2019 Supreme(SC) 901

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar – Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019 (@SLP (Crl) No. 2712 of 2019)
Decided on : 21-08-2019

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is an overriding section which saves inherent powers of court to advance cause of justice.
(2) There is a distinction between a false promise given on understanding by maker that it will be broken and breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled.

Headnote:

(a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Exercise of inherent jurisdiction – Section 482 is an overriding section which saves inherent powers of court to advance cause of justice – Under Section 482 inherent jurisdiction of court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under Cr.P.C; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure ends of justice – Powers of court under Section 482 are wide and court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them – Court should be guarded in use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies prosecution opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. (Para 7)

(b) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 90 and 375 – Rape – Misconception of fact – Consent with respect to Section 375 of IPC involves an active understanding of circumstances, actions and consequences of proposed act – An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action – There is a distinction between a false promise given on understanding by maker that it will be broken and breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled – Where promise to marry is false and intention of maker at the time of making promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates woman’s “consent” – On other hand, breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise – To establish a false promise, maker of promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it – Consent of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of misconception of fact where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in said act – Consent of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards proposed act – To establish whether consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established – Promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given – False promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to woman’s decision to engage in sexual act. (Paras 12, 13, 14, 16 and 18)

(c) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 376, 417, 504 and 506(2) read with Section 90 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Rape, cheating, intentional insult and criminal intimidation – Repeated sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage – Rejection of quashing application by High Court – In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of facts alleged or enter into appreciation of competing evidence presented – Limited question is whether on face of FIR, allegations constitute a cognizable offence – Complainant and appellant knew each other since 1998 and were intimate since 2004 – Complainant and the appellant met regularly, travelled great distances to meet each other, resided in each other’s houses on multiple occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse regularly over a course of five years and on multiple occasions visited hospital jointly to check whether complainant was pregnant – Appellant expressed his reservations about marrying complainant on 31 January 2014 – This led to arguments between them – Despite this, appellant and complainant continued to engage in sexual intercourse until March 2015 – Appellant is a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF while complainant is an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax – Allegations in FIR do not on their face indicate that promise by appellant was false, or that complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise – There is no allegation in FIR that when appellant promised to marry complainant, it was done in bad faith or with intention to deceive her – Allegations in FIR belie case that she was deceived by appellant’s promise of marriage – Even if facts set out in complainant’s statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of IPC and/or SC/ST Act has occurred--Impugned judgement and order of High Court quashed. (Paras 8, 9, 19, 20, 22 and 23)

Facts of the Case:

By its judgement dated 7 February 2019, High Court of Judicature at Bombay dismissed application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Appellant sought quashing of First Information Report registered against him for offences punishable under Sections 376, 417, 504 and 506(2) of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.

Findings of Court:

With respect to the offences under the SC/ST Act, the WhatsApp messages were alleged to have been sent by appellant to the complainant on 27 and 28 August 2015 and 22 October 2015. At this time, Sections 3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of the SC/ST Act as it stands today had not been enacted into the statute. These provisions were inserted by (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act 201513 which came into force on 26 January 2016.

Result : Appeals allowed.