SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.
Irfan @ Naka – Appellant
Versus
The State of Uttar Pradesh – Respondents
Criminal Appeal Nos. 825-826 of 2022
Decided on : 23-08-2023
(A) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and man is induced by most powerful consideration to speak only truth – Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth – Since accused has no power of cross-examination, courts insist that dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of court in its truthfulness and correctness – Court, however, should always be on guard to see that statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. (Para 43)
(B) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Since time immemorial, despite a general consensus of presuming that dying declaration is true, they have not been stricto-sensu accepted, rather general course of action has been that Judge decides whether essentials of a dying declaration are met and if it can be admissible, once done, it is upon duty of court to see extent to which dying declaration is entitled to credit – There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration should be accepted – Duty of Court is to decide this question in facts and surrounding circumstances of case and be fully convinced of truthfulness of same – Dying declaration while carrying presumption of being true must be wholly reliable and inspire confidence – Where there is any suspicion over veracity of same or evidence on record shows that dying declaration is not true it will only be considered as a piece of evidence but cannot be basis for conviction alone. (Paras 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64)
(C) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 436 and 326-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 8 – Murder of three persons – Death penalty – Circumstantial evidence – Two dying declarations – Inflammable substance might have been poured on floor of room and thereafter, fire must have been ignited – Once, room is on fire person responsible for setting room on fire would immediately leave that place – Conduct of accused may be unnatural because he was residing in the very same house, however, conduct which may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of Evidence Act, 1872, by itself may not be sufficient to hold a person guilty of offence of murder – Two dying declarations are not consistent or rather contradictory to oral evidence on record – It is duty of prosecution to establish charge against accused beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must always go in favour of accused – It is unsafe to record conviction on the basis of a dying declaration alone in cases where suspicion is raised as regards correctness of dying declaration – Prosecution has not proved its case against appellant-convict beyond reasonable doubt – Appellant-convict acquitted of all charges levelled against him. (Paras 46, 47, 63, 64, 68 and 69)
Facts of the case:
Present appeals by special leave are at the instance of a convict-accused and is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.04.2018, passed by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Capital Case No. 4669 of 2017 connected with Reference No. 11 of 2017 by which, High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the convict-accused and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of death passed by Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 6, Bijnore for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 436 and 326-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Findings of Court:
Rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from the evidence, circumstantial or direct. Even applying this principle, we have a doubt as regards the complicity of the appellant-convict in crime.
Result : Appeals allowed. Appellant acquitted.
JUDGMENT
J. B. Pardiwala, J.
These appeals by special leave are at the instance of a convict-accused and is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.04.2018, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Capital Case No. 4669 of 2017 connected with Reference No. 11 of 2017 by which, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the convict-accused and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of death passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 6, Bijnore for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 436 and 326-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the IPC) respectively.
2. The convict was awarded death penalty with fine of Rs. 20,000/- by the trial court for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. For the offence punishable under Section 436 IPC, the convict was awarded life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and for the offence punishable under Section 326-A IPC, the appellant came to be sentenced for life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fines, further six months of rigorous imprisonment.
3. While the criminal reference was submitted by the trial court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the CrPC) for confirmation of capital punishment awarded to the appellant-convict, the appellant-convict preferred an appeal by way of Capital Case No. 4669 of 2017, putting in issue his conviction and sentence. The High Court dismissed the case filed by the appellant-convict thereby confirming the death reference under Section 366 of the CrPC.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
4. FAMILY CHART
5. The appellant-convict was married twice. The first marriage was with a lady by name Ishrat, who was the daughter of his uncle Mohammad Yunus (PW-1). His second marriage was solemnised with a lady named Afsana. One son by name Islamuddin (deceased) was born in wedlock with Ishrat. The convict had two brothers, namely, Irshad (deceased) and Naushad (deceased), who lived along with him and his sister Soni (PW-4). Another brother by name Shanu alias Shahnawaz (PW-2) of the convict lived in the neighbourhood.
6. It is the case of the prosecution that the three deceased persons more particularly Islamuddin (convicts son) was highly opposed to the second marriage of his father, i.e., the appellant-convict. Islamuddin (deceased) was even once beaten by the appellant-convict as he had offered lot of opposition to the second marriage of his father. Islamuddin was also threatened by the appellant-convict that he would be thrown out of the house. Deceased Naushad (appellant-convicts brother) was in Saudi Arabia. He had just returned to Bijnore from Saudi Arabia on 04.08.2014.
7. Few days before the date of the incident, the appellant-convict had beaten his son (deceased Islamuddin) and at that point of time, Naushad and Irshad (deceased persons) had intervened to save Islamuddin. On 05.08.2014, at around 05.30 pm, PW-2 Shanu (convicts brother) went to see deceased Naushad and had dinner with PW-4 (convicts sister), Islamuddin and Irshad. The PW-2 also invited the appellant-convict for dinner. The appellant-convict lived in the same house as PW-4 and Naushad, but on a different floor.
8. On 05.08.2014, at around 10.00 pm, after the dinner was over, PW-4 asked the PW-2 to stay overnight as it was too late. Naushad and Islamuddin slept in one room. As Irshad wanted to sleep on the roof, the appellant-convict advised him to sleep inside the room, as the weather was bad. Thus, all the three deceased persons ended up sleeping in one room.
9. PW-2 claims that the door of the room in which, the three deceased were sleeping, was open. However, according to the PW-4, it was locked from inside. The PW-2 lived at a distance of 200 metres from the place of the incident. It is pertinent to note that the High Court disbelieved the presence of the PW-2 at the
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