The Additional Superintendent of Police had the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, and mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless it resulted in prejudice to the delinquent officer.

JUDGMENT :

Sujata V. Manohar. - The respondent was working as a Police Constable in the Tamil Nadu Government. Three charge-memos were issued to him.

2. Charge-memo dated 21-6-1991 stated that he absented from duty for 17 hours on 31-3-1991 on his own accord without intimating his whereabouts in having failed to obtain sick passport from a nearby police station but reported for duty on 14-4-1991 with a controversial medical certificate and special report. Charge-memo dated 5-1-1992 stated that the respondent did not attend the parade on 12-2-1991 at the time of annual mobilisation and scolded the Duty Reserve Sub-Inspector indecently, picking up a quarrel in an arrack shop in a drunken mood demanding bribe etc. Charge-memo dated 23-7-1992 stated that he was in a drunken mood while on guard duty in Ward No. 25 on 2-7-1992 at 10.30 hours, behaved in an indecent manner and used vulgar language. He was also placed under suspension pending enquiry. The respondent filed three applications in OAs Nos. 1932, 1933 and 4081 of 1992 on the file of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Madras seeking to quash the charge-memos dated 21-6-1991 and 23-7-1992 respectively on the ground that the same had been issued by the Additional Superintendent of Police who was not the appointing authority to initiate the enquiry proceedings while charge-memo dated 5-1-1992 was attacked on the ground that there was an inordinate delay of more than one year in issuing the same and was not preceded by any preliminary enquiry prior to framing of the charge. On similar aforesaid allegations, minor penalties were imposed upon certain other persons and therefore the charge-memo issued against the respondent amounts to invidious discrimination. The Tribunal accepted the plea raised by the respondent and was of the view that the Additional Superintendent of Police has no authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the charge-memo dated 5-1-1992 was stale. The Tribunal also accepted the ground of discrimination and therefore, set aside the charge- memos as well as the order pertaining to suspension. Hence, this appeal by the State of Tamil Nadu by special leave.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the points raised in this appeal are fully covered by the decision of this Court in Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan, (1996) 2 SCC 145 inasmuch as this Court had interpreted the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and has taken the view that departmental enquiry could be initiated by different authorities such as appointing authority, disciplinary authority or even the controlling authority. He submitted that delay by itself will not be fatal to the enquiry unless the same has resulted in any prejudice to the official against whom enquiry is initiated. In this case, it is pointed out that no such plea of prejudice has been raised.

4. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. A.T.M. Sampath, appearing for the respondent, drew our attention to the decision of this Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General, (1993) 1 SCC 419 and contended that the view taken by the Tribunal is sound in law and need not be interfered with. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal is that the Additional Superintendent who initiated the enquiry against the respondent was not competent to conduct the enquiry under Rule 2-A of the relevant rules.

5. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. While interpreting Rule 2-A of the Rules applicable in this case, this Court in Thavasiappan case1 has held that provisions under Rule 2-A enabled the Governor or any other authority empowered by him to institute disciplinary proceedings but that provision would not derogate the power of the otherwise competent authorities like the appointing authority, disciplinary authority or controlling authority to initiate disciplinary enquiry. In the light of this clear enunciation of law, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case can