Tarun Pal Singh"], had held that the said proviso would govern Section 24 (1)(b), and not Section 24 (2). This judgment has been followed in a number of other judgments of the same High Court. DDA has filed appeals against Tarun Pal Singh (supra) and all the judgments that have followed in its wake. By a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, namely, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh, (2018) 14 SCC 161 ["Delhi Metro Rail Corporation"], the Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the proviso to Section 24 governs Section 24 (2) and not Section 24 (1)(b). As a result of this judgment, there is no doubt that the main judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Tarun Pal Singh (supra) and all the judgments that have followed would have to be upset.
3. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, contends that the judgment in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (supra) itself requires a relook. According to him, if the proviso to Section 24 were to govern Section 24 (2) and not Section 24 (1)(b), a valuable right of lapsing would be taken away and also, various repugnancies and inconsistencies would follow. According to Shri Amarendra Sharan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the DDA, this being a very recent judgment of this Court ought not to be disturbed as it has correctly appreciated and laid down the law in great detail.
4. Before entering into the controversy raised by the learned counsel, the setting of Section 24 , together with certain other provisions, must first be seen. Section 24 occurs as a part of the 2013 Act. This Act repeals the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ["1894 Act"] by Section 114 of the 2013 Act, which reads as follows:
"114. Repeal and saving.-(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."
5. In a lengthy Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is stated that the 1894 Act has been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues, and therefore, needs to be replaced by an up-to-date measure. Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons is relevant, and reads as follows:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons.-
xxx xxx xxx
18. The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken.
xxx xxx xxx"
6. The Preamble of the Act is also important and reads as follows:
"An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair compensati