SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.M.Khanwilkar, Hemant Gupta, Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.
RAJ PAL SINGH – APPELLANT
Vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, HARYANA, ROHTAK – RESPONDENT
Civil Appeal No. 2416 of 2010
Decided on : 25-08-2020
(A) Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 45 read with Sections 2(47), 16 and 17 – Chargeability of tax for capital gains arising out of award of compensation towards acquisition of land belonging to assessee-appellant – Such definition of ‘capital asset’ is of wide amplitude, taking in its fold property of any kind held by an assessee, except what has been expressively excluded therein, like stock-in-trade, consumables stores, personal effects, etc. – Capital gains of an assessee, arising from transfer of capital asset, are chargeable to tax as income of previous year in which transfer had taken place – When subject land has been compulsorily acquired, its transfer from assessee-appellant to Government is directly covered by Section 2(47) of Act of 1961 – Basic elements for chargeability of gains, arising from compulsory acquisition of subject land, to income-tax under head “capital gains”, do exist in present case – However, gains so arising would be deemed to be income of previous year in which transfer took place. (Paras 29.1, 29.3, 30 and 30.1)
(B) Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 45 read with Sections 16 and 17 – Chargeability of tax for capital gains arising out of award of compensation towards acquisition of land belonging to assessee-appellant – Subject land had been a capital asset of assessee-appellant – Accrual of capital gain depends upon completion of transfer of property from owner to Government and not upon accrual of right to receive compensation – Income-tax on capital gains is not levied on mere right to receive compensation – For chargeability of income-tax, income ought to have either arrived or accrued – In matter of acquisition of land under Act of 1894, taking over of possession before arrival of relevant stage for such taking over may give rise to a potential right in owner of property to make a claim for compensation but, looking to scheme of enactment, it cannot be said that transfer resulting in capital gains is complete with taking over of possession, even if such taking over had happened earlier than point of time of vesting contemplated in relevant provisions – In case of urgency acquisition, even if possession of land under acquisition is taken earlier, it should be related to process contemplated by Section 17 (1) of Act of 1894 and deemed to be effective from the date on which period prescribed by Section 17 (1) would expire that is, fifteen days from the publication of notice under Section 9(1) of Act of 1894 – In such cases, capital gains shall be deemed to have accrued upon making of award, in case of ordinary acquisition referable to Section 16; and after expiration of fifteen days from publication of notice mentioned in Section 9 (1), in case of urgency acquisition under Section 17 – Assessment of capital gains as income of appellant for previous year relevant to assessment year 1971-1972 does not suffer from any infirmity or error – AO had rightly assessed tax liability of appellant, on long-term capital gains arising on account of acquisition, on the basis of amount of compensation allowed in award as also enhanced amount of compensation accrued finally to appellant and as regards interest income, had rightly made protective assessment on accrual basis – Appeal dismissed. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 5] (Paras 34.1.3, 35, 35.1, 36, 39, 46 and 47)
(C) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Sections 4, 6, 16 and 17 – Emergent acquisition of land – In matter of compulsory acquisition of land under Act of 1894 for public purpose, property is to vest absolutely in Government thereby divesting owner of all his rights therein only after taking of possession in either of methods i.e., after making of award, as provided in Section 16; or earlier than making of award, as provided in Section 17 – Owner is divested of property and same vests in Government in absolute terms only if and after possession was taken by either of processes envisaged in Sections 16 and 17 – However, so long as possession was not taken, mere fact of issuance of notification under Section 4 of Act of 1894 or declaration under Section 6 thereof, do not divest owner of his right in respect of property in question. (Para 31.5)
Facts of the case:
Controversy in the present matter has its genesis in compulsory acquisition of the land of assessee-appellant under the Act of 1894. Present appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 23.04.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Income Tax Reference No. 53-A of 1991 whereby High Court, while answering the reference under the then existing Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 19612, disapproved the order dated 29.06.1990 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench for assessment year 1971-1972 and held that capital gains arising out of land acquisition compensation were chargeable to income-tax under Section 45 of Act of 1961 for the previous year referable to the date of award of compensation i.e., 29.09.1970 and not the date of notification for acquisition. Root question is as to whether, on the facts and in circumstances of the present case, the High Court was right in taking the date of award as the date of accrual of capital gains for the purpose of Section 45 of the Act of 1961?
Findings of Court:
Acquisition proceedings in the present case had not been of urgency acquisition but had been of ordinary process where possession could have been taken only under Section 16 after making of
the award. As noticed, the very structure of the ordinary process leading to possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 has been different than that of the urgency process under Section 17; and the said decision pertaining to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act of 1894 cannot be directly applied to the present case.
Result : Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
Preliminary And Brief Outline
1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 23.04.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh[ For short, 'the High Court'] in Income Tax Reference No. 53-A of 1991 whereby the High Court, while answering the reference under the then existing Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 19611[ For short, 'the Act of 1961' or 'the Act'], disapproved the order dated 29.06.1990 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench3<[ For short, ITAT] in ITA No. 739/Chandi/89 for the assessment year 1971-1972; and held that the capital gains arising out of land acquisition compensation were chargeable to income-tax under Section 45 of the Act of 1961 for the previous year referable to the date of award of compensation i.e., 29.09.1970 and not the date of notification for acquisition.
2. In the present case, the question concerning date of accrual of capital gains arose in the backdrop that though the proceedings for acquisition in question were taken up by way of notification dated 15.05.1968 and award of compensation was made on 29.09.1970 but, as a matter of fact, at the time of issuance of the initial notification for acquisition, the subject land was already in possession of the beneficiary under a lease, though the period of lease had expired on 31.08.1967. In the light of these facts, the ITAT did not approve of charging tax over capital gains with reference to the date of award while observing that the date of notification (i.e., 15.05.1968) would be treated as the date of taking over physical possession and the transaction (leading to capital gains) would be considered as having taken place on that date and not on the date of award (i.e., 29.09.1970). The High Court, however, did not agree with this line of reasoning and held that the amount of compensation was determined only on passing of the award dated 29.09.1970 and, therefore, if any capital gain was chargeable to tax, it would be chargeable for the previous year referable to the date of award.
3. Thus, the root question is as to whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the High Court was right in taking the date of award as the date of accrual of capital gains for the purpose of Section 45 of the Act of 1961 ?
4. Keeping the question aforesaid in view, we may briefly summarise the relevant factual and background aspects of this case while indicating at the outset that the matter relating to the assessment in question, before reaching the High Court in the reference proceedings, had undergone two rounds of proceedings up to the stage of appeal before ITAT.
THE ASSESSEE: THE SUBJECT LAND: AND THE ACQUISITION
5. The assessment in question is for the assessment year 1971-1972 in relation to the assessee Amrik Singh HUF4[Hindu Undivided Family]. The appellant Raj Pal Singh is son of late Shri Amrik Singh and is Karta of the assessee HUF. As noticed, the dispute essentially concerns the chargeability of tax for capital gains arising out of the award of compensation towards acquisition of land belonging to the assessee-appellant.
6. It is noticed from the material placed on record and the observations in the orders passed in this matter that the subject land, admeasuring 41 kanals and 14 marlas and comprising Khasra Nos. 361 to 369 and 372 to 375 at village Patti Jattan, Tehsil and District Ambala5[ For short, 'the subject land' or 'the land in question'], became an evacuee property after its original owner migrated to Pakistan; and the same was, as such, allotted to the said Shri Amrik Singh, who had migrated to India, in lieu of his property left in Pakistan. However, a substantial part of the subject land, except that comprising Khasra Nos. 361 and 364 admeasuring 5 kanals and 7 marlas, had been given by the original owner on a lease for 20 years to a Government College, being S.A. Jain College, Ambala City6[ For short, 'the College']; and the lease
Rama Bai v. Commissioner of Income-Tax
Joginder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.: AIR 1985 SC 382 – Distinguished [Para 22.2]
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay and Ors. v. Godrej and Boyce
Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust: AIR 1957 SC 344 – Relied [Para 31.4]
Buddaiah v. Commissioner of Income-Tax
Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma: (1971) 1 SCR 413 – Relied [Para 33.1.1]
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