SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY, M.R. SHAH, JJ.
Satish Chander Ahuja – Appellant
Versus
Sneha Ahuja – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 3483 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1048 of 2020)
Decided On : 15-10-2020
(A) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 17 – Objects and Reasons – Progress of any society depends on its ability to protect and promote rights of its women – Guaranteeing equal rights and privileges to women by Constitution of India had marked step towards transformation of status of women in this country – Domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or other or almost every day, however, it is least reported form of cruel behaviour – A woman resigns her fate to never ending cycle of enduring violence and discrimination as a daughter, a sister, a wife, a mother, a partner or a single woman in her lifetime – This non-retaliation by women coupled with absence of laws addressing women’s issues, ignorance of existing laws enacted for women and societal attitude makes women vulnerable – Reason why most cases of domestic violence are never reported is due to social stigma of society and attitude of women themselves, where women are expected to be subservient, not just to their male counterparts but also to male’s relatives – Enactment of Act, 2005 is a milestone for protection of women in this country – Act, 2005 is a further step to secure social justice by legislation. (Paras 29, 30, 32 and 39)
(B) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 – Right to residence in shared household – Definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is an exhaustive definition – Definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of aggrieved person has a share – Use of both expressions “means and includes” in Section 2(s) of Act, 2005 clearly indicate the legislative intent that definition is exhaustive and shall cover only those which fall within purview of definition and no other – It is not requirement of law that aggrieved person may either own premises jointly or singly or by tenanting it jointly or singly – Household may belong to a joint family of which respondent is a member irrespective of whether respondent or aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in shared household and shared household may either be owned or tenanted by respondent singly or jointly – Shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is shared household of aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from use or she is temporarily absent – Living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency – Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household – Intention of parties and nature of living including nature of household have to be looked into to find out as to whether parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not – Act 2005 was enacted to give a higher right in favour of woman – Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of Act, 2005 grants an entitlement in favour of woman of right of residence under shared household irrespective of her having any legal interest in same or not. (Paras 53, 54, 55, 62, 63 and 84)
(C) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XII Rule 6 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 12 – Judgment on admission – Being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary for Court to pass judgment on admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC – Court, on examination of facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to defendant by way of an appeal on merits – Unless admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, discretion of Court should not be exercised to deny valuable right of a defendant to contest claim – Discretion should be used only when there is a clear admission which can be acted upon – Admission should be categorical – It should be a conscious and deliberate act of party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it – Expression “may” in Order XII Rule 6 CPC suggests that it is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right – Where defendants raised objections which go to root of case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC – Power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right – In facts of present case, Trial Court ought not to have given judgment under Order XII Rule 6 on admission of defendant as contained in her application filed under Section 12 of D.V. Act – View of High Court that judgment and decree of Trial Court given under Order XII rule 6 is unsustainable, upheld. (Paras 87, 88 and 98)
(D) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 17 and 19 read with Sections 2(q) and 26 – Domestic violence – It is now permissible under definition of Section 2(q) to include females also – One of conditions to treat a person as a respondent is that against whom aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act – For the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 in suit in question plaintiff can be treated as respondent but for grant of any relief to defendant or for successful resisting suit of plaintiff necessary conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by defendant, only then relief can be granted by Civil Court to defendant. (Paras 100, 103 and 104)
(E) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 145/146 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 2(q) and 17(2) – Recovery/restoration of possession of property – A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds criminal court – An order passed by Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry – Order is entitled to respect and weight before competent court at interlocutory stage – At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on evidence adduced before court, order of Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence – Suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by owner of property is maintainable before a Competent Court – In appropriate case, competent court can decide claim in a properly instituted suit by owner as to whether women need to be excluded or evicted from shared household – In case, shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/ allotment/license is in name of husband, father-in-law or any other relative, Act, 2005 does not operate against landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of tenant/allottee/licensee qua shared household – However, in case proceedings are due to any collusion between two, woman who is living in shared household has right to resist proceedings on all grounds which tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in proceedings – Embargo under Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with procedure established by law operates only against respondent, i.e., one who is respondent within meaning of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005. (Paras 115, 116 and 117)
(F) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 11 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 19 and 28 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 40 to 44 – Res Judicata – There can be no applicability of principle of res judicata when orders of Criminal Courts are pitted against proceedings in Civil Court – With regard to criminal proceedings Code of Criminal Procedure also contains provision that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for same offence nor on same facts for any other offence – Principle enumerated in Section 300 Cr.P.C. may be relevant with respect to two criminal proceedings against same accused, which might have no relevance in reference to one criminal proceeding and one civil proceeding – Scheme of D.V. Act, 2005 does not contemplate that any judgment and order passed under Section 19 of said Act prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding of trial – Orders passed under Act, 2005 cannot be held to be orders or judgments passed in exercise of any matrimonial jurisdiction by Court – Act, 2005 is a special act on subject of providing for effective protection of rights of women who are victims of violence of any kind – In facts of present case, where there are pleadings in suit in question regarding proceeding under Section 12 existence of orders passed under Act, 2005 are relevant and admissible in Civil Proceedings – Proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005 are proceedings which are to be governed by Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (Paras 126, 128, 129 and 130)
(G) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 19 – Right to residence in shared household – Pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings which relate to subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005 – Judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant within meaning of Section 43 of Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by civil court – A civil court is to determine issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence which has been led by parties before civil court – In facts of present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and issues raised by appellant as well as by defendant claiming right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by parties in suit – High Court has rightly set aside decree of Trial Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. (Paras 157 and 159)
Facts of the case:
Instant appeal raises important questions of law pertaining to the interpretation and working of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Present appeal has been filed by plaintiff questioning the judgment of Delhi High Court dated 18.12.2019 in RFA No.381/2019 by which judgment Delhi High Court has set aside the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, decreeing suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction. High Court after setting aside the decree of the Trial Court has remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with the directions given by the High Court. Plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has come up in this appeal.
Findings of Court:
In event a judgment of criminal court is relevant as per Sections 40 to 43 of Evidence Act in civil proceedings, the judgment can very well be taken note of and there is no embargo on civil court to place reliance upon it as a corroborative material.
Result : Appeal dismissed.
Key Points: - The judgment resolves whether the definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is exhaustively confined to joint-family properties or where the husband has a share (and rejects the Batra interpretation) (!) (!) (!) . - It examines whether a civil suit for mandatory/permanent injunction under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be decreed based on admissions in DV Act proceedings, and affirms the discretionary nature of such judgments (Order XII Rule 6) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It discusses the interplay and primacy between DV Act reliefs (Sections 17, 19, 26, 26) and civil proceedings, including pendency of DV proceedings, impleadment of husbands/relatives, and the proper territorial/authority balance in granting right of residence vs. eviction/alternate accommodation (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It clarifies that Section 26 permits claiming DV-related relief in civil/criminal proceedings to avoid multiplicity, and that DV judgments are admissible as evidence but not binding in civil courts except under limited evidentiary relevance (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It holds that the "save in accordance with the procedure established by law" in Section 17(2) contemplates court-based eviction/exclusion procedures, and that civil courts can adjudicate on such relief while balancing rights (!) (!) (!) (!) .
JUDGMENT :
Ashok Bhushan, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal raises important questions of law pertaining to the interpretation and working of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 2005").
3. This appeal has been filed by Satish Chander Ahuja, the plaintiff questioning the judgment of Delhi High Court dated 18.12.2019 in RFA No.381/2019 by which judgment Delhi High Court has set aside the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff dated 08.04.2019under Order XII Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction. The High Court after setting aside the decree of the Trial Court has remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with the directions given by the High Court. The plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has come up in this appeal.
4. We may notice the brief facts of the case and relevant pleadings of the parties for determining the questions which have arisen for consideration in this appeal.
5. The appellant by deed dated 12.01.1983 purchased property bearing No.D-1077, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. The son of the appellant, Raveen Ahuja was married to the respondent, Sneha Ahuja on 04.03.1995. After marriage the respondent started living in the first floor of the house No.D-1077, Friends Colony, New Delhi along with her husband. There being marital discord between Raveen and Sneha, in July, 2014, Raveen moved out of the first floor and started staying in the guest room of the ground floor. In the year 2004 a separate kitchen was started by the respondent in the first floor of the house. Raveen, the husband of the respondent filed a Divorce Petition on 28.11.2014 under Section 13(1)(ia) and (iii) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty against the respondent, Sneha Ahuja which proceeding is said to be still pending. The respondent, Sneha Ahuja, on 20.11.2015, i.e., after filing of the Divorce Petition, filed an application under Section 12 of Act, 2005 impleading Raveen Ahuja as respondent No.1, Shri Satish Ahuja, respondent No.2 and Dr. Prem Kanta Ahuja (mother-in-law of the respondent), respondent No.3. In the complaint it was alleged that Sneha Ahuja has been subjected to severe emotional and mental abuse by the respondents. In the application respondent prayed for several orders under Act, 2005. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed passed an interim order on 26.11.2016 to the following effect:
"The respondents shall not alienate the alleged shared household nor would they dispossess the complainant or their children from the same without Orders of a Competent Court. These directions shall continue till next date."
6. The appellant filed a Suit No.792/2017 impleading the respondent as sole-defendant for mandatory and permanent injunction and also for recovery of damages/mesne profit. Plaintiff's case in the suit was that he is a senior citizen of 76 years old, the defendant is in occupation of two bed rooms with attached dressing and bath rooms and a kitchen on the first floor of the property bearing No. D-1077, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. Plaintiff pleaded that he is a heart patient and has undergone angioplasty twice and suffers from hypertension and high blood pressure. Plaintiff pleads that the defendant has filed false and frivolous cases against the plaintiff and his wife and hence he prays for removal of the defendant from the suit property so as he may live peaceful life. Plaintiff further pleaded that the plaintiff acquired the house from the previous owner, namely, Kulbhushan Jain on 12.01.1983. He also pleaded that the property has been converted into free hold vide conveyance deed executed in his favour dated 14.07.2003 which is registered. Plaintiff pleaded that his
S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra
Hiral P. Harsora and others Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and others
Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi
B.R. Mehta Vs. Atma Devi and Ors.
Kunapareddy Alias NookalaShanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr.
Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal Vs. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and Ors.
Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar
Hiral P. Harsora and Ors. Vs. Kusum narottamdas Harsora and Ors.
Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union
Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors.
The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. Vs. The State of Gujarat and Anr.
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation and Anr. Vs. Ashok Iron Works Private Limited
Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel Vs. Vatsalben Ashokbhai Patel and Ors.
Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira
Himani Alloys Limited Vs. Tata Steel Limited
S.M. Asif Vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj
Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi
Hiral P. Harsora and others Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and others
Shanti Kumar Panda Vs. Shakuntala Devi
Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others
M.S. Sheriff and Anr. Vs. State of Madras and Ors.
S.M. Jakati and Anr. Vs. S.M. Borkar and Ors.
K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police and Anr.
V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra (1995) 5 SCC 767 – Relied [Para 143]
Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr.
Seth Ramdayal Jat Vs. Laxmi Prasad
Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.