2016 Supreme(SC) 832

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Kurian Joseph, R.F. Nariman, JJ.
Hiral P. Harsora & Ors. – Appellants
Versus
Kusum Narottamdas Harsora & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 10084 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9132 of 2015)
Decided On : 06-10-2016

IMPORTANT POINTS
For ascertaining what exactly is the object sought to be achieved by an enactment, Statement of objects and reasons, the Preamble and the provisions of the Act as a whole have to be considered.
Perpetrators and abettors of domestic violence can be women themselves.
Domestic relationships includes male as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and female members of a family related by blood.
The restricted definition in section 2(q) needs a re-look.
Definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) is not based on any intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Over emphasis on classification may end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality.
The words “adult male” before the word “person” in Section 2(q) struck down.
The words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted.

Headnote:(a) Interpretation of statute – Objects of the enactment – Ascertaining what exactly is the object sought to be achieved by an enactment – Statement of objects and reasons, the preamble and the provisions of the Act as a whole have to be considered. (Para 10)

       (1990) 2 SCR 441; 1979 2 SCR 476; (1996) 1 SCC 1 – Relied upon

       (b) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Object – Statement of objects and Reason, and Preamble – Act aims to provide for effective protection of the rights of women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family – Perpetrators and abettors of such violence can be women themselves. (Para 16)

       (c) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(f) – Definition of “domestic relationship” is very wide – Domestic relationships involve persons belonging to both sexes and includes persons related by blood or marriage – Includes male as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and female members of a family related by blood. (Para 18)

       (d) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(s) r/w section 2(q) – Shared household – Would include a household which may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member – By amendment to section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 females have been made coparceners of a joint Hindu family – The anomaly is that respondent in section 2(q) continues to be ‘adult male member’ while Section 2(s) would include such female coparcener as a respondent, being a member of a joint family – Therefore the restricted definition in section 2(q) needs a re-look. (Para 18)

       (e) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(q) r/w section 3 and section 17(2) – Section 3 in tune with general object of the Act, seeks to outlaw domestic violence of any kind against a woman, and is gender neutral – Further, section 17(2) aggrieved person can be evicted by the respondent – If respondent, in terms of section 2(q), is to be read as ‘adult male person’ then a women can evict the aggrieved person with impunity – That is not the object of the Act – Similarly, a woman can violate protection orders u/s 18(b) with impunity – Again a residence order u/s 19(1)(c) will be toothless unless the female relatives of the respondent are also bound by it – Therefore definition in section 2(q) needs re-look. (Para 19, 20, 21)

       (f) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(q) – Under the act a proceeding can be brought against only the adult male respondent – However if the aggrieved person chooses to seek remedy in a civil or criminal proceeding, female members of the respondent’s family can also be roped in – Thus the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) is not based on any intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (Para 23)

       (g) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(q) – Expression ‘adult’ in the definition – A non-adult 16 or 17 years old can aid or abet the commission of acts of domestic violence, can evict or help in evicting or excluding from a shared household an aggrieved person, or violate residence order u/s 19(1)(c) – Therefore even the expression “adult” must also be struck down. (Para 24)

       (2011) 3 SCC 650; (2013) 15 SCC 755; (2014) 1 SCC 188 – Referred

       (h) Constitution of India – Article 14 – “Equality before law” is negative aspect of equality – No one can claim special privileges and that all classes are equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land – “Equal protection of the laws” is the positive aspect, postulating an equal protection of all alike in the same situation and under like circumstances – No discrimination can be made either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities imposed – In heterogeneous society reasonable classification, being necessary, is permitted – However, over emphasis on classification may end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality. (Para 30, 31)

       (1961) 1 SCR 14; (1963) 2 SCR 353 – Relied upon

       (i) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(q) – Classification of “adult male person” – Restricting the reach of a social beneficial statute – Subverts the doctrine of equality – The microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non adult, in the context of objects of the Act, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the Act – Therefore the words “adult male” before the word “person” in Section 2(q) struck down. (Para 31, 36)

       (1961) 1 SCR 14; (1963) 2 SCR 353; (1983) 1 SCC 305; (1986) 3 SCC 385; (2014) 8 SCC 682; (2015) 10 SCC 681 – Relied upon

       (1979) 2 SCR 476; (1978) 2 SCR 621 – Referred

       (j) Doctrine of severability – Striking down of words ‘adult male’ from definition of respondent in section 2(q), Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Will have no effect on implementation of rest of the Act – Proviso to section 2(q) carving out an exception in situation where respondent is not an adult male – After striking down of words ‘adult male’ from section 2(q), the Proviso will be rendered otiose and have no independent existence. (Para 40)

       1957 SCR 930; [1964] 5 S.C.R. 25; (1984) 1 SCC 222; (2008) 5 SCC 287 – Relied upon

       (k) Interpretation of statute – External Aid – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 2(q) in the original Bill presented in 2002 did not have the words ‘adult male’ – It defined “respondent” as meaning “any person who is…..” without the words “adult male” – After lapsing of Bill 2002, the present Bill was presented and passed in 2005 – Both the Bills had same objects – Similarly, in pari materia Act, Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, “respondent” is defined in Section 2(m) without the prefix “adult male”. (Para 42)

       (l) Interpretation of statute – Doctrine of ‘Reading down’ – It would apply only when general words used in a statute or regulation can be confined in a particular manner so as not to infringe a constitutional right – Otherwise it is not permissible – Similarly, ‘reading up’ is not permissible. (Para 45, 46)

       (2016) 7 SCC 703; (2001) 7 SCC 231 – Relied upon

       Facts of the case:

       On 3.4.2007, Kusum Narottam Harsora and her mother Pushpa Narottam Harsora filed a complaint under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against Pradeep, the brother/son, and his wife, and two sisters/daughters, alleging various acts of violence against them. The said complaint was withdrawn on 27.6.2007 with liberty to file a fresh complaint.

       Nothing happened for over three years till the same duo of mother and daughter filed two separate complaints against the same respondents in October, 2010.

       An application was moved before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for a discharge of respondent Nos. 2 to 4 stating that as the complaint was made under Section 2(a) read with Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, it can only be made against an adult male person and the three respondents not being adult male persons were, therefore, required to be discharged. The Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order dated 5.1.2012 in which such discharge was refused. In a writ petition filed against the said order, on 15.2.2012, the Bombay High Court, on a literal construction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three respondents from the complaint.

       The mother and daughter have now filed a writ petition, being writ petition No.300/2013, in which the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) has been challenged. Though the writ petition was amended, there was no prayer seeking any interference with the order dated 15.2.2012, which has attained finality.

       The Bombay High Court by the impugned judgment dated 25.9.2014 has held that Section 2(q) needs to be read down.

       Finding of the Court:

       The words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted.

       Result: Appeal disposed of