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1963 Supreme(SC) 312

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO, J. C. SHAH, JJ.
BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS - Appellant
Versus
BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND ANOTHER - Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 672 of 1962
Decided on : 10-10-1963

The right of pre-emption is annexed to full ownership of property of co-sharers. It is not attached to property held on subordinate tenure, such as leases etc.

Headnote:

PRE-EMPTION - MOHAMEDAN LAW - RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION - SCOPE - LEASEHOLD INTEREST - SUPER-STRUCTURE - RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION IN RESPECT OF LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND SUPER-STRUCTURE - DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCITY - FULL OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY - ENTIRE BARGAIN - MOHAMEDAN LAW OF PRE-EMPTION AS CUSTOM IN BIHAR - RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION IN RESPECT OF HOUSE STANDING ON LEASEHOLD LAND - WHETHER EXISTS.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff-respondent 1 filed a suit for a declaration that he has a right to pre-empt the property purchased by appellants 1 and 2 and for directing them to transfer the said property to him. The defendants contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the ceremonies of pre-emption were not performed and that under the Mohamedan law the plaintiff was not entitled to pre-emption, as the land on which the said house and golas stood was "rent-paying" land.

Finding of the Court:

The right of pre-emption is simply a right of substitution, but not of re-purchase i.e., the preemptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee; it is a right of acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of it; and the right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place.

Issues: 1. Whether the right of pre-emption infringes the fundamental right of a citizen under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution? 2. Whether the first respondent failed to establish his title and, therefore, his suit should have been dismissed on that ground? 3. Whether the ceremonies of pre-emption were performed only on October 11, 1949 whereas the sale deed in favour of the appellants was executed and registered on October 20, 1949 and, as the said performance of the ceremonies was premature, they having been performed before the sale was completed, the right of pre-emption could not be enforced? 4. Whether there is no right of pre-emption in respect of leasehold interest and, therefore, there cannot be a right of pre-emption in respect of a house standing on such land, as Mohamedan law does not recognize a right of pre-emption in mere super-structure.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The right of pre-emption vis-a-vis co-sharers does not infringe the fundamental right conferred under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. 2. The right of pre-emption is annexed to full ownership of property of co-sharers. It is not attached to property held on subordinate tenure, such as leases etc. It is an incident of the co-sharer's property operating both as a right and as a burden in different situations. It is a right of substitution taking in the entire bargain. It must take the whole or nothing. It does not matter if the inability to take the whole arises out of a voluntary act or out of a legal limitation inherent in the nature of the property transferred. It is reciprocal in operation, that is, if the situation was reversed and the vendor became the preemptor, he should be in a position to pre-empt the co-sharer's whole bargain. The two doctrines which may, for convenience, be referred to as "entire bargain" and "reciprocity" cannot operate unless both the co-sharers are full owners of their respective properties. Akar or a house standing on a freehold land is subject to the right of pre-emption, but a house on a leasehold land stands on a different footing. As there is no right of pre-emption in respect of a land held on a subordinate tenure, the right of pre-emption cannot be enforced against the house either, as the preemptor cannot be substituted for the entire bargain. The right must fall also on the ground that the super-structure disannexed from the land would be movable property and it is well settled that the right of pre-emption cannot be enforced in respect of movables.

Final Decision: Appeal allowed, decrees of the Subordinate Judge's Court and the High Court are set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The appellants will have their costs throughout.

JUDGMENT :

SUBBA RAO, J.

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna and raises mainly the question of the scope of the right of pre-emption under the Mohamedan law as applied by custom in Bihar.

2. The facts lie in a small compass. On June 17, 1930, Chathilal Sah of Sahebganj, who was the owner of a house and two golas bearing holdings Nos. 184 and 185 situated in mahalla Sahebganj, executed a will bequeathing the said property to his daughter Parbati Kuer and nephew Ram Swarup in equal shares. Under the said will Ram Swarup was to get the entire property in case Parbati Kuer died unmarried or issueless. On July 18, 1940, Ram Swarup sold one-half of the said property to the plaintiff-respondent 1. On July 27, 1942, the plaintiff-respondent 1 acquired under a patta some lands adjoining the said property. On October 10, 1949, defendant 3 (respondent 3 herein), alleging to be the husband of the said Parbati Kuer, sold the remaining half of the disputed property to defendants 1 and 2. It may be mentioned at this stage that the land on which the said house and golas stand is Dih-Basgit Lagani (rent-paying) land. On December 10, 1949, respondent 1 filed Title Suit No. 214 of 1949 in the First Court of the Munsif at Chapra for a declaration that he has a right to pre-empt the property purchased by appellants 1 and 2 and for directing them to transfer the said property to him. To that suit, the first appellant and his two sons were made defendants 1, 2 and 2A and their vendor was made defendant 3. The defendants contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the ceremonies of pre-emption were not performed and that under the Mohamedan law the plaintiff was not entitled to pre-emption, as the land on which the said house and golas stood was "rent-paying" land. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit. But, on appeal the Subordinate Judge of Chapra allowed the appeal and granted a decree for pre-emption in favour of the plaintiff-respondent 1. On appeal, the High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the appeal. Defendants 1, 2 and 2A have preferred the present appeal by special leave against the Judgment of the High Court.

3. Mr. Varma, learned counsel for the appellants, raised before us the following four points : (1) the right of pre-emption infringes the fundamental right of a citizen under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and it is not saved by clause (5) thereof : (2) the first respondent failed to establish his title and, therefore, his suit should have been dismissed on that ground; (3) the ceremonies of pre-emption were performed only on October 11, 1949 whereas the sale deed in favour of the appellants was executed and registered on October 20, 1949 and, as the said performance of the ceremonies was premature, they having been performed before the sale was completed, the right of pre-emption could not be enforced; and (4) there is no right of pre-emption in respect of leasehold interest and, therefore, there cannot be a right of pre-emption in respect of a house standing on such land, as Mohamedan law does not recognize a right of pre-emption in mere super-structure.

4. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents controverts the correctness of the said propositions. We shall deal with his arguments in the course of the judgment.

5. To appreciate the first contention, some dates may be recapitulated. Respondent 1 purchased one-half share of the property by a sale deed dated July 18, 1940. Appellants 1 and 2 purchased the other half of the property on October 10, 1949. The suit was filed on December 10, 1949. The Munsif dismissed the suit on April 14, 1953. The Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950. The appellants had no fundamental right on the date when they purchased the property. But it is said that under the law of pre-emption a person who seeks the assistance of a court with a view to enforce the right of pre-emption is bound






































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