SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INDU MALHOTRA, SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.
The State Of Arunachal Pradesh – Appellant
Versus
Ramchandra Rabidas @ Ratan Rabidas & Anr. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 905 of 2010
With
The State Of Tripura – Appellant
Versus
Ramchandra Rabidas @ Ratan Rabidas – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 906 of 2010
Decided on : 04-10-2019
(a) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Indian Penal Code, 1860 - MV Act is beneficial legislation - Providing a statutory scheme for compensation of victims of motor vehicle accidents; or, their family members - IPC, on the other hand, is punitive and deterrent in nature - (Para 5)
(b) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Under Section 183 driving at excessive speed is an offence and under section 184 driving dangerously is an offence - Ingredients of 304A of the Code are rash and negligent driving - On the other hand, when a person drives a vehicle so recklessly, rashly or negligently that it causes the death of a person, and of which he had knowledge that such act was dangerous enough to cause death, he may be held liable under Section 304 Part II - Offences under the Code are punishable because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein, irrespective of the knowledge or intention of the offender - Act and the Code operate in two different fields and there is no conflict - Offences provided and penal consequences thereof in two statutes are different - Principle that the special law should prevail over the general law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act - The Act is silent about the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hurt to persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same - Sections 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC specifically deal with such offences - There is no conflict between the two statutes. (Para 5, 6, 7)
(c) General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 26 - Act or omission constituting offence under two statutes - Offender liable to be prosecuted under either or any of the enactments - But not liable to be punished twice for same act or omission. (Para 8)
(d) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Chapter XIII - Offences under Chapter XIII cannot abrogate applicability of the provisions u/s 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 IPC - Offences prescribed under IPC are independent of offences prescribed under the Act - Offences do not overlap - Therefore, maxim of “generalia specialibus non-derogant” is inapplicable. (Para 9)
(e) Interpretation of statute - M.V. Act and IPC - Offences under Chapter XIII of the Act are compoundable whereas those under the Code are not - Proposition held by High Court that motor accident cases will be triable only under the Act - Means IPC and CrPC giving way to provisions of the Act - Meaning that even cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing death, or grievous hurt, or simple hurt by rash and negligent driving, would become compoundable - Offender will get away with fine only without facing prosecution - Proportionality between the crime and punishment - Held, a prosecution, if otherwise maintainable, would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act. (Para 10, 12, 13)
Facts of the case:
The issue arising in the present Criminal Appeals is whether road traffic offences should be dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and in cases of road traffic or motor vehicle offences, prosecution under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 is without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in law?
Finding of the court:
Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
Result: Appeals allowed.
JUDGMENT :
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
1. The issue which has arisen for consideration in the present Criminal Appeals is whether the Gauhati High Court was justified in issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“M.V. Act”), and in holding that in cases of road traffic or motor vehicle offences, prosecution under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) is without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in law?
2. The Gauhati High Court, Agartala bench vide the impugned judgment dated 22.12.2008 held that:
i. Sections 183 and 184 of the M.V. Act, which relate to driving of motor vehicles at excessive speeds and dangerously, and other offences under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act are compoundable before the Police, or in court, and that no further proceeding shall be taken against the accused after he has pleaded guilty. On this premise, it was held “that the provisions of Cr.P.C must succumb to the statutory provisions to the M.V.Act, and any investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to the same, would be illegal and unsustainable in law”. [Para 14 of the impugned judgment].
ii. The IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C”) are placed in Entry No. 1 and 2 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The M.V. Act, 1988 falls under Entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List.
Hence, the status of the M.V. Act is at par with the IPC and Cr.P.C, and it cannot be presumed that M.V. Act is either a subordinate legislation, or inferior to the IPC and Cr.P.C in status. [Para 21 of the impugned judgment]
iii. Section 5 of the IPC removes any kind of ambiguity about the conviction and punishment of offenders under a special enactment, which covers the field. Section 208 of the M.V. Act has laid down a special procedure for disposal of road traffic offences. Hence, recourse to the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC.
Section 5 of the IPC recognizes the supremacy of the special laws, which cannot be diluted under the garb of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 24-26 of the impugned judgment]
iv. The prosecution of road traffic offences under the IPC is not permitted, since it has no sanction of law. The only exception to this rule would be where the offence cannot be adequately punished under the M.V. Act. [Para 24-26 of the impugned judgment]
v. Since road traffic offences can be regulated and adequately dealt with under the provisions of MV Act, resort to the provisions of the IPC, which is a general law should be avoided. [Para 28 of the impugned judgment]
vi. Sections 183 to 188 of the MV Act, which relate to punishment for driving at excessive speed or dangerously or in a drunken condition, etc., are silent about the outcome of the accidents. These penal provisions do not prescribe any separate punishment for causing hurt to people or for damaging any property. However, this does not mean that the Legislature was not aware or totally oblivious to the consequences of dangerous driving while enacting the M.V. Act. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment]
vii. If a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any person while driving a motor vehicle in a rash and dangerous manner under the MV Act, then the said offender cannot also be convicted under the IPC, since the IPC does not expressly take within its purview road traffic offences. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment]
viii. To permit the prosecution of offenders under the provisions of any other penal law other than the M.V. Act in cases of motor vehicle offences would amount to overriding the M.V. Act, which is a special enactment framed by Parliament for motor vehicle offences. By invoking provisions of the IPC for motor vehicle offences, the basic character and structure of the M.V. Act would get distorted, and would not help in curbing the rising rate of motor vehicle accidents. [Para 33 of the impugned judgment]
ix. Prosecuti
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