2019 Supreme(SC) 460

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.
Dr. R.S. Grewal and Others – Appellants
Versus
Chander Parkash Soni and Another – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 11086, 11087, 11088 of 2018
Decided On : 16-04-2019

IMPORTANT POINTS
The life estate granted to a person enables him/her to create a tenancy and receive the rent from the tenants on the property. Such person fulfills the description of a ‘landlord’ under Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949.
A person covered by the expression ‘tenant’ under Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 acquires the character of a statutory tenant and is protected under it.
The statutory protection afforded to the tenant does not cease to exist upon the death of the person having life interest in the property who inducted him.
A suit for possession on the basis that the tenant was a trespasser after the death of the person who inducted him and who had only a life interest in the property is not maintainable. In such a case the remedy lies in pursuing eviction proceedings.

Headnote:(a) Hindu Succession Act 1956 – Section 14(1) r/w section 2(c), East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 – Shiv Dev Kaur had a life interest in terms of the Will by original owner – The Will bequeathed entire estate of the testator including the suit property to the son – Supreme Court in earlier litigation held that Shiv Dev Kaur did not acquire an absolute title – Respondent tenant inducted by life beneficiary of the will by the original owner of the property – Landlord need not be the owner – Held Shiv Dev Kaur was within her rights to induct tenant. (Para 9, 10)

       (2013) 4 SCC 636 – Relied upon

       (b) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 – Section 2(i) and 13 – Protected tenant – Need not be inducted by the owner – Instantly first respondent, inducted by Shiv Dev Kaur – Acquired status of statutory tenant – That status not obviated by death of Shiv Dev Kaur – Remedy for repossession of suit property available to appellants only by way of eviction proceeding u/s 13 – Appellants cannot seek possession in a civil suit. (Para 14)

       (2002) 1 SCC 119; (2016) 15 SCC 102; (2017) 2 SCC 622; (1979) 4 SCC 214; (1976) 4 SCC 855; (1963) 3 SCR 1; (1977) 1 SCC 500 – Relied upon

       AIR 1961 Cal 505; 1970 AIR (Punjab) 104 – Cited with approval

       (2018) 12 SCC 1 – Referred

       (c) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 – Section 2(i) and 13 – The person having life interest in the property may induct tenant for his/her maintenance – But once a tenancy is created it is controlled and governed by the Act – The tenancy will not terminate with life of the landlord – Suit for possession treating the tenant as trespasser, held, was not maintainable. (Para 16)

       Facts of the case:

       Dr. Hira Singh was the owner of a residential house together with some shops constructed on the property.

       On 16 September 1944, Dr. Hira Singh executed a will by which he bequeathed his property to his son, Shiv Dev Singh Grewal, subject to a right of residence for his widowed daughter, Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal in the property.

       The testator’s son, who was a legatee under the will, was also appointed as an executor. The testator died in 1945. His son died on 14 August 1968. The first appellant is the grandson of the testator, while the second and third appellants are the sons of the first appellant.

       A suit for possession was instituted by the appellants and by proforma respondent No. 2 against the first respondent.

       The first respondent is a tenant inducted by Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal. The foundation of the suit was that Shiv Dev Kaur Grewal was only entitled to a life interest in the property in terms of the will executed by her father and upon her death the appellants were entitled to possession of the shop from the defendant.

       The suit for possession was decreed and the first appeal was dismissed.

       The second appeal was allowed, the decree for possession was set aside, though with the observation that this would not preclude the appellants from seeking ejectment of the first respondent on any of the grounds available under the applicable rent control legislation.

       Finding of the Court:

       There is no infirmity in the impugned judgment.

       Result: Appeals dismissed.