IMPORTANT POINT
Court should not quash the proceedings u/s 482 CrPC unless it is convinced, from the material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court.

ORDER :

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the order dated 22.09.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Petition Nos. 6508, 6530 & 6531 of 2017, whereby the High Court allowed the Criminal Petitions filed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 and set aside the cognizance order passed by the trial court.

3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the appellant had entered into an investment agreement with M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no.1) on 01.12.2013 on the basis of representation of respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein, who were the Directors of the said Company. The appellant invested a total amount of Rs. 2,11,50,000/- in the said project. According to the appellant, as on 31.03.2016, a total amount of Rs. 1,81,50,000/- was left to be repaid to him along with applicable interest on it. Thereafter, upon several representations by the appellant, M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited agreed to repay the amount via issue of seven cheques in favour of the appellant. Six cheques for Rs. 25,00,000/- each and one cheque for Rs. 30,00,000/- were drawn on different dates by the authorised signatory, i.e., M.D. of M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited, which were returned dishonored, on presentation by the appellant, with the remark "Payment stopped by Drawer".

4. Thereafter, the appellant issued a legal notice on 04.08.2016 to (i) M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no. 1); (ii) M.D. of M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no. 2); (iii) Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 (as Directors).

5. Consequently, proceedings were initiated by the appellant under Sections 138 & 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act). During the pendency of the said complaint, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 made an application before the High Court for the quashing of the proceedings initiated against them. The High Court, as mentioned above, allowed the Criminal Petitions filed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 and quashed the proceedings against them. Being aggrieved, the appellant has approached this Court through the instant appeals.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Y. Rajagopala Rao vehemently contended that the High Court was not justified in allowing the quashing petitions by invoking its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 despite the fact that a prima facie case was made out against respondent nos. 1 and 2 in the complaint filed by the appellant. He contended that the trial court, on the basis of the material on record, took cognizance of the case against respondent nos. 1 and 2 under Sections 138 and 141 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that all the accused, in active connivance, mischievously and intentionally issued the cheques in favor of the appellant and later issued instructions to the Bank to "Stop Payment".

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Kaushal Yadav submitted that the answering respondents are only non-executory Directors of the company, neither playing any role in the conduct of day-to-day business of the company nor being in charge of the affairs of the company. Further, he also contended that merely by virtue of being a Director in a company, one cannot be deemed to be in charge of, or responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business.

8. In any case, the learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that his clients are ready to pay the balance amount of Rs. 70,00,000/- to the appellant within a period of six months. However, learned counsel for the appellant did not agree to the same.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully scrutinizing the record, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in allowing the quashing petitions by invoking its power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., 1973 In a case pertaining to an offence under Section 138 and S