The right to travel abroad is valuable, but the precondition of securing prior permission is crucial and should not be deleted altogether without significant change of circumstances.

ORDER

1. Delay condoned. Permission to file SLP is granted. Leave granted. With the consent of counsel of the parties, the appeal was heard finally.

2. The respondent had approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court seeking modification of orders made previously, which had granted anticipatory bail to him. By the impugned order, the conditions governing his anticipatory bail were modified. In these circumstances, the father of the victim of the crime has approached this Court, claiming to be aggrieved by the modifications in the impugned order.

3. The facts necessary for the purpose of this order are brief; a First Information Report (FIR No. 250 dated 08.09.2017) was registered for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) read with Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, Section 75 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2005 and Section 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POSCO) at Police Station, Bhondsi. Investigation of the said case was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for brevity “CBI”). Consequently, the case was again registered on 29.09.2017. The respondent was released on interim bail on 07.10.2017, upon furnishing bail bond to the satisfaction of the investigation agency, subject to statutory terms and conditions.

4. The interim bail was subsequently made absolute on 21.11.2017. One of the conditions stipulated in the order of the final bail was that he would not leave India without prior permission of the Court. This order was appealed by a Special Leave Petition. That petition was dismissed on 11.12.2017. After the grant of interim bail, the respondent sought leave to travel abroad for about three weeks between 19.01.2018 and 09.02.2018. By an order dated 18.01.2018, permission was granted. The respondent approached the High Court thereafter, with an application for modification of order granting bail, in so far as the order imposed the restriction on his travel. That application was permitted to be withdrawn. Yet again, on another application CRMM No. 55170/ 2018 was filed. In this application, the respondent argued that the CBI had not gathered any incriminating material against him, and that the chargesheet was filed on 05.02.2018, did not contain any allegation regarding his involvement and role in that crime, and further investigation was kept open under Section 173(8) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”).

5. In this second application for modification, it was argued that the respondent frequently travelled abroad and the condition of having to secure prior permission was cumbersome and extremely inconvenient. The respondent, in support of his application placed reliance upon certain judgments, including a judgment of this court. The CBI opposed the application, emphasizing that the conditions imposed were not unreasonable, but in the larger interest of justice. It was also pointed out that the conditions were imposed by virtue of Section 437 of the CrPC.

6. The High Court by its impugned order, noticed the provisions of Sections 437 and 438 of the CrPC. It also took note of decisions which stressed upon the value of personal liberty and observed that the court has to exercise extreme care in imposing restrictions in regard to travel. The court was influenced by two decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Gujarat High Court respectively (K. Ramani v. State, 2014 (10) RCR(Cri) 1468 and Kenal Vrajmohan Shah v. Department of Revenue Intelligence, 2016 (341) ELT 37). The court noted in these two judgments that the requirement of obtaining permission prior to travel have been dispensed with. Taking due notice of the fact that the respondent was a frequent visitor and had in the past participated in certain conferences, seminars etc., it proceeded to modify the terms of anticipatory bail conditions imposed earlier.

7. The impugned order stated that the respondent was no longer under an obligation to seek permi