The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC and the interpretation of Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

JUDGMENT :

(Abhay S. Oka, J.)

1. Leave granted.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

2. The issue which arises for consideration in this appeal is what is the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’).

3. The property subject matter of this appeal held by the appellants was sold in execution of a decree passed against the appellants in a public auction. The respondent is the purchaser of the property. The order of confirmation of sale in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC was passed on 16th July 2009. The sale certificate under Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC was issued by the Executing Court to the respondent on 5th February 2010. On 27th July 2010, the respondent filed an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC before the Executing Court. The said application was allowed by the Executing Court. The appellants applied for a review of the said order. The prayer for review was dismissed by the Executing Court. The appellants challenged the orders of the Executing Court by filing a Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Judicature at Kerala. By the judgment dated 11th April 2017, which is impugned in this appeal, the High Court dismissed the revision application by holding that the starting point of limitation for making an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI was the date on which the sale certificate was issued by the Executing Court. The High Court relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of United Finance Corporation v. M.S.M. Haneefa (dead) thr. LRs., (2017) 3 SCC 123.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants invited our attention to Article 134 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Limitation Act’). He pointed out that Article 134 is specifically applicable to an application made under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC. It provides one year for filing such an application from the date the sale becomes absolute. He submitted that in this case, the sale was confirmed on 16th July 2009, and the application was moved by the respondent after more than one year i.e. on 27th July 2010. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan & Anr, (1996) 5 SCC 48. He submitted that this Court has clearly held that the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Rule 95 of Order XXI of CPC is the date on which the auction sale is made absolute in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC. He submitted that the High Court committed an error by relying upon the decision in the case of United Finance Corporation1. In the said case, a revision application against the order rejecting the application for setting aside the sale was filed before the High Court in which, further proceedings were stayed. While computing the limitation, the period of stay was excluded and that is how this Court held that the application made in the said case was within limitation.

5. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in support of the impugned order is that the application made by the respondent will be governed by residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which provides for a period of limitation of three years. He would, therefore, submit that in any case, the decision of this Court in the case of United Finance Corporation1 has been rightly applied by the High Court.

OUR VIEW

6. We have carefully considered the submissions. It is necessary to reproduce Rules 92, 94 and 95 of Order XXI of CPC, which read thus:

“92. Sale when to become absolute or be set aside.­

(1) Where no application is made under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.

Provided t