1. Forgery of documents in Revenue Court proceedings — FIR registered — High Court quashed proceedings for lack of preliminary inquiry under Section 340, CrPC. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
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2020 Supreme(SC) 192
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ASHOK BHUSHAN, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB – APPELLANT
VERSUS
JASBIR SINGH – RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.335 OF 2020
Decided On : 26-02-2020
Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner(s):Uttara Babbar, Bhavana Duhoon, Manan Bansal, Advocates
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Yajur Bhalla, Adv. Mr. Shubham Bhalla, AOR Mr. Deepak
For the Petitioner(s):Uttara Babbar, Bhavana Duhoon, Manan Bansal, Advocates
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Yajur Bhalla, Adv. Mr. Shubham Bhalla, AOR Mr. Deepak
The Court referred to a larger bench the question of whether Section 340 of the CrPC mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing for the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195, due to conflicting decisions by coordinate benches of the Supreme Court.
Headnote:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 340 and 195 - Filing complaint for offences mentioned in section 195 - Pritish holding that providing opportunity to would be accused before the filing of complaint not mandatory and preliminary inquiry itself not mandatory - Coordinate Bench in Sharad Pawar not taking note of Pritish and holding to the contrary - A Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah opining that preliminary inquiry was discretionary - In the circumstances matter referred to Larger Bench. (Para 14, 15)
Facts of the case:
The Respondent’s mother, Karamjit Kaur, had filed an application in seeking transfer of the subject property in her name on the basis of possession which was allowed on 28.06.2002. In the year 2005, the Respondent filed a suit for declaration that the subject property was owned by him, which is still pending.
Later, in the year 2006, the Respondent filed an appeal against the order of the Tehsildar (Sales), claiming that such order was based on an incorrect finding that the application was filed only by his mother, while it had actually been made jointly.
On 29.08.2007, the SDM-cum-Sales Commissioner set aside the order of the Tehsildar (Sales) dated 28.06.2002, directing that the transfer of land be entered jointly in the names of the Respondent and his mother. In appeal, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Sales Commissioner restored the initial order dated 28.06.2002 passed by the Tehsildar (Sales) noting that the Respondent had submitted forged and fabricated documents in connivance with the Tehsil staff in the appeal before the SDM-cum-Sales Commissioner.
The FIR in question was registered against the Respondent. The trial commenced after the filing of the chargesheet. During the trial, a petition was filed by the Respondent seeking quashing of the proceedings, which has been allowed by the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
Matter is required to be referred to larger Bench.
Result: Matter referred to larger Bench.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether a preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are mandatory under Section 340, CrPC before filing a complaint under Section 195, CrPC. (Para 5 , 6 )
3. Conflicting views between coordinate benches on whether Section 340, CrPC mandates a preliminary inquiry and hearing before initiating prosecution for offences under Section 195, CrPC. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 )
4. The necessity of a preliminary inquiry and hearing under Section 340, CrPC is a contested legal issue requiring resolution by a larger bench. (Para 14 )
5. Matter referred to a larger bench to determine the mandate and scope of preliminary inquiry and hearing under Section 340, CrPC. (Para 15 )
6. Is a preliminary inquiry mandatory under Section 340, CrPC before filing a complaint under Section 195, CrPC?
There is a conflict of judicial opinion. One three-judge bench held that a preliminary inquiry is not peremptory and the court can form an opinion without it, while another three-judge bench held that such an inquiry is necessary. (Para 11 , 12 )
7. Is an opportunity of hearing mandatory for the accused before a court files a complaint under Section 340, CrPC?
Based on the ruling in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra, there is no statutory requirement to afford an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused during the preliminary inquiry stage. (Para 11 )
8. What is the purpose of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340, CrPC?
The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is not to determine whether a particular person is guilty, but only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence. (Para 11 )
9. How is expediency in the interest of justice judged under Section 340, CrPC?
Expediency is judged by the effect or impact the commission of the offence has upon the administration of justice, rather than the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by the forgery. (Para 13 )
JUDGMENT
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1. The judgment dated 22.01.2019 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 24691/2009 (O&M), which quashed FIR No. 74 dated 13.4.2008 registered against the Respondent herein for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), has been called into question in this appeal.
2. The First Information Report (“FIR”) against the Respondent was registered under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC on the allegation that he had forged and fabricated documents submitted in the course of legal proceedings before the Revenue Courts. The relevant facts for the purpose of the present appeal are as follows:
2.1 The Respondent’s mother, Karamjit Kaur, had filed an application in Tehsil Patti, District Tarn Taran seeking transfer of the subject property in her name on the basis of possession. Vide order dated 28.06.2002, the Tehsildar (Sales) allowed this application, directing conveyance in favour of Karamjit Kaur. Meanwhile, in the year 2005, the Respondent filed a suit for declaration that the subject property was owned by him, which is still pending.
2.2 Later, in the year 2006, the Respondent filed an appeal against the order of the Tehsildar (Sales), claiming that such order was based on an incorrect finding that the application was filed only by his mother, while it had actually been made jointly.
2.3 Furthermore, in parallel mutation proceedings, the Respondent got the subject land mutated in his favour along with his two cousins. In appeal, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate- cum-Collector, Patti declared the mutation as contested, and vide order dated 11.12.2006, mutation was sanctioned in favour of Tarjit Kaur, the elder sister-in-law of the Respondent. The appeal filed by the Respondent against such order was dismissed vide order dated 06.06.2007.
2.4 On 29.08.2007, the SDM-cum-Sales Commissioner, Patti set aside the order of the Tehsildar (Sales) dated 28.06.2002, directing that the transfer of land be entered jointly in the names of the Respondent and his mother. This was done on the basis of a report submitted by the Tehsildar, Patti stating that the initial application for transfer of land had been made jointly by these two persons. In appeal, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Sales Commissioner, Tarn Taran restored the initial order dated 28.06.2002 passed by the Tehsildar (Sales), noting that the Respondent had submitted forged and fabricated documents in connivance with the Tehsil staff in the appeal before the SDM-cum-Sales Commissioner. Thus, the order dated 29.08.2007 was set aside and a direction was issued to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Patti to immediately get an FIR registered against the Respondent.
2.5 In pursuance of the said order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Patti addressed a communication dated 11.04.2008 to the SHO, Police Station, Patti on the basis of which the FIR in question was registered against the Respondent. The trial commenced after the filing of the chargesheet. During the trial, a petition was filed by the Respondent under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) seeking quashing of the proceedings, which has been allowed vide the impugned order.
3. The High Court, while passing the impugned order, principally accepted the ground raised by the Respondent that the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Sales Commissioner hearing the appeal had neither held an inquiry, nor had he directed the subordinate authority to hold any such inquiry against the accused, in terms of Section 340 read with Section 195 of the CrPC. Thus, it was held that the FIR was hit by these provisions, since it had been filed without any inquiry and without giving any opportunity to the Respondent to be heard, and was therefore liable to be quashed.
4. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
5. Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned counsel appearing for the State has taken us through the material on record, and r
